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1 LATIN AI^ ERICA : ECPNOniC ANALYSIS
1 . 1 INTRODUCTION
In order to have a better understanding in regard 
to what is coming at a later stage , I consider it 
essential to give a general picture of the main 
features comprised in the Latin American regional 
growth and development from the political economy 
judgement point of view , It is my willing to ex­
plain firstly , the actual and present status of 
macroeconomic variables included in such an econo­
mic analysis of Latin America as a whole region , 
and secondly to go more deeply into the Argentinean 
case within the frame of the maritime problematic 
but never by splitting it into different subjects , 
since shipping as a whole is strongly linked to 
macro and microeconomic variables , therefore , no 
shipping analysis could be seriously carried out 
by isolating it from the main leading concepts 
found in both the domestic economies and the inter­
national environment , wherein Argentina and the 
whole Latin American region keep certain common 
factors regarding econom.ic growth and development 
under what I would call certain standards of econo­
mic and political behavior ,
Before starting , I want to point out that in addi­
tion to the fact that Latin America presents countries 
with different productive structures and therefore not 
very homogeneous degrees of development , it has the 
very typical problems faced by a less developed area 
during the industrialization process through quite 
strict import substitution schemes • In other words f 
the difference among those countries is mainly given 
by the way the resource allocation is carried out and
Tby the degree of efficiency in the utilization and I
optimization of those resources , so long as on the
other hand they keep aporoxinately the same national
and even regional targets for reaching higher indexes
of productivity , wider and more efficient resources 1
distribution , better income allocation , better t
inter and intra-regional relationships , etc • t
I consider these brief concepts-of top importance |
in order to understand the methodology and extent j
of my analysis ; thus shipping variables will find
their different sources in the master variables of ;
the national economies .
I
1 . 2 ECOMOfviIC OUTLOOK
The arguments set out in this thesis , as far as de-
velooment planning is concerned , are applicable to <
developing countries , but more specifically to those |
located in Latin America . Therefore , I consider it I
necessary first of all to observe a series of restric- I
tive or limiting features: ft-- r^lost of the countries are on the way of getting i
consolidated as nations . This means that not only j
in physical and political terms but also in econo- '
mic and social terms , the national territories a.re t
still not totally integrated .
• —  Their social systems are still not well structured
not only on their organizational side but also re- \
t Igarding their cal^egories or divisions . In real J
I life , even the systems called formally "federals"I ■ II are in fact highly , if not totally , centralized *
k structures regarding the decision making process .
* -- Their economic systems are definitely less developed
and are crossing a period of transition toward in­
dustrialization , which in practical terms generates
1
I
■
different changes and therefore different patterns 
in the distribution of population and economic acti­
vity ,
—  Countries are relatively poor and therefore they 
lack of economic capacity so as to afford any sort 
of waste or overlapping with respect to governmen­
tal functions in its different levels .
—  Countries have experimented a urbanization process 
considerably faster than the processes related to 
their own economic developments •
—  Latin American countries are generally primary pro­
duct exporters , excluding certain segments of pro­
duction of a few regions , whereby they have to 
face problems of demand limitation as well as down­
ward movements in product unit price terms .
—  Latin American countries are tied to operative 
restrictions , informally set up into huge amounts 
of foreign debt .
-- Countries have individually different productive 
structures within the same domestic economy and a 
very low integration degree or relationship among 
those structures .
—  Very large shares of the public administration in 
the GDP of each country , thus generating huge 
figures in terms of fiscal deficits as a result 
of mismanagement or lack of cost consciousness , 
among other topics , on the part of the public 
officials .
The concepts above mentioned are , although not all , 
the main restrictions that are playing a decisive role 
against development in this region of the world •
Now f if we check the existing national planning schemes 
we can find the following similarities regarding natio­
nal targets :
1 ) to increase the GNP at a rate which allows the im- 
proupment of the income per capita . Such a goal 
has the top priority in most of the countries , 
(A==!GEh'TINA - BRASIL - CHILE - PA^ JAflA - VENEZUELA - 
- PARAGUAY ) .
Further objectives must be taken into account in 
the great majority of the cases , as restrictions :
2) to improve income distribution .
3) to reduce inflationary pressures .
4) to increase the economic autonomy , either by rais­
ing exports and decreasing imports or by balancing
the foreign debt , 'dithin this context , it is normal­
ly assumed that imports substitution and exports 
diversification have a major role to play in the 
achievement of this goal •
5) to increase the employment rate , Such a goal should 
rather be understood in the way of creating new va­
cancies instead of diminishing the firing rate •
5) to raise the standard of living so as to increase 
consumption together with its multiplier effect , 
in order to reach educational and health standards 
among many others,
7) national integration : elaborated and thought in 
terms of economic access of all the subsystems or 
regional markets to the master system or national 
market , as well as in terms of the participation 
of all available human resources in the develop­
ment process. .
Now , if we take these national targets and translate 
them in terms of regional objectives , it is possible 
to examine to what extent the regional policies could 
contribute to the creation of national policies and 
goals •
1 ) GLOBAL OBJECTIVE : to increase GNP
IM REGIONAL TERP1S : a) to oromote investments to­
wards areas where higher capital-product rates can 
be obtained , without overlooking the concept of 
economies of scale and cumulated capital in infra­
structure .
b) to incorporate new regional 
resources (human , natural , financial , etc) to the 
development process •
2) GLOBAL OBJECTIVE : to improve income distribution 
IN REGIONAL TERMS : a) to increase the income per 
capita in those areas of lesser relative development 
by means of assigning capital endowments and know-how 
from outside the area concerned , and to encourage 
the transference of population towards other areas .
3) GLOBAL OBJECTIVE : to reduce inflationary pressures 
IN REGIONAL TERMS : a) to increase the endowment di­
rectly productive of the total investment and to ca­
nalize such an investment towards areas wherein the 
existing infrastructure allows an additional expan­
sion of those sectors directly productive ,
4) GLOBAL OBJECTIVE : to increase the economic autonomy 
- REGIONAL TERMS : a) to assign importance , within
the framework of the regions involved , to the export 
industries through a better utilization of the regio­
nal resources . The multiplier effect arising out of 
such a process , should contribute to the reduction 
of regional imports within the context of their na­
tional comparative advantages •
5) GLOBAL OBJECTIVE : to increase the employment rate 
IN REGIONAL TERMS : a) to increase the geographical 
mobility of capital and manpower endowments accor­
ding to the potential resources allocation' ,
B) GLOBAL OBJECTIVE : national integration
IN REGIONAL TERMS t a) economic aspect : to promote
inter end intra-regional links by improving the 
access,between all the areas of nroduction and 
consumption ,
b) social aspect : to improve 
the access of all the inhabited areas to the capital 
of social infrastructure •
c) political aspect : descentra- 
lization of the administrative and political struc­
ture in order to integrate the regions to the deci­
sion making process by spreading out the existing 
powers •
And now , u'e can discuss how these global objectives for 
Latin America can be influenced by shipping activities 
and through the regional policies . Then , following 
the same order we have :
1) The countries involved in development processes show 
a great heterogeneity in this regard . Consequently 
that is the reason whereby the positive return of the 
investment depends to a great extent on the right 
allocation of the available investment funds . In case 
a country takes the decision to invest in shipping , 
we might say there are certain advantages , although 
some drawbacks as well , to consider before starting 
to think in terms of shipping investments , Let us 
now look upon only the advantages and deal with the 
disadvantages at a later stage .
t iThen we can state the typical favourable arguments 
about shipping , advocated by any international or­
ganization as well as by any succesful shipping 
nation :
A - IMPORT SUBSTITUTION 
B - FOREIGN EXCHANGE SAVING
C - EFFCTS ON FREIGHT COST AND TRADE 
D - EF.PLOYf'lENT
E - SHIPPING IN'JESTNENT AND'RELATED SECTORS 
F - SECURITY AN NON-ECONON.IC FACTORS
a ) Nowadays , Latin American countries are engaged , 
as a whole , in ,a very strong import substitution 
process with the purpose of accelerating domestic 
industrialization , of creating employment oppor­
tunities and specialization , of getting rid of 
economic dependency as much as possible from the 
industrialized centers , of saving foreign currency 
by limiting imports , of being capable of exporting 
manufactured products to get foreign currency ,
Such a nrocBss o'as and still continue being so 
strong , that the substitution coefficients of the 
main three countries (ARGENTINA - BRASIL - F.EXICO) 
were even lower than those obtained by USA during 
the crisis in the 30s , Import substitution is a 
quite useful economio mean , whenever it is known 
how to make good outcomes out of it ; but on the 
other hand , it could perfectly lead to shortage 
of capital goods and industry inputs within the 
scope of economic stagnation if it is not well 
understood and run , In such a case , investments 
in shipping for a country's foreign trade , provided 
such a country counts with specialized and skillful 
people , can initially be looked upon as the avoided 
import cost or freight payment , and th.e cost of 
imported goods and services and national resources 
used so as to provide the shipping service , taking 
into account shadow prices where appropiate .
B) The potential for avoiding substantial foreign 
exchange payments for maritime freights is often 
given by LDC's as one important reason for invest-
ments in ocean-going shipping ,
Although the total freight paid to national flag 
lines in a country's foreign trade is a gross 
foreign exchange saving , the net saving from the 
national point of view mill be significantly less 
depending on a number of factors , including :
(l ) the type of vessels involved and their age and 
cost structures under national anf foreign flag ;
(2) the extent to which the vessel is acquired from 
abroad and the financing arrangements ; (3) the 
extent to which the national resources are used in 
its operation (crew , management , repair facilities, 
etc ) ; (a) the operating efficiency and profitabi­
lity level ; (5) the impact on freight rates ; (6) 
the general conditions on the oarticular trade 
routes in Question ,
The relative savings might be greater if , apart 
from crew and management costs , a significant part 
of the repair costs , insurance and some other items 
could also be procured nationally • In this regard, 
Argentina together with Brasil , are in a better 
position than the rest of the Latin American coun­
tries . Therefore , there is no reason for believing 
that the infrastructure owned by these two countries 
could not help to achieve this goal , either natio­
nally or even regionally , However , foreign currency 
savings do not come up so easily , but with a good 
and experienced management and with the necessary 
knowledge to carry out actions connected with the 
real needs of the balance of payments . In addition 
to that , it should be noticed that in some other 
nations of this area , shipping management may 
initially have to be partly obtained abroad and 
would therefore , in part , involve a foreign ex­
change cost , While crew costs might largely be a
national currency cost, there could be partly 
offsetting foreign currency losses if the employ­
ment of notional crews of national flag vessels 
meant a transfer of such crews from foreign flag 
vessels to national flag vessels rather than the 
employment of previously unemployed people or 
persons locally employed in other national in­
dustries . Once again , both the Argentinean and 
Brazilian vessels have their own officers and crews 
whereby such a trabsference of human resources is 
not required . Therefore , this could be another 
argument in favour of shipping investment with 
the aim of saving foreign currency « In the case 
the national currency is overvalued , like the one 
in Argentina , the value of the net foreign currency 
savings would be understated if the official ex­
change is used without adjustment , which actually 
is not a big constraint if we bear in mind the 
fact that such a gap in the Argentinean case is 
only of 10% and belongs to a special economic pro­
gram with a finite extent . Then , we could state 
that , although significant gross foreign exchange 
earnings or savings may be obtained from invest­
ments in shipping , the net savings will be smaller, 
although still potentially interesting , This would, 
however , have to be considered on a case-by-case 
basis by the relevant candidates «
C) The chance of bringing down freight charges and to 
improve services is often cited as reasons for LDC's 
investing in merchant marines . Such a statement , 
might be true or not , strictly depending on two 
fundamental issues so far not very well understood 
in this region of the earth :
-- mANAGEflENT CRITERION
-- FREEDOIV! OF UPJDERTAKING
These concepts are supposed to be apolicable to the
same extent to both , the public and private sectors, 
subjects to which I will refer later on during the 
strategic planning stage . But anyway , I consider 
it necessary to mention the mein guidelines whereby 
trades and their costs could be directly affected 
and therefore probable generators of indirect posi­
tive effects on both the domestic economy and the 
foreign sector , and always bearing in mind their 
results on the balance of payments .
Firstly , an important cost is labor , covering 
both crew and management , This would be particularly 
significant and generally favourable for the LDC's 
in liner shipping and could become increasingly im­
portant in bulk shipping if open registry shipping 
were curtailed through international agreements,It 
should , however , be noted that in the case of some 
LDC's , the potential advantages in terms of lower 
units wage rates may be partly offset by larger crew 
sizes •
Notwithstanding , the River Plate market is presently 
dominated by those ships enjoying lower crew costs 
like container ships and others built under high-tech 
standards , which brings about comparative advantages 
in real terms .
Secondly we have the ghost of the economies of scale. 
According to the universally accepted theory , we have 
the economies of scale associated with vessel size , 
and economies associated with number of vessels opera­
ted by a single company , In principle , there are 
considerable economies of scale in bulk shipping from 
increased vessel sizes , particularly in the long-dis— ' 
tance and large volume trades ; however , the extent 
to which increasing vessel sizes can be economically 
used in particular trades , depends , apart from 
vessels costs , on the trade volumes involved and
the caoacity of the existing port and storage facil­
ities or the cost of new facilities . These factors 
are even more important for liner vessels . For both 
liner and bulk vessels there may be a trade-off 
between decreasing ship operating costs per ton-mile 
from fully used larger vessels and increasing port,' 
and storage costs . It is , however , likely that 
increasing^bunker orices and the reduced bunker 
costs per ton of cargo for larger vessels may gra­
dually result in increased vess'el sizes , particu­
larly in the average size of bulk vessels . In liner 
trades , this could also increase the use of larger 
container vessels for main,line port trades y sup­
plemented by feeder services as in the case of US 
LINES , EVERGREEN and others . But in fact , in most 
of the Latin __American traffic systems , two barriers 
seem to come up before the argument of economies of 
scale ;
--  no port is efficiently outfitted , neither from
the safety nor from the operations o^int of view, 
as to receive vessels aimed at achieving economies 
of scale •
--  no volume of trade is available as to reasonably
serve those vessels , unless the existing traffic 
structures were eliminated by law , which frankly 
speaking is not very likely to occur •
Furthermore , there are many examples of succesful ship­
ping undertakings carried out by  ^certain number of 
small companies operating in the range of one to four 
ships and in those markets where economies of scale are 
perfectly feasible for those interested owners . This 
could be the case of several shipping lines operating in 
the Scandinavean markets as well as in the North Atlantic, 
Therefore , I do not foresee any reasons for believing 
that operations carried out with a reasonable dosis of
managerial common sense under market freedom terms , 
and without taking the scale concept , would not 
lead to a more competitiue liner market together with 
all the direct and indirect effects on the domestic 
and foreign sector of the country's economy , 
Specifically speaking , I think that the Riuer Plate 
market and its .deep hinterland , would largely benefit 
from any positive effect caused on its trade provided 
that both the foreign trade and the shipping field 
do not get divorced before getting married .
D) Although investments by LDC's in shipping may increase 
the employment opportunities both on board and on 
shore , they generally cannot be justified solely 
in terms of employment created ; shipping is , 
despite large variations , a relatively capital 
intensive industry in terms of capital cost per job.
But the conoept of employment oreation must not be 
looked upon in domestic terms only , but also in 
foreign market terms .
Shioping requires certain skills which , although 
available in some LDC's , are unlikely to be readily 
available in many others without considerable expen­
ditures on training and , in the ease of offioers , 
considerable time as well ,
According to an IMO estimate , the cost of training 
a radio cadet is some 7/80D0 us dollars and that of 
a navigator or engineering officer 11/l3000 us dollars. 
These are very good reasons for thinking in terms of 
the international market for employing nationals in 
foreign flag vessels , and specially in those of LDC's 
by means of bilateral or regional agreements as far 
as the supply of officers is concerned , Argentina y 
once again , seems to have all the suitable conditions 
for fulfilling the requirements of marine personnel 
set out by those LDC's suffering from shortage on a 
regional basis .
Let us tako the example of South Korea , whose sea­
farers have increasingly been employed by foreign 
flags in recent years , which nocmially represents 
an income of 120 million us dollars per year ,
Another example is giv/en by the Philippines , where 
foreign exchange earnings from seamen employed in 
foreign vessels presently means 160 million us dollars 
per annum , Of course , it would be dangerous to think 
in professionalizing this career in such a way that 
hundreds of people should get their diplomas every 
year without chances of signing on national flag 
vessels and with the only viable way out of leaving 
far sway in order to find jobs • But if we take the 
Latin American market , we can identify a certain 
market that in itself lacks of seamen and comes re­
presented by most of these nations • Therefore , such 
a shortage could be matched with the assistance of 
Argentinean seamen under any sort of regional agree­
ment a'nd thus representing more people employed and 
a better resources allocation in manpower terms , 
I'.’hich could always be absorbed once again by the na­
tional fleet ) provided there is a demand reactivation 
in any liner trade segment ,
E) Investment in shipping may , in appropiate cases , 
create further employment and output in related sec­
tors • The extent of these economic likages will de­
pend largely on how far shipping is planned as an in­
tegral part of the economy and can draw on f and pro­
vide service for , other sectors of the economy , The 
main economic linkages between shipping and other sec­
tors of the economy , apart from employment of crew 
and onshore personnel , could be shiprepair*and ship­
building and their supply industries as well as many 
other support industries such as insurance | comunica— 
tions , financing , etc , Within this context , it is
known that Arnantina has kept and developed during rrany 
years an acceptable naval industry and repair yards 
from a technical paint of view , although many times 
overpuoted as regards to newbuilding prices . Therefore 
I wonder why , if this country has got the key installa 
tions to produce and expand employment either directly 
or indirectly , has not taken the necessary steps for 
doing so • Obviously , the answer leads by itself to 
the governmental shipping policy which was never aware 
of such matters and consequently , neither of maritime 
planning • I should add that all these secondary activi 
ties tend to be more labor-intensive than modern ship­
ping , Ideally , therefore , the existence or possible 
development of such related Industries should be evalu­
ated in connection with any consideration of major 
investments in shipoing , taking into account the eco­
nomies of scale which might be involved ,
A clear , although possibly unique , example of this 
approach appears to have been Korea • In S, Korea , 
shipping forms an integral part of the national eco­
nomy and planning since the country's export-led 
development pattern depends both on the imports of 
large volumes of raw materials for the steel industry, 
particularly shipbuilding , and on the export of manu­
factured products to many different markets . Shipping, 
particularly bulk shipping , provides the transport 
for these essential imports and is , itself , a cus­
tomer of the shipbuilding industry • As exports have 
increased , investments have been made in liner 
vessels to meet part of the transport requirements • 
Korean shipping , by focusing initially on bulk ship­
ping , has been different from that of most LDC's , 
which have focused , at least initially , on liner 
shipping ,
A second example where the development of shioping
seems to have been expanded as an integral part of 
the country's economy is Brazil • It has developed 
a liner fleet to serve its foreign trade in liner 
goods , partly through cargo reservation measures 
as well as with economic growth and development 
acting as driving axis for tonnage expansion purp­
oses •
F) The availability of shipping services to meet part 
of a country's foreign trade needs in case of war 
or other emergencies , has been in consideration in 
connection with the development of many national mer­
chant marines . At periods of high worldwide demand 
for shipping services and high freight rates (not 
necessarily related to wars) LDC's with small trade 
volumes might find the availability of shipping ser­
vices greatly reduced , This might be particularly so 
for essential imports when vessels are transferred 
to large volume trade routes and chartered vessels 
might only be available et higher rates , if at all . 
The question of security of service , for instance , 
seems to have been a major consideration , once again, 
in the development of Korean shipping , given the 
country's geographical position , its dependence on 
imports of large volumes of raw materials for its 
industry , as well as the growing importance of ex­
ports to many different countries • While defense 
considerations fall outside the normal economic eva­
luation , they have been very convincing arguments 
to carry out fleet expansions of not few merchant 
marines (USA - ISRAEL - KOREA - BRAZIL) .
Other non-economic considerations could include , 
according to some theorists , the concept of national 
prestige or identity , which in my opinion could be 
totally overlooked for representing old fashion 
arguments orobably used a couple of centuries ago ,
snd far being ignorant of the present econorric end
social reality of the internetional society ,
?) In this case , human resources which are going to 
be used together with other production factors are 
not going to be transfered , strictly from one area 
to another as the theory sets out , but they will be 
absorbed by a region which before was not considered 
as an area ; i.e, the sea and its related factors . 
Therefore , whenev/er we do not look upon the sea as 
an integral area of the country to be regionalized 
and developed , employing people by investing in 
liner shipping as a wey of increasing the income oer 
capita and fostering the transference of human re­
sources from one area to another , is by no means, 
justifiable . But if we assume that the sea is other 
area that needs to be developed within an integral 
regional development program , ue can saV that invest­
ments in liner shipping together with a strategic 
planning of shipbuilding and a ship repairing industry, 
it could be a valuable source of employment and special­
ization with all the economic components therein 
soecified . Employment in shipping , even if of limited 
importance , may have , however , somewhat greater 
regional importance as the seamen may come from 
coastal areas with few employment alternatives . 
Employment in the national shipping administration or 
directly related service industries increases the total 
employment opportunities • International shipping is 
generally considered a relatively capital intensive 
industry although the capital invested per employee 
differs markedly for different types of shipping , and 
also on whether new or second hand vessels are used .
The capital invested per employee is also affected by 
vessels crewing patterns , national labor policies ,
ronshore-onboard ratio , among others •
Onshore employment for instance , is normally signi­
ficantly higher for liners than for bulk services , 
and specially in LDCs . To give an example , the in­
vestment per employee in shipping in the UK increased 
between 197D and 1980 by 89^ at constant 1975 prices ; 
the investment per employee in shipoing in 1975 was 
slightly less than in electricity , gas and water but 
substantially higher than in other major industries , 
Another example could be the net (unrevalued) fixed 
assets per employee of the Shipping Corporation of 
India , which was about 58.000 us dollars in 1978 as 
compared with an average of 5,000 us dollars per 
employee for 22 other major Government of India 
undertakings in the same year . While on the other 
side we can see that the real capital per employee 
in ocean-going shipping in Norway was 150,000 us 
dollars in 197A , and therefore largely superior to 
the 70,000 us dollars per employee used for five major 
industrial concerns • From, this , we can notice that 
in the Norwegian case , even when capital/labor ratios 
have been obtained four years before , they ere much 
higher than those belonging to India , which obviously 
means that such a ratio may differ according to the 
technological needs of the traffic concerned as well 
as the degree of specialization desired by the owner , 
In the case of South America , I would say there is 
no need for investing huge amounts of money to acquire 
high-tech vessels , even when markets of developed 
countries are involved , but to operate what they own 
with structural shifts regarding managerial procedures 
and manpower allocation ,
3) Normally , the large investments in infrastructure 
represent important sources of inflationary pressure 
in LDCs ) since those undertakings are generally in
the hands of the governments who usually run out of 
liquid resources , thus incurring large fiscal defi­
cits with endless inflationary effects f unless they 
count on foreign capital resources for offsetting 
their internal negative balances by increasing foreign 
debt amounts , which in other words means purchasing 
hard currency without chances of letting such capital 
get self-amortized • But if we consider a port and its 
equipment such as a railway , a container terminal and 
others y as basic infrastructure to serve not only li­
ner shipping but also bulk activities , tramp and 
many other segments which could eventually come up 
later , the likelihood of self-amortizing such a 
capital input in the long run , increases significan­
tly even when inflation is still present therein .
Mery basically we could say thaf^the better the harbour 
is outfitted and run , the more exports and imports 
will take place and therefore more ships will come 
with the consequent advantages for the balance of pay- 
mants .
Besides the fact the better the traffic as a whole is 
managed , the more are the chances to reduce inflatio­
nary sources arising out of the national resources in 
terms of currency . In connection to this issue , ship­
ping could have an outstanding role to play if govern­
ments should allow it  ^ and provided that fiscal deficits 
are not going to be entirely financed by taxing and by 
getting foreign loans but by improving efficiency and 
effectiveness as regards infrastructure creation without 
inflationary effects . 
a ) Economic independency does not come only with shipping, 
but what we can say in this context is that shipping , 
certainly is an important link in the orocess of diminish­
ing dependency from the international economic centers 
by means of the utilization of national units . 
Nevertheless , it can be said that the two fundamental
pillars as to reduce economic deoendency , are gi­
ven by the following oolicies :
-- IFIPORTS SUBSTITUTION : it has the aim of producing
locally what before uas imported from abroad , with 
the consecuent expected advantages in the domestic 
economy regarding employment and industrialization 
at different levels , as long as on the foreign 
sector such advantages are given by foreign cu­
rrency savings and by what I consider very relevant^ 
lesser economic dependency which can also be looketi 
upon in terms of strategic value , This system 
has its advantages and drawbacks , to which I am 
not going to refer right now since it deserves a 
separate analysis related to liner shipping ,
--  PLANNED EXPORTS : it means that all foreign loans
obtained by one country , are supposed to be alloc­
ated , in very broad terms , to the existing local 
activities or starting local industries wherein 
such a current of money may reactivate the industry 
concerned , in such a way that its products will 
be exported leading to the generation of sufficient 
foreign currency as to refund the whole fund and 
generate profits as well in the medium , although 
preferably short run . Of course , I should point 
out that such a foreign currency drain might well 
be allocated among infant industries , which unless 
they are quite technologically advanced , could 
achieve the same goals other than the already 
existing or just starting ones .
Then the Question is , how liner shipping and to 
what extent could help in achieving those targets? 
Evidently , liner shipping could be of great help when­
ever maritime policy-makers keep close links with the 
national economic planners with respect to the foreign 
sector of the economy , This is to say that national
liner shipping could follow and support ,either 
profitably or interms of expected earnings , the 
markets wherein national products are being gradually 
introduced ; it could positively influence the export 
operation by increasing frequency together with fiscal 
or freight reimbursements for using national flag 
vessels , or by avoiding a general rate increase 
assuming a strong position in a conference through 
its share , or by fostering the participation of nat­
ional outsiders and by discouraging foreign outsiders 
to operate therein , by getting those inbound goods 
on national flag vessels but exclusively those that 
are going to be used in some manufacturing processes 
capable of generating cash in hard currency terms , 
and which has still not been fit into a substitution 
process . Like these examples , we can find a long 
list , but it is up to the governments to lay down 
the regulations in order to have a shipping policy 
coincident with the main aims of the foreign sector 
of the national economy , u'hich usually works out 
many models and trends but without getting any positive 
balance in real terms owing to the existing lack of 
understanding and coordination between the different 
governmental spheres -»
5)B) Regarding these points I have already stated the 
miain guidelines included in the previous items •
However , I would like to highlight the fact that in 
Latin American countries , larger mobility of man­
power is of top importance owing to the capital 
scarcity and to the traditional migratory trend of 
the countries comprised in such an area . Shipping 
could make its own contribution for the transference 
and mobility of human resources as well as capital 
endowments • But for doing so , countries involved 
in this area should first of all think of integrat­
ing themselves internally and afterwards , at a
later stage , of becoming a production and trade unit 
in regional terms , I'.'hich could eventually be carried 
out only in the shipping field , but certainly uith 
not so promising results as if it mere done in actual 
regional terms bearing in mind both concepts , the 
social and economic environments in all their stages 
of development and interaction •
1 , 3 -  ECONOfllC AND FINANCIAL COflPARATIUE ANALYSIS 
LATIN AMERICA - EAST ASIA
In order to have a better understanding of the relation­
ship between shipping policy matters and economic growth 
and development strategies , I consider it extremely 
useful to go into further detail in a brief but quite 
demonstrative comparative analysis between two areas 
perfectly differenciated from each other , regarding 
their productive structures and management styles , but 
with quite a big potentiality in common , which is 
represented by natural and non-natural resources . These 
two areas are represented by East Asia and Latin America 
and this comparative study could be looked upon as a 
tale of Asian winners and Latin losers • Then , anyone 
might wonder why did Latin America fare so much worse 
in the early 1980s than East Asia ? In this context , 
there is a recent study by a special team from Harvard 
University , which refute some popular answers , and 
offers a not-so-obvious one instead ,
Some Latin American economies grew fast enough in the 
1970s to rival Asia's best . But between 1981 and 198A , 
the six Latin American countries considered in this stu­
dy saw their economies shrink , on average , Meanwhile , 
the four East Asian countries grew almost as quickly as 
in the 1970s , at an average rate of 5,8 % a year , Then, 
why the difference ? We can look at several plausible-
-seeming reasons as to exolain such a situation , but 
ue can better focus our attention to those areas which 
are qualified as suspicious of being grounds :
fl) EXTERNAL ECDt'OfllC SHOCKS : many economists maintain 
that swings in interest rates and commodity prices 
hit Latin America with greater force than East Asia, 
Column 1 on the next page summarises the economic 
impact of both kinds of shock - changing prices and 
changing interest rates . Let us take Brazil , main­
ly because of the rise in the price of oil . Its 
import orices rose much faster than its export prices 
after 1979 , So in 1979—83 , its terms of trade were 
on average 29 % lower than in 1975-78 , Translated 
into loss of income , the annual cost was 2,3^ of 
GDP a year , Altogether then , external shocks cut 
Brazil's potential annual income by 5^ of GDP after 
1979 . Evidently , all this can be translated in 
terms of lower traffic volumes to be carried by nat­
ional flag ships and a sort of impasse for carrying 
out any kind of investment in this field ,
Obviously , the greater the economic stagnation of 
a country or region is , the more difficult it is 
to realize and to be aware of the multiplier effect 
of shipping and its incidence on a market economy 
structure .
The rest of column 1 , though , shows that these 
shocks can not account for Latin America's poorer 
economic performance • True  ^ the Asian countries 
made , on average , a small gain (l,l/C of GDP) , 
while Latin America came out roughly even (a loss 
of Qfl% of GDP) • But averages can mislead , The 
shocks left l/enezuela , an oil exporter , well on 
top ; its GDP still declined by 2,2^ a year in 
1981-1984 • South Korea meanwhile suffered a relat-
and Thailandiue loss of 3,8^ of GDP from the shock , 
of 3,3% , yet both still grew rapidly •
Now , if we compare economic development with the ship­
ping evolution of these three countries , we could easily 
realize that lack of awareness is not of exclusive Latin 
American property , represented by Venezuela in this case, 
but also of an apparent economically successful country 
like Thailand . The outstanding one is South Korea , which 
seems to gather everything the others do not ; i.e, eco­
nomic development and growth together with shipping 
conciousness that comes represented through investm.ents 
in shipbuilding and in maritime trade among other things . 
From this statement , it would seem to leave clear that 
no shipping policy can be successfully carried out in the 
practical field by shuting out the behavior of the eco­
nomic variables of the domestic economy in all its branches, 
or by giving up any investment project in the maritime 
field , specially those related to the liner buisness 
during periods of reactivation and economic expansion •
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COLUTN 1 
(+) external economic 
shocks
0) S,Korea - 3,8
(2) Malaysia 4,8
(3) Thailand - 3,3
(4) Indonesia 6,2
(1) Brasil - 5,0
(2) Argentina 1,6
(3) nexico 1,2
(4) Venezuela 16,2
(4) Peru - 4,2
(4) Chile - 6,2
yEIGHTED AVERAGES
EAST ASIA 
L. APIERICA
1,1 
-  0,1
7,8 5,8
5,6 - 0,A
(+) average annual change in income as a percentage of
GDP comparing 1976-78 with 1979-83 *
B) DEBT : column 1 already takes into account part of
the harm from over-borrouiing caused by higher interest 
charges . Some say that bigger debts can also be a 
drag on grouth in their own right . Column 2 , belou, 
confirms that by 1981 the Latin Americans had a 
higher average ratio of debt to GDP . Yet the difference 
(31,3!^  compared with 25,91^ ) does not seem big enough 
to explain the growth-rate gap between the two regions. 
During the 1970s all of the Asian countries had run 
up debt-GDP ratios that were about as high as Brazil's,
COLUMN 2 Debt/GDP ratio 1981
S, Korea 27,6
Malaysia 27,8
Thailand 25,7
Indonesia 24,1
Brazil 26,1
Argentina 31,6
Mexico 30,9
Venezuela 42,1
Peru 44,7
Chile 47,6
EAST ASIA 25,9
LATIN AMERICA 31 ,3
So , even u.'hen there is greater constraint in such a 
ratio for Latin Amarica , it is not so big as to 
justify such an imbalanced economic growth and so 
heterogeneous shipping policies between both regions , 
and sometimes among the member nations in the same 
region ,
C) TAXES : it is commonly accepted that when govern­
ments overtax , not only in liner shipping but also 
in most activities , growth can suffer ; that much 
is uncontroversial • The figures in column 3 , how­
ever , suggest than in 1982 Latin American countries 
were no more highly taxed than their East Asian 
counterparts .Latin America's average share of taxes 
in GDP was 22,2% , compared’with 2D,5% in East Asia, 
Argentina , Brazil , Mexico end Peru all had lower 
tax shares than Malaysia .
CPLUMN 3 Taxes as %> of GDP (l 982)
S, Korea 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
Indonesia
19.1
29.2 
1 3,9
2 2 . 2
Brazil
Argentina
Mexico
Venezuela
Peru
Chile
26,1 
1 6,5
17.0 
29,3 
16,8
32.0
EAST ASIA 
LATIN AMERICA 22,2
20,6
Obviously , high taxes can brake and conseguently 
delay , if-not refute , economic development . But 
the key concept in this context , is not hou much a 
country is going to get from taxes or how many dif­
ferent kinds and shapes of taxes a country could 
applicate , but the, way they are allocated .
In the specific case of liner traffic , taxes could 
be higher for foreign flag ships which use a certain 
kind of technology which obliges national ports to 
invest in equipment and infrastructure to serve them.
Taxes could very according to the number of containers 
utilized on each voyage , or might be sased on the 
freight paid , or in other words on the value of the 
commodities , ^^ tc , Evidently , national vessels 
would benefit in the short and medium run because of 
the existing structure of the market , which is normal­
ly more favourable for foreign flags than for national 
ones . Of course , many people would start speaking 
about subsidies and so on , although I believe in such 
a case it would be more a commercial tool than what 
many academics call indirect subsidy . Anyway , taxes 
are supposed to keep a certain relationship with the 
market orospects and the needs of liner buisness evol­
ution ,
D) GO'JERMriENT SP EM PI MG : the four column shows the share 
of government spending in GDP in 1982 . Again the average 
is higher for Latin America than for East Asia , but not 
much . Government spending in Malaysia was higher than 
in any of the Latin American countries . In Peru , was 
lower than in any of the East Asian nations . Bits and 
pieces of other evidence also suggest that Latin America's, 
governments are no more economically intrusive than Asia's, 
and perhaps less so ,
Ue can consider the following figures for public invest-
ment as a oroportion of total investrent in order to 
have a better idea of this item : 25°? in South Korea 
in 197A-77 , 32^ in Taiwan in 1 978-80 , 1 3^ in Chile 
in 1 978-80 , 1 5^ in Peru ini 978-79 .
Excluding Brazil , from the Latin American group , and 
South Korea from the East Asian group , all public 
investments ere normally made up of any kind of projects 
in many fields except transport , or more specifically 
we might say excluding shipping ,
CObUriN A Government spending in GDP 1 982 (%)
S, Korea 19,5
Maalaysia A1 ,0
Thailand 19,9
Indonesia 23,5
Brazil . 21,8
Argentina 21,B
I'lost of these countries , due to the fact "that they 
have never had a clearly identified shipping policy , 
believe that by making a feu investments for port 
maintenance and acquisition of harbour outfittings 
they reach an implied target , which is generally 
comprised in the development program of other field , 
like public works , communications and so forth , and
Mexico
V/enezuela
Peru
Chile
31 ,7
29.6 
18,0
37.6
EAST ASIA 
LATIN AMERICA
23.7
25.8
consequently without bearing in mind the concept of 
specialization by breaking doun the main pillarsinto 
many independent undertakings f which do not even keep 
certain links between them ,
E) exports as % OF GDP : columns 5 and B show the 
largest difference between the two regions • In Latin 
American countries  ^ the share of exports in GDP 
increased from 11^ in 1965 to 15^ in 1983 ; in East 
Asia , the increase was from 1Z% to 32^ • In relation 
to total output , Latin America had not borrowed much 
more than Asia , and higher interest rate cost both 
regions roughly the same , but when the crunch came , 
Latin America had far less foreign exchenge to use for 
repayment ,
exports as % of GDP
CDLUnN.............. ......... 5 B
S, Korea 9 37
Malaysia 4 A 54
Thailand 18 22
Indonesia 5 25
Brazil 8 8
Argentina 8 1 3
flexico 9 20
Venezuela 31 26
Peru 1 B 21
Chile 14 24
EAST ASIA 1 3 32
LATIN AMERICA 11 15
Such a scarcity of foreign exchange is represented by
the non-existence of undertakings regarding the develop­
ment of the foreign sector of the national or regional 
economies , or in other words the lack of undertakings 
from the domestic economies towards the international 
markets in all their branches : international trade , 
international capital market , international transport 
and so on ,
Without the output of foreign currency , not only a 
single country but also a whole region , like South 
America , is obliged to face serious problems in the 
long runand to suffer wider economic cycles of depen­
dency from the centers and as members of the so called 
periferia •
Column 7 shows that its ratio of debt service to ex­
ports averaged 153% between 1980 and 1983 , compared 
with 61,7^ in East Asia • To find that foreign exchange, 
the region had to slash imports , and in doing so brought 
on the recession of the early 1980s •
COLUfir^ J 7 debt service ratio / average 80-83
S, Korea 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
Indonesia
BRAZIL 1 32,6
ARGENTINA 214,9
P"EXICO 1 61 ,8
VENEZUELA 117,8
PERU 122,2
CHILE 1 53,3
90.1 
1 6,9
58.1
EAST ASIA 
LATIN AF-IERICA
81 ,7 
1 53,8
Ip
i
I
I'lost Latin American countries denied themselves rapid 
export growth in the 1970s because they kept their ex­
change rates too high , In 1982-83 , the black market 
discount on the currencies of the Latin American nations 
in our table averaged 4 0 , compared with 6,9^ for East 
Asia . But this begs for a question : why did the East 
Asian countries try so much harder to make exports 
competitive ? In the short term , currency devaluations 
in poor countries usually helps rural workers and hurts 
urban workers : farmers get more (in local-currency terms) 
for the crops they export , but imported goods (which 
urban workers consume in greater amounts) become more 
expensive , In 1980 , 12% of the people in our six 
Latin American countries lived in towns ; the figure 
for East Asia was only 32^ . Inthis case , we can say 
that the strnght of rural interest in East Asia may 
deserve much of the credit for the region's triumph as 
an exporter of manufactures .
CnLUflN 8 urban population ratio -1 980-
S. Korea 55
('lalay sia 29
Thailand 14
Indonesia 20
Brazil 68
Argentina 82
Mexico 67
Venezuela 83
Peru 67
Chile 80
EAST ASIA 32
LATIN Af-IERICA 72
In addition to ths still low existing urban population 
ratio in East Asia , I should highlight that this region 
was on the one hand , deeply involved in a strong import 
substitution process , 'and on the other hand , the foreign 
currency amount this region borrowed from abroad , was 
mainly allocated rim those activities capable of generat­
ing again foreign currency by exporting , as to get self- 
amortized such an undertaking . ; this is to say , by 
founding new feeding domestic sources with foreign oriented 
outputs,
Both facts were constantly joined and supported by a cer­
tain and quite defined shipping policy in the case of S, 
Korea , wherein , and differently from other countries 
of the same region , gave its first steps in the bulk 
shipping , and afterwards in liner business • Of course , 
once more I should stress that a coherent shipping policy 
is not such , without a relevant support and logical 
connection with the foreign sector of the national economy. 
Even though national economies seem to grow up and to 
quickly become developed thanks to different policies ■ 
externally oriented , like Thailand and Malaysia for 
instance , does not mean that shipping is going to grow 
and exoand by itself , as if it were a consequence of a 
possible economic boom . The kind of activities which can 
be expected to get , to a great extent , a positive 
starting and promising perforti]ance , are those called 
collaterals : banking and capital markets , domestic 
transport (railway and trucks) , general services 
(storing , packing , stevedoring , surveillance , etc).
But shipping will never come up by itself due to the fact 
that it gathers all the characteristics comprised in a 
quite capitalistic industry and all the aspects related 
to strategic functions subject to high degrees of state 
regulations and interventionism ,
Andthis is what actually happened in East Asia with the
honourable exception of South Korea .
■Uith resoect to Latin Ac,erica , its growth and develop­
ment was f as this reports shows , much lesser with the 
exception of Brazil , In these countries , economic 
innovation and progress were rather poor , so long as 
shipping , as a whole , was usually an isolated island 
within the inmensity of the economic universe . In this 
case f a real and strong foreign trade did not exist 
so as to support the idea of developing the already 
existing maritime infrastructure and fleet , and 
neither could they have thought of going beyond their 
own market limits to compete as cross traders in a 
buisness where the uncertainty and fierce competition 
were even greater than the existing competition in the 
international trade of goods •
That is why I advocate the idea of developing the 
foreign sector of the economy first of ell , but not 
only for carrying their own exports or imports a 
country could eventually get in a greater dimension as 
to multiply the existing tonnage several times , but 
also to increase in importance and to improve in quality 
the capacity and actual extent of governmental negotia­
tions as regards to several and well differenciated 
markets , specially in the liner and dry bulk fields •
1 . 4 -  STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS IN LATIN AKiERiCA
The figures stated in table 1 represent total disbursed 
debt , debt owed by the public sector , private sector , 
and short term debt , end-year (US million dollars)
ARGENTINA 1975 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Total 6026 19668 27065 32276 36680 40718
Public 3121 8557 10187 10506 16587 18590
Private 1193 5439 6593 12166 12311 12353
Short-term 1712 5672 10285 9604 7782 9775
TABLE 1
BBAZIL 1975 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Total 233A4 51482 64631 74051 83206 91613
Public 13755 35618 39151 43829 45013 54312
Private 9593 15864 16580 19622 24640 24700
Short-term — — 8900 10500 13533 12602
I'lEXICD 1975 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Total 5700D 23700 27500 29300 31800 32804
Public 1262 9805 10873 11352 12000 12000
Private 995 2515 3853 6588 13800 13810
Short-term 3443 11380 12774 9360 5000 6994
TABLE 2
LATIM AT'^ ERTCA 1975 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Total 75393 184193 229054 279697 314630 335230
Public 44955 112096 125940 144791 166521 204871
Private 19340 41796 46975 69658 79251 80265
Short-term 11097 30328 55139 65238 68588 51094
source : Inter-american Development Bank
From the huge amounts of money set out on tables 1 and 
2 , no money was allocated neither for shipping nor for 
collateral or ancillary industries or services . L'ot 
even the private sector was interested in investing in 
the shipping field , mainly owing to the non-existence 
of support and definition on the part of the government 
heads • But it is also true that there is a substantial 
gap between Brazil and the rest of debtors as regards 
the final beneficiaries of those money loans . This 
country became differenciated from the others due to 
the fact that most of the loans obtained in hard cur­
rency terms , were allocated with the planned purpose»
of producing and exporting manufactures as to get such 
loans self-amortized , and not just like internally 
oriented industries aiming to serve local needs , which 
actually could have been met as well from the amortiza­
tion point of view , This is how Brazilian shipping 
received a valuable support from the foreign sector of 
its domestic economy with respect to cargo volumes to 
be carried on board national vessels under certain 
agreements or without them , and under clear definitions 
about what is truly called shipping policy or in other 
words , strategic planning of maritime targets . 
Regarding the foreign debt problem , the shortage of 
liquid funds with which to service its debt was the 
immediate cause of Latin America's debt crisis in the 
summer of 1982 . But there was a second , and longer- 
-term , asoect to the problem , A number of structural 
features of the big Latin American economies contribu­
ted to the heavy indebtedness . At the risk of over- 
-simplifying , we shall touch on four of the most 
important areas . First is the pattern of industrializa­
tion ,
The major Latin American countries present a sharp 
contrast with the other big borrowers in the interna­
tional capital markets (South and East Asian countries, 
such as South Korea and the Philippines) . The industria 
lization programs of these countries have been export- 
-oriented as I mentioned before , ensuring specializa­
tion in goods and services on which they were interna­
tionally competitive . This has forced them to generate 
the maximum amount of foreign exchange per dollar of 
foreign borrowing • Hence although South Korea's gross 
external debt stood at about AO billion US dollars - 
not far from Argentina's - its debt service ratio in 
1983 was only 2A^ , against 1A9^ for Argentina . In 
the larger Latin American countries , export orientation
has been a secondary consideration . They hav/e favoured 
the import-substitution model which , although not 
necessarily unworkable , was made so by distorted 
domestic prices caused by government subsidies and 
high tariff barriers . Many new industries in Latin 
America have recuired substantial protection in order 
to get by . Easy foreign bank loans made it possible 
to undertake projects whose priorities were primarily 
political rather than economic - Argentina's paper 
industry , Venezuela's steel mills , Peru's huge 
irrigation schemes and Brazil's nuclear oower sta­
tion (to give just a few examples) - and they were 
all motivated largely by prestige or employment 
considerations , neglecting the vital fact that the 
output they generated would not be sufficient to 
reoay the capital cost , Shipping fits perfectly into 
these considerations and mainly into the political 
side , without considering at all , subjects such as 
balance of payments , manpower employment , spreading 
effect and so forth • Such tendencies have been ex­
acerbated by a second factor : the importance of the 
public sector .
With the exception of Chile and Brazil (where public 
spending declined and remained roughly stable ), pu­
blic sector spending increased sharply as a proportion 
of GDP in Latin America during the 1970s f with reve­
nues failing to match expenditures , public sector 
deficits also grew , Brazil's public sector deficit 
rose from 2,4 per cent to 6,1 per cent , Mexico from 
1,9 to 16,9 per cent , Peru's from 0,B to 8,2 per cent 
We can say that inefficiently and sometimes corruptly 
managed , state enterprises were a major reason ; and 
obviously within the concept of state enterprise , we 
should include national shipping lines which , in 
in real life were and still are contributing to the
public deficits of their governments to a considera­
ble extent due to the already known high degree of 
capital intensive of those companies and for all 
the huge investments they require to operate at a 
minimum level of entreoreneurial criteria , without 
considering of course the managerial and strategic 
matters which will be looked upon at a later stage •
In Mexico , for instance ) the public-enterprise 
deficit alone stood at around 10^ of GDP in 1982 « 
Spending by public enterprises was often subject to 
little central control , and their revenues were de­
pressed by policies to hold down prices of their out­
put as part of government efforts to combat inflation. 
The consequence of this uncontrolled expansion of the 
public sector was a crowding-out of private investment 
and esoecially in those countries with poorly-deve­
loped domestic capital markets . The deficits were 
financed not just by external debt but also by loans 
coming from the central bank , which simply Increased 
the rate of monetary growth ,
In many cases public enterprises , including national 
shipping lines , had direct access to both sources of 
finance without even having to seek the permission 
from the treasury or economy ministry , The result 
was an explosive buil-up of both public-sector debt 
and of inflation cauded by rapid expansion of the 
money supply . The third factor is the political 
prejudice against direct foreign investment , Poli­
ticians appear to believe that loans create less de- 
oendency than investments , which Latin American 
countries have encouraged , Direct investment in La­
tin America dropped from 30^ of capital inflows in 
the 1960s to 20^ by the end of the 1970s • This lack 
of encouragement for attracting direct investments 
had its impact on shipping by avoiding and shutting 
out any sort of policy related to the creation and
exnansion of the national flags by means of either 
the existing transnationals in Latin America or those 
from Latin America with liquid assets abroad . Further­
more , and as I stated before , the feu investments 
this area received during the last two decades were 
sent to the wrong areas whenever we should accept . 
that every investment has a certain tangible priority 
and opportunity cost which is supposed to be taken 
into account for the decision making process .
But normally , investments in activities related to 
the sea-borne traffic were unconventionally put off 
and even many times , not even spelt out . Eventually 
there has been a substantial build-up of overseas 
assets (much of it the result of capital flight) held 
by residents of the debtor countries • Overvalue in 
exchange rates in many countries not only worsened 
their trader-deficits but also encouraged local resi­
dents to borrow abroad . The distorted exchange rates 
and artificially low domestic interest rates (often 
negative in real terms) made foreign currency denomi­
nated assets seem artificially attractive . And the 
fact that domestic residents clearly believed such 
policies were unsustainable provided a further incent­
ive to capital to move abroad •
Despite the serious policy errors , it would be a mis­
take to conclude that all of Latin America's external 
borrowing was frittered away • Gross domestic invest­
ment increased significantly as a proportion of GDP 
during the 197Ds for the major Latin American debtor 
countries , much of it financed by the external bor­
rowing . Nevertheless the present problems would not 
have been nearly so acute if the policy errors had 
been avoided .
TABLE 3 : external debt service as a oercentage of 
■export of goods and services
LATIN Ar'lERICA
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
service/exp. 42, A 43,4 38,3 43,8 59,0 64,6
interest/exp. 16,5 19,2 21,2 26,4 34,3 37,8
ARGENTINA
service/exp. 41,7 22,9 43,5 53,3 113,0 149,4
interest/exD, 9,5 12,7 71,8 32,0 56, 9 56,9
BRAZIL
service/exp. 59,3 55,6 53,8 62,8 78,2 82,4
interest/exp. 24,1 31,5 34,1 35,5 4 5,4 40,7
MEXICO
srrvice/exp. 65,3 74,8 39,8 44,7 65,4 59,3
interest/exp. 23,3 --*24,2 23,2 28,8 37,4 42,4
VENEZUELA
service/exp, 21,5 25,6 26,4 28,2 32,3 32,2
interest/exp. 13,4 16,0 17,1 18,5 19,4 25,0
PERU
service/exp, 40,3 29,5 39,5 58,2 49,8 66,2
interest/exp 18,8 14,7 16,5 20,5 21,7 31,8
source : Inter-american Development Bank
Although this ratio gives a crude indication of the 
debt burden , it does not reflect developments which 
may be critical to the long term manageability of the 
debt , Such developments include the level of import 
prices , the amount of official development assistance
and foreign direct investment inflows and the rate of 
economic growth in the debtor country , Undoubtedly , 
by focussing an integral olanning on shipping activi­
ties , those ratios could be lowered in the short run, 
further the other positive outcomes for the domestic 
area such as emoloyraeCit , services and so on , Obvious­
ly , onoe more we can affirm that it is a matter of 
maritime conciousness and managerial undertaking by 
the corresponding governments in mutual and regional 
cooperation . In other words , a change in attitudes • 
But we can also state in macroeconomic terms , that a 
delicate combination of domestic economic adjustments, 
fresh financing , and external economic growth is ne­
cessary , if the crisis is to be overcome ; and certain­
ly shipping might be of great help regarding the last 
of these three concepts , whenever looked upon as an 
integral industry capable of generating foreign ex-^  
change , technology and employment , and not as a mere 
service with political targets •
So far , the easiest part of the adjustment process 
has been completed - a turn-round in Latin America's 
balance of payments achieved almost entirely through 
a severe contraction in imports . In 1983 Latin Ame­
rica's imports dropped by 21^ following a 22^ contrac­
tion the orevious year , But the most difficult part 
of the adjustment process., restoring economic growth 
through increased exports , is still to come .
Despite some encouraging signs such as a 20^ rise in 
Brazil's exports in the first half of 1985 , it remains 
questionable how far this can be achieved , The criti­
cal factor will be the rate of economic growth in 
the industrial countries • Although the economy of the 
United States displayedwa strong performance in 1984 
and 1985 , growing at per annum , with a 5% real 
growth rate predicted for 1987 , as long as''the
European economies hav/e been slow to respond •
There are • justifiable fears that the recovery will 
prove to be only weak and therefore such an outcome 
would clearly jeopardize Latin America's export prosp­
ects with the already known consequences on shipping , 
Finally , we might set out that in order to avoid-such 
a step , economic policies in the industrial countries 
will have to be shifted away from the simple focus of 
inflation-fighting towards promoting steady and non- 
-inflationary growth , Fiscal deficits in the developed 
countries , specially in the USA , should be reduced 
in order to lower interest rates , which of course is 
not going to be an easy task , But shipping growth 
does not necessarily depend on said oolicies as the 
only way out , Opposite to this , I might say without 
any doubt , that every event which came up in the 
international environment as a restrictive variable , 
can be overcome in very different clever ways whenever 
those affected by them , make the best use of their 
available resources within the framework of strategic 
administration and high degree of cohesiveness of the 
participating sectors and heads of the domestic eco­
nomies .
2 LINER SHIPPING POLICY TRENDS
2 . 1 INTRODUCTION
If ue pay attention to the different types of regular 
traffic in Latin America , and mainly in Argentina , ue 
can notice seueral kinds of maritime traffic systems 
with different levels of protection on the part of the 
Freight Conferences and also uith different degrees of 
intervention on the part of the National State through 
its legislation , Thus , uithin the limits of the same 
country ue can see that , even though there is a govern­
mental and therefore official institution to deal with 
maritime affairs and shipping topics , the shipping 
policy does not seem to be uniform or of the same 
magnitude for all the regular trades concerning the 
foreign sector of this South American country •
Such a uay or philosophy for defining and laying down 
the maritime policy of a country , which could readily 
depend upon its maritime resources to a great extent , 
would seem to be rather misleading and what is even 
worse , contradictory and incomprehensible .
This lack of legal criterion not only affects the nor­
mal development of the maritime sector but also has a 
negative impact on the day-to-day perform.ance of the 
various freight conferences to which the country is 
commited .
In spite of the worsening of the commercial relation­
ships of Argentina with the rest of the world , as a 
consequence of the world recession which has taken 
place in recent years , this country has kept alive 
a relatively old shipping tradition as regards freight 
conferences and pooling agreements with foreign govern­
ments and orivate lines . Among such deals and as I 
have mentioned before , several types of conferences
can be seen at the same time operating in the same
country or maritime area . Then , what I intend to do
is to analyse each class of freight conference and to
carry out a quick but not shallow comparison of the
advantages and drawbacks of the main trades . Thus f
we presently have ;
CONFERENCES SHARE ALLOCATION
n/b s/b
ARGENTINA/ US GULF FC. 40-40-20 50-50
ARGENTINA/ US EAST COAST FC. 0CM1oIo 50-50
ARGENTINA/ US 'I'EST COAST FC. — —
ARGENTINA/ EUROPE FC. 40-40-20 40-40-20
ARGENTINA/''^EDITERRANEAN FC. 40-40-20 40-40-20
ARGENTINA/ PERU FC. 50-50 50-50
ARGENTINA/ BRASIL FC. 50-50 50-50
ARGENTINA/ CHILE FC. — —
ARGENTINA/ FAR EAST FC. 40-40-20 40-40-20
note : most conferences have pooling agreements
As can be noticed , these are just some of the Argentinean 
trades showing different criterisnfor sharing cargoes .
But in fact , uihat is really important for creating and 
dav/eloping a given maritime trade are not only the shares 
but also the actual conditions of each market whecein 
each conference has been set up . This is' to say that in 
the practical life of the market economy, it does not 
really matter whether the conference concerned is close 
or open , or whether the share allocation is higher or 
lower than it should be • Actually , what does matter 
is whether such a conference operates in an open market 
or in a close one '• This is extremely important to point 
out , because regardless of whether we are considering a 
developed country or a LDC , the pricing mechanism
opsretas to I-'-- benefit of the foreign trade of the 
country inuolued , provided thet it has been well 
understood . But in Argentina , es uell ae in s.any oth 
Latin American countries , the opening degree and the 
firmness of the entry barriers in the different liner 
markets are due more to the traditional practices and
customs coming from the very begining ,of shipping than 
to oriented maritime policy , elaborated and laid doun 
in governmental spheres , Therefore ue can set out that 
every segment of the maritime market in this country 
hoE found its grouth and development based on uhat I 
would call the trade inertia or in other ucrds , ace­
phalous self-development . And of course , such a ship­
ping growth and development , framed into a great var­
iety of commercial yardsticks (open market - close con­
ference / close market - close conference / close mar­
ket - open conference / open market - ocen conference ), 
never joined the real needs of the country neither knew 
how to get the advantages from many foreign shipping 
markets during booming periods . But since this state­
ment has much to do with the political side of this 
global analysis , I would prefer to go straight through 
a brief comparison of the two typical prevailing regu­
lar systems in Argentina : Freight Conferences and Out­
sider Liners ,
2 . 2 -  THE ARGEWTINFAM CA5F
Regarding this subject there are many opinions or post­
ures on the part of the many exporters and importers 
who make up the Argentinean foreign sector , as well as 
on the part^of national and foreign shipping companies ;
1 - A certain current of opinion advocates that conferenc­
ed shipping lines , usually get involved inhard tariff 
battles in order to be able to gradually get rid of out-
siders from the market , end thus to remain uithout 
any interference coming from outsiders .
2 - Other people support the idea that , euen if the 
competition exercised by outsiders represents an actual 
competition for a conference made up within a market 
aconomy or within a market of imperfect competence , it 
is to a great extent a complementary activity ,
3- Finally , the last current of ideas sets out that 
outsider services are entirely complementary to those 
served by the conference , thus giving up the chance 
of considering certain rivalry relationship between 
both organizations •
Mow , bearing in mind the opinions just mentioned and 
paying attention to the historical trend and behavior 
of the shipping market strenghts , we could affirm that 
not only in this South American country but also in any 
other liner markets , there is always a relationship of 
complement between those organizations , and therefore 
there is also a certain level of participation for each 
of them in the liner trade concerned •
Mevertheless , I should point out that because of orga­
nizational end , obviously , commercial grounds , a 
freight conference is normally going to get the largest 
share in a given market , mainly due to a larger number 
of lines , a more periodical frequency , a more solid 
and reliable strategic planning , a better image given 
by its entrepreneurial organization and so forth ,
It would be quite misleading to think thaf'in a given 
segment of the sea trade , the same number or even more 
outsider lines could come up than the already existing 
lines operating under the control of the conference , 
since if it were so , the conference would drastically 
loose sense and its members , either ordinary or asso­
ciated f would run away from the conference so as to 
become free and remain subject to the free game of
supply and demand , In such a case , as soon as the 
conference has been literally erased from the map , 
some fluctuations in the freight rates are likely to 
haopen . fleny theorists state that once such a market 
condition is reached , there are big chances of creating 
a sort of chaos owing to the irreversible competition 
among the existing lines and during the short run . In 
other words they alleged rate fluctuations would be so 
sharp that instead of having the normal share of risk 
any market has , the status of total uncertainty will 
take over the trade with all the dreadful derivations 
som.eone could think of .
However , in real life , rate movements are going to 
happen only in the short run due to the establishment 
of a new conference during the seme period of time , 
end made up of old and new partners , this is to say 
by those who were already outsiders before the confer­
ence should break down into independent members , by 
those which i-'ere members of such, a conference and 
remoined operating in the market after the breakdown 
should occur and prob-tly by newcomers who could intend 
to exoloit the same critical market but with technical 
and management innovations •
Obviously , the composition of this new conference will 
differ from the previous as regards the members and 
consepuently the shares , capacities , allotments , 
and so on , At the same time , outsiders will find 
changes in the market with new and old partners , 
although in fact , they are more competitors than part­
ners . But anyhow , this is an aspect I would like to 
highlight later on when explaining , in more detail f 
its effects on a specific and traditional Argentinean 
liner market : East Coast and Gulf of the United States, 
I think it is worthwhile to stress that , despite the 
several drawbacks and advantages the running of a conf­
erence could cause the different sectors of the domestic
economy , it is hirbly beneficiel on a macroeconomical 
basis or simply for the foreign sector of the economy 
concerned , From this statement we can pick up certain 
concepts in order to give an idea about the main strong 
points of a conference system in Argentina , which for 
the time being and in order to follow the methodology of 
this research , will not differ very much from the gene­
ral model used all over the world :
—  it organizes and regulates the liner sea trade by 
means of its internal structure , share allocation , 
rights , duties and so on .
—  it avoids orice wars and consecuently any kind of 
shortage in the tonnage supply ,
—  it guarantees a minimum revenue exploitation level 
net only for the member companies but also for the 
country wherein it operates , whenever we consider 
that these lines have to oay taxes based on general 
revenues , port dues and general services •
—  it solits up the freight according to the several 
flags and through the pobling agreement ,
—  it constitutes cn element of pressure in the diffe­
rent international negotiations .
The above mentioned , ere just five advantages from the 
macroeconomic point of view , as long as at a micro­
economic level there are a few others , which are alrea­
dy quite popular such as a more periodical frequency 
with more number of departures , regular service , loyal­
ty agreements , reliability and so forth , Nevertheless, 
it would be quite misleading to think that the conference 
was founded for the exclusive benefit of exporters and 
importers and that its function lacks buroeracy and over­
flows efficiency •
In a country like Argentina , where during recent periods
the rate of inflation reached one of the highest levels 
of the whole world , and with it f production costs and 
financing expenses permanently grew up to unexolainable 
levels , where also the national currency was exposed to 
monthly devaluations in order to let the main sectors of 
the economy breathe , where there were all sorts of rules 
and regulations to bother and restrict the foreign trade, 
a small degree of cooperation and understanding to be held 
by the conference system would have been of extreme uti­
lity . However , even though the conference was aware 
of the global crisis and of the high degree of elasticity 
of demand for shipping , it did not react accordingly to 
the present needs at that time and therefore , it had 
its negative output spread over many market segments ,
This was what happened in a close conference run in a 
close market , end ccnseruently acting with monopolist 
power during a long period cf time and depriving many 
commodities to be placed in foreign markets with all the 
advantages comprised for a balance of payments • 
Specifically speaking , this was the case of the Argenti­
na / US East Coast and Gulf traffic , to which I am going 
to refer later on in more detail . On the other hand , 
we have other types of traffic which in my opinion are 
fairly shared with regular and quite reliable outsiders, 
such as the Argentina / Europe traffic and the Argentina / 
flediterranean traffic among others . In these open markets 
outsiders play the role of moderators between supply and 
demand , or what in other words may be called the price 
setting mechanism . So , let us make a brief analysis of 
the role outsiders play within the above mechanism ,
When there is an open market with a certain conference 
operating in it , whenever the traffic in terms of cargo 
tonnage is interesting , outsiders will come up by their 
own means to compete with the already established confe­
rence . If the traffic is not so attractive so as to
being shared with outsiders , the latter uill come to 
this traffic as soon as it gets interesting in tonnage . 
Obviously , in such a rase , the one who should be in 
charged of promoting the cargo flow is the government 
through its different departments , secretariats , bil­
ateral or multilateral chambers or whatever be the'entity, 
in order to foster its foreign trade and conseruently its 
movement of cargo by sea . But only when such a cargo 
flow is large enough so as to encourage outsiders to come 
and compete under open matket rules , many shippers , 
either exporters or 'importers , will feel tempted to give 
up the conference in order to join a new outsider , thus 
'^ aving in some cases a substantial amount of freight , 
which is euite significant in times of very elastic de­
mand for ^hipping services .
What I intend to do is just to leave clear the influence 
of outsiders in the open market mechanism , but without 
considering any kind of strategic planning policy for the 
time being , with which I will deal at a leter stage ,
Hence , we could set out that the possible choice in the 
hands of the shipper may be called outsider and may pro­
bably have the following advantages :
—  LOWER RATE LEVEL
—  NO LONGER IRREGULAR SERVICES
—  BETTER WILLINGNESS FDR NEGOTIATING
—  BETTER POSSIBILITIES OF REACHING AN AGREE|V!ENT
—  SERVICE TO CONFERENCED AND NON-CONFERENCED PORTS
—  AVAILABILITY OF lAEDIUn AND LONG TERM AGREEMENTS
Evidently , from the point of view of the outsider ship­
owner , we could say that the essential requisite for 
success or for up-keep of its market share in the buisness, 
it can be split into two orientations ; one is more 
technical oriented while the other one deals more with
the managErial side • Assuming that the ou’ner involved 
in this example is a small or medium size operator , he 
should :
1 ) operate ships of smtaller dead weight tonnage than 
thoseowned by the conference , whereby it could 
be possible to run ships with lower daily running 
costs and consequently with more competitive rates. 
At this point , some theorists could raise some 
objections and to affirm that the concept of eco­
nomies of scale can never be overlooked ; but to 
those people I would reply that such a concept in 
South American liner trades , is as far as the 
moon from the earth of being realized , since the 
possibilities of reaching economies of scale I 
would say is a privilege of those shipping compa­
nies engaged in huge trade volumes on one hand , 
and on the other one in very advanced degrees of 
capital intensive , which actually are not the 
representative variables of thr market structure 
neither in Argentina , nor in South America as a 
whole .
2) draw an intensive and well planned strategy with 
regard to marketing and canvassing activities , 
thus giving to the import-export sector a quite 
finished knowledge of the advantages and marginal 
savings they could get with a service of such a 
nature .
But let us for the moment pay attention to the ex» 
port-import sector and its relationship with confe­
rences and outsiders : there are large firms which 
because of their huge volumes of cargo during periods 
of one year , either imports or exports , they are 
bound in one way to make use of conferenced ships 
since the turnover of such companies is so high in 
number that they must load a stated tonnage in a
riven period of tirr.e , which could be every week end 
even more frequently , And as we know , the only one 
able of placing ships in a given port with a very high 
frequency and acceptable schedule performance , is the 
conference Usually , the latter gets a higher number 
of ships f higher number of sailings and therefore is 
capable of providing better scheduling for huge cargo 
flow firms , than outsiders do . Also we can notice 
there are firms that in spite of having a very import­
ant cargo flow and need of space as frequently as those 
before mentioned , are bound to' share their shipments 
with both conferences and outsiders .
This is the case of multinational companies or binatio­
nal groups , wherein import and export operations are 
carried out almost everyday , and with it , the neces­
sity of quick hold space availability becomes of ex­
treme importance in order to avoid :
—  STORAGE EXPENSES
—  ADDITIONAL INSURANCE COSTS
—  SLOUi ALLOCATION OF OUTPUTS WITH OPERATIVE KNOTS OR 
BOTTLE NECKS IN STOREHOUSING OPERATIONS
—  SLOW INPUT FEEDER SYSTEM AND SUBSECL'ENT SUBUTILIZA­
TION IN THE FANUFACTURING PROCESS
—  WORSENING OF STOCKS BELOW THE MINIMUM OR SECURITY 
LEVEL
For this kind of firms , outsiders become a binding al- 
ternaitve and subsequently , a more expensive choice , 
which regardless of the freight rate level , they have 
to use to avoid some drawbacks such as those recently 
stated •
Normally , although not always , companies of this size 
and structure can be found in almost all liner markets 
representing therefore a sort of fixed incom.e for out-
siders provided that the liner trade , uhich is framed 
into an open market , finds only one outsider competing 
uiith the conference , and a kind of variable income 
u-'ith very slight fluctuations during the year for those 
outsiders competing between themselves and with the 
conference in a given open market . Therefore , while 
the income for outsiders can be forecasted withi,relative 
accuracy in this case , and therefore decisions based 
on trade forecasting can be taken under conditions of 
risk , conference members can forecast and adopt deci­
sions under safer terms , since priority for shipping 
will be given to them , Subsequently , knowing in 
advance what is going to be the income , the decision 
making process is carried out far from conditions of 
risk and uncertainty , 'Ihat we can see so far , is that 
even though there are many differences between these two 
entities , there still are certain segments of the mar­
ket whose trends may be foreseen and their demands met 
accordingly ,
In addition to this , I should poin-t out that neither 
the structure nor the targets of any conference f al­
low them to compete face to face with outsider freight 
rates on their own . However , this lets the conference 
have a few commercial tools of relative efficiency such 
as fidelity bonus to be credited to exporters and imp­
orters . As we already know , such a bonus in its several 
shapes , normally varies according to the class of com­
modity and kind of traffic , but in the Argentinean case 
we can take an average of 10^ discount on the net rate 
to be paid out cash and six months after shipment . In 
my opinion , the fidelity bonus system , in real life , 
is partially and not totally efficient since its actual 
power of tying up importers and exporters to the conf­
erence to a great extent , depends on several topics 
deeply linked with the following items , to which I am
obliged to refer to leter on :
1) OUTSIDER COi'';Pf!ERCIAL F!AWAGEHENT 
?) OUTSIDER TECHNICAL flAMAGETENT 
3) MARKET RESTRICTIONS AND POSSIBILITIES
The reason for which the effectiveness of such a com­
mercial tool differs from country to country and there­
fore from conference to conference is that every market 
is unique in itself and cannot be gene*ralized or 
gathered in the same group under the same critical eye . 
Besides this , the fidelity bonus system does not have 
equal outcomes in developed countries as in LDCs , 
and it gives different results according to the real 
strengths , uses and practices of the market in a given 
period of time , including the degree of elasticity of 
demand •
In one of the reports which was published by UNCTAD and 
based on opinions coming from both shippers and confer­
ences about the loyalty arrangements , I consider it 
relevant to oay attention to what has been argued by 
one conference regarding the need for such a loyalty 
system ;
.....as distinct from the tramp operator , the cargo- 
liner owner builds complex ships equipped to carry 
many types of cargo , operating them on regular services 
because this is what most exporters want ; he keeps 
large shore staffs and installations to meet and coordi­
nate exporter needs . He commits large capital sums 
months ahead on regular voyages , and indeed , years 
ahead by building to serve a particular trade's require­
ment • He is not like a tramp , taking cargoes where 
the best profit is available and laying up his ship 
if times are specially lean ; he provides a service in
good and bed times without uhich much internetional 
trade cou-ld not continue , But uh^t can he do if a 
tramp vessel , oerheps prepared to operate at a tempo­
rary loss uhile waiting for better employment , makes 
an isolated raid on his trade and removes a lot of his 
cargo ? . He tries to protect himself by saying to his 
customers that , if they confine their support to him 
and his conference colleagues , then he will give them 
special terms or deferred rebated on the rates •
What has been stated by this conference , although 
perhaps too dramatic , is what happens on the practical 
side of the buisness . However , what clearly comes out 
of this statement is the incompetence shown by such a 
conference in facing the aggressiveness of a trade under 
competence rules by granting a fidelity bonus , and what 
is even worse , by relying entirely on its effects • 
There is no doubt this bonus is just a tactic like many 
others and nothing else ; in addition to this , it has 
the same very relative results in accordance with the 
existing opening degree of a given liner market • In 
the case of Latin America , bonuses always had a rather 
limited scope for producing positive figures since any 
action or strategy undertaken by the conference side , 
deserved its corresponding countermeasures laid down 
from the very top of the managerial teams of outsider 
operators • Besides this , an item an exporter or impor­
ter should carefully evaluate is the freight rate quoted 
by the conference for a special commodity , as well as 
to what extent such a rate influences its international 
price .
There are plenty of cases and examples where a long list 
of Argentinean products of the same FOB value as their 
similars from com,petitor countries , could not be expor-i=' 
ted due to the overvalue the freight rate got in compa-
rison with other exporter countries and its excessiv/e 
value and subsequent negative implication in the final 
cost of the product , This is neither very encouraging 
nor very easy to swallow if we consider that the oro- 
duction cost of such goods are framed within interna­
tional standards and even some of them enjoy the -prin­
ciple of comparative advantage •
In such a case , one might think that somewhere through­
out the manufacturing process or within the cost struct­
ure of the manufacturing chain , there should be an 
adjusting variable so as to let the goods involved fit 
into a more suitable international price , but in fact 
the most common variable ~nd one of the easiest to 
identify in the cost analysis , usually comes out of 
the transport chain wherein shipping plays a fundamental 
role most of the times ; this is tc say that during 
times of economic stagnation and high elasticity of 
demand for shipping in the domestic market , the inflex­
ible rates set up by conferences lead to compress even 
more the chances of exporting in fair domestic conditions 
in order to get access to a certain market . This is the 
typical case of those goods with a specific item or voice 
in the tariff which did not get a detailed or at least 
serious study as regards the setting up of the freight 
rate , The theory indicates that an acceptable rate of 
incidence ranges from 10 to 20 % of the FOB value , 
although at the same time states that each product 
deserves, a particular and updated treatment , Even 
though the incidence of the rates were commercially 
acceptable , still it would let the possibility of 
improving either the profit margin or of reducing the 
final cost by means of ^he utilization of an outsider , 
whereby a quite simple market appraisal on the part of 
the interested exporter is required •
Logically , all this depends on the existing commitment
rI
degree between the exncrt5.no firm and the conference , 
as well as on the chances such a company has , to get 
rid of the conferenced mechanisms and to manage itself 
within a market economy scheme •
Regarding the importing sector there are some differen­
ces • On one hand there is a law of cargo reservation 
known as the law 18.250 , whereby in general terms , it 
is laid down that all commodities destined to official 
entities , as well as those financed through official 
banks , are bound to be transported on Argentinean flag 
vessels ; and on the other hand , the imports are pre­
sently mostly made up of raw materials for the industry 
as well as capital goods » with normally are required 
with a certain degree of urgency since , as everybody 
knows , they ere not final consumption goods but of 
intermediate production stages , and therefore are 
shipped on the first available vessel regardless of the 
rate level . Even so , part of the importer sector is in 
conditions of negotiating and dealing with shipowners , 
thus reducing considerably its import costs •
In such a case , importers or southbound shippers 
should be clever enough not to get any kind of commit­
ment with any conference , or to get it but with certain 
limits which obviously will differ greatly according to 
the bargaining power of -^ he firm in particular .
Finally , I should point out that in the South American 
liner market , the cargoes picked up by regular out­
siders , are bigger year after year and not only in 
tonnage terms but also in volume terms , thus producing 
more profitable freight tons provided that the relevant 
government allows the establishment and functioning of 
open markets • Nowadays , this trend clearly indicates 
that subject to the fulfilment of the minimum technical 
and commercial requirements demanded by shippers , on 
the cart of the outsiders , conferencial systems are to
a great extent being obliged to share its old fashion 
dominating position with the growing hold capacity of 
outsiders , which as well as the conference structure, 
has its own limits , advantages and drawbacks «
As an examole I could mention the flexibility found in 
many European liner markets and specifically in the 
trade between Germany and the Scandinavian countries •
In such a trade there is neither conference nor out­
sider , but an intermediate position between both sys­
tems under the shape of the so called "Freight Arrange­
ment" or "Gentlemen's Agreement" , Actually , such a 
position looks like the conference as regards the struct­
ure , but is quite more flexible , if there is any 
flexible conference , and more buisness minded mixed 
up with a certain dosis of economic and market reali­
ties . But on the other hand it might be a big mistake 
to believe that such a system is all flexibility , 
comprehension and managerial tenderness . What really 
makes the difference between them is a better and fastex 
reaction to any market eventuality arising out of a 
competitor's innovation , any kind of specialization , 
strategic administration or whatever other cause .
As I have just said , the GERMAN Y/SCAI\!QI!\! A\/IA liner 
m.arket , which is supposed to be a very advanced and 
technological one , is run under the above mentioned 
conditions and without an actual regular competition 
but with a non-regular and very spontaneous one • 
Regarding this topic I should point out that in this 
market there’ is no need for setting up either a conf­
erence or a pooling agreement . Although difficult to 
believe , this is the pure reality and it works owing 
to the simple fact that all the shipowners operating 
therein have homogenous vessels , with similar out- 
fittings and with what I consider of extreme importance, 
the same average costs although with seme existing
gaps uith resoect to handling costs , which obviously 
differ substantially according to the cargo specifi­
cations and volumes to be carried .
We could very well say that such a system is likely, 
to be the most moderate within the range of different 
classes of market dominations , and that it is based
I
on anconferencial structure , partially at least , 
and on competition from non-regular outsiders who on 
the other hand , would like from time to time to be­
come regulars in such traffic , what logically is not 
even possible in the medium run due to the fast rate 
adaptation strategy undertaken by the members of this 
almost informal understanding ,
If we have a quick look at the Argentinean liner mar­
kets as well as at the South American liner trades as 
a whole , we can mainly notice two trends :
1 ) whenever and wherever there are certain types of 
freight arrangements j member shipowners are of so 
different magnitude , distinct technology , speed 
and capacity , that those freight arrangements are 
very often broken by those members who are not able 
to get by in the trade by joining such an organiza­
tion , and therefore can not succesfully compete with 
their partners , who on the other hand operate with 
higher technology or perhaps even with the same 
degree of technology , but with more suitable ships 
in size , in operations and in technical characte­
ristics , required by a particular liner traffic .
2) vi/henever there is neither a freight arrangement nor 
any other kind of jointundertaking ,'but a few out­
siders competing for the cargo , it is very likely 
to happen what was set out above on the previous 
item • This is to say that again every owner enga­
ged in such traffic is likely to have bis own and
particulsr technology , which actunlly is substantia­
lly 'different from the rest . In this esse each owner 
will do his best and the ones in better competitive 
position will not even think about the chance of rea­
ching a settlement by means of a rate agreement with 
other existing outsiders •
Obviously , the facts stated on these two points , sim­
ply represent the lack of capital for investing in new 
technology and equipment and the consequent disadvantage 
of having to deal with a market which in fact , is-very 
heterogeneous on the part of the supply , But on the 
other hand one may wonder why a shipowner should invest 
in new technology if his market share is not going to 
grow up as it theoretically should , In this context 
it is normally said that through specialization an 
owner is likely to increase his share on either a car- 
tainsegment of the market or on the whole market , but 
provided there is a market to increase and. keeping a 
given relationship in reasonable proportions with the 
capital invested to acouire such technology , Normally, 
such a relationship is definitely not feasible in eco­
nomic terms in the great majority of developing count­
ries but excluding those which are oil exporters and 
consequently submerged into overwhelming import pro­
cesses . Then I am personally convinced that in LDC's, 
where the growth and development of liner trades is 
many times non-existant or directly negative , shipping 
investments are totally useless , unless reactivation 
indexes can be locally foreseen so as to allow certain 
projects to"come up , with the purpose of being run in 
the long run ,
However , in the markets where positive growth and ex­
pansion figures still can be found , investments in 
technology become necessary to keep at least a normal
excessive cashcapital-labour ratio . Of course , 
flows oriented to the acquisition of ship technology 
in a market whose output does not keep a normal or 
lineal growth regarding cargoes development f means 
a wasted overflow of money unable of providing useful 
specialization due to the very simple fact that there 
is nothing to obtain from such a specialization . As 
we have seen in the previous chapter , economic growth 
and development in Latin America is crossing a not 
very stable stage on average as we have already demons­
trated by means of different indexes such as GNP , for­
eign debt , import coefficients , debt service , ex­
ports Find some other ratios • Then , if we look-back 
and bear in mind these ratios just for a while , it 
appears very clear that no booming period is to come 
in the next few years to allow or encourage investments 
in the liner buisness or to speculate with an eventual 
reactivation in the long run ,
Of course , exceptions to the rule can always be found 
since as I said before , each market is unique in it­
self and can not be put in a common basket ; but still 
what remains perfectly clear is that economic growth 
is very unlikely to take place and with it , liner 
trade booming , thus producing a ouite big technologi­
cal gap between the present technology which takes
I
over the upkeep of ^he capital-labour ratio in its min­
imum expression , and the existing one in the industrial 
centers of ^he northern hemisphere •
What I want to clarify is that shipping'investment and 
shipping trade can not be separated from the domestic 
economies of the member countries to the relevant traf­
fic , since this- is , and not any other reasons , the 
top reason for the present shipping crisis not only in 
LDC's but also in the whole world , then leaving the 
problems of international overtonnaging and subsidize-
tion in the category of consequences and not causes . 
The econornies considered in terms of domestic ones , 
either regional or nationals , represent the actual 
knot of the problem and should be understood as what 
they really are : the source of the problem •
3 . 3 -  TRAFFIC I^SCRIf!I^ ■'ATID^ J
From the foreign trade firm point of view , it can be 
noticed , for instance , that when an Argentinean ex­
porter carries out a simple traffic comparison , and 
pays attention to the different existing freight rate 
levels in the particular traffic systems , and when he 
spells out possibilities of negotiation or chances of 
getting certain commercial advantages , he suddendly 
realizes there are quite considerable gaps between one 
traffic and another .
These gaps are mainly given by heterogeneous freight 
levels y which at the same time are directly connected 
with general handling and port expenses , bunker costs, 
running cost of the operative units , capital costs , 
cargo flows and a long list of variables whose final 
numbers are generally figured out by the shipowners , 
as long as its outcomes are made public through the 
respective freight cxinferences as in any other country 
and under standard procedures previously set up for 
this purpode • But ihere are some other differences , 
which in my opinion are much less logical and accept­
able than the previous one and that are related to 
the functioning itself of a certain traffic system 
compared with others •
This example is specifically given by the north bound 
seaborne trade to both coasts of the United States , 
where , and according to the resolution number 519 
laid down by the relevant maritime authorities , the
participation of any outsider regarding both lines is 
forbidden , as long as trades of ^he same importance 
and even of greater influence on the domestic ecbnomy , 
enjoy the participation of not only one outsider for 
a given traffic , but also of several outsiders operat­
ing in the same line ,
Once more I shoul stress the fact that there is no doubt 
about the importance of ^he role to be played by a 
conference system , such as the one existing between 
Argentina and the Gulf and East Coast of the United 
States . However , neither can be denied the role to 
be played by outsider liners as a complementary service 
to the conferences . Now , if we look for actual grounds 
for having laid down such a resolution t'e can find two 
main arguments advocated and defended by the maritime 
authority , which was inspired on two fundamental 
aspects according to what they considered "necessary 
and basic for the national interest" :
1 ) The need of securing suitable frequency and efficien­
cy of .the maritime transport services , in such a 
way as to become a real auxiliar of t* he trade ex­
change .
2) The need of reaching a poPling agreement among the 
different shipowning companies belonging to the north 
bound traffic towards the USA ,
Regarding the first point , I should clear up the fact 
that both efficiency and frequency , are terms that 
have nothing to do with a possible inclusion of an out­
sider , since the latter would operate in such a way 
that would be more complementary than actually compet­
itive f as has been manifested historically in other 
shared trades in the Argentinean market . The only case 
where such a statement migh be accepted , would come
up in the hypothesis that , suddenly and without 
human explanation , the same number or even more out­
siders should apoear than the conferenced ships wil­
ling to compete with , and willing to challenge all 
the existing laws of the market , In such a fantastic 
eventuality , the conference and its pooling agreement 
would run the risk of breaking down into many indeoend- 
ents or new outsiders . But as I said before , even if 
such hypothesis should materialize , it would not run 
so much time before a new conferencial organization 
should take place with old and new partners whenever 
allowed by the cargo flow level existing at that time , 
Obviously , this is not likely to happen owing to a 
simple cost restriction , since the Pacific line as 
well as the East Coast and Gulf line have a relative 
yield sharply lower than other trades , and its cargo 
flow is insufficient incentive so as to motivate the 
commercial exploitation on the part of the non-conf- 
erenced line •
Therefore , there are no grounds for the belief that a 
liner shipping market open towards the United States , 
means serious consequences for the conference or nat­
ional exporters •
An excessive protectionism , normally tends not only 
to hinder the achievement of a right liner market ex­
ploitation but also to hamper the export process in 
itself of a long list of national products , due to 
reasons we are going to observe afterwards •
Regarding the second item , the hazard that a pool 
agreement may not be reached at a given stage , arises 
out of rather internal policy matters of commercial 
orientation belonging to conferenced enterprises f 
and not of the possible competition of an outsider 
whose traffic , owing to development and growth 
limitations , could only have a minimum influence on
ths pool agreement - ,
In order to demonstrate ii'hot I have just set cut , I 
will only mention a practical example such as the nor­
mal management other pool agreements have : the one in 
the North Atlantic and the one in the Mediterranean traf­
fic , counting in its structures uith the pressure 
coming from the permanent and regulatory competition 
of one or several outsiders freely acceeding to tfie 
cargo end competing with the conference and even be- 
tueen themselves . Thus , this is the way of granting 
the import-export sector an additional alternative 
without negatively influencing the freight market and 
without hampering the normal unfolding of the pooling 
agreement ,
Therefore , I find myself in the academic obligation of 
saying that not only the soirit but also the basis of 
such a resolution , does not even have a minimum back­
ground or practical orofile for being as presently it 
is •
On the other hand , I should recognize that the Inter- 
American Freight Conference counts uith a very high 
relative effioiency uithin ths River Plate market ; 
but this doss not mean that one has to guess that such 
an organization spells out , analyses and works out 
problems in a reasonable way , speoially those related 
to project rates • I can highlight such unefficiency 
once more , by stating that once shippers send their 
applications for lowering rates , based on the fact that 
many times the rates have a too high impact on the FOB 
value of ^he product , are commonly rejected without 
even considering the elasticity of those products in 
the international markets • Thus , and without having 
another shipping way out , shippers are bound to over­
quote in the foreign markets and consequently to loose 
competitive position in a very dynamic market such as
the international one • This situation brings about the 
fact that shippers prefer to underquote in the foreign 
markets and therefore to underearn instead of giving up 
their commercial networks . This obviously can be clas­
sified as 3 short term strategy to keep the clients 
tied up , but as all short term policies , they need 
to be adjusted and properly oriented through the fol­
lowing periods • This is to say that such a strategy 
is only feasible in the short run , and normally is 
done when there is no other way out and by those 
internationally integrated companies owning such a 
large structure and enough capital endowments so as 
to bear the burden of the capital d'osts involved in 
such a strategy ,
Anyway , this is not the most representative case , 
since if it were so , this liner market would be cond­
emned to fail and go bankrupt , thus leading to an 
aceohalous trade , probably full of constraints and 
negative outoomes.
Exoorters are , like most activities placed in private 
hands , profit oriented and just a few are willing to 
export without immediate earnings , which normally 
leads to uncertain conditions in the case a shipoer 
decides to run the risk of doing it without a reliable 
trade forecast or freight negotiation prosoects on the 
part of the conference •
Once more I insist on the fact that the make up and 
functioning of a conference as a commercial entity , 
is of top importance for the growth and"development 
of a marine trade in harmony , or at least in what 
could be called a civilized manner , However , by 
jealously protecting such traffic and therefore trans­
forming it in a very strong oligolpoly , the only 
coming out of that is one side the negative pressure on 
the foreign sector of the economy followed up and
monitored by rrocroeconomic indexes , and other side , 
a permanent stop and go policy as regards the starting 
and continuation of export ooerations •
If the conferenced v/essels are run at a certain daily 
running cost level , and at the same time recuire a 
wider profit margin to maintain the pool agreement , 
it is quite comprehensible that those owners tend to 
UD date or adjust their rates to their real needs .
But to deny a good part of the Argentinean exporters 
the right of using the principle of free choice
of carrier in order to choose the mors suitable avail­
able service , shows us the low quality and under­
standing of the maritime authority , In addition , it 
gives us a rather finished idea about the lack of 
confidence a conference can have in itself to overcome 
market innovations coming out of outsider strategies • 
If the authorities at that time had evaluated in a 
proper and detailed way the cost structure of those 
trades , they would have reached the conclusion that , 
as a consequence of high cost and low average of an 
existing cargo flow , only the participation of one 
outsider operator would have been possible . In addit­
ion , such outsider , would have found itself bound to 
operate with smaller OUT vessels , lower operative 
costs and therefore with lesser cargo capacity , where­
by its share in the trade would be insignificant •
Then , we could affirm that the inclusion of one or 
more outsiders , by no means would sharply affect 
the conferencial structure , but on the contrary , it 
would tend to normalize or to balance the free game of 
supply and demand strengths , which for the time being 
are quite unaccustomed to suffer displacements and 
fluctuations as they should • In this special case , 
it would be desirable to put off such a regulation 
which in other words would lead to a greater freedom
fin choosing the best shipping alternative by shippers 
with the only aim of bringing down export costs and all 
the ^existing constraints therein comprised . This would 
lead as well , to a greater growth and development of 
the domestic side through a greater number of exports 
and consequently more production factor endowments 
coming up together with several other variables in­
volved in such a process • Summing up , we could say 
that by granting a certain level of freedom to the 
north bound traffic under consideration , the liner 
shipping field as a whole and as a service , will pro­
bably become more efficient and flexible than it was 
before , and what is in my opinion much more important, 
export curves will tend to move upwards as a typical 
characteristic of the existing high market elasticity 
of such traffic . Of course , the u:ay such a trade 
opening is going to occur will depend on the marine 
policy adopted by the government and subsequently on 
how much interest it has in having balance of paym.ents 
earnings by means of the utilization of national flag 
ships , either outsiders or conferenced , and through 
relevant national legislation encouraging trade ex­
ploitation by different means , to which I will refer 
to later on •
2 . 4 CQNCLIJSIOM
From uihei: has bssn prsviously set out throughout ohis 
chapter , there is a certain number of key points which 
I would like to bear in mind so as to reach a partial 
conclusion • These key points ere closely related each 
other and all of them lead to a final thought  ^ the key 
points are :
-- COrOPLEnENTARY CHARACTER
—  CCIV1PETITI0^ '
--  rationalIZATIOM
--  TECHNOLOGY
--  FLEXIBILITY
-- (V'ARKET GRO'JTH
According to whet we have seen so far , these items are 
the six key points to be looked upon when developing a 
kind of opening with respect to the different liner 
markets . We might well say that a gradual liberalizat­
ion of the different liner trades , would involve a sort 
of relationship of com.plement and competition among the 
conferences and the outsiders • The extent to what the 
com.petition degree exercised by the outsiders against 
the conferences is going to be kept under the actual 
level of complement between both organizations , will 
entirely depend upon the existing elasticity of demand 
by the time such an opening takes place , and upon the 
competitive attitude undertaken by both the conferences 
and the outsiders •
The more competitive and commercially aggressive a conf­
erence is f the more complementary the character of the 
outsider service will be , as regards the types of 
goods to be carried , The opposite reasoning is valid 
in order to understand the increase of the competitive
cheracter of ths outsiders •
In this case , ths outsiders would ■^ ulfill ths role of 
rates moderators provided that the Government does not 
intervene ; which would fastly lead to imerove ths over 
all efficiency of the trade •
In addition to that , we have the concepts of ration­
alization and technology , The former leads to avoid 
a breakdown or inefficient functioning on any conf­
erence due to the existing incompatibility among the 
members , as long as the latter pretends to settle a 
kind of logical ratio between the actual demand or 
market growth and what should be the most suitable 
technological devices so as to serve efficiently the 
particular trade . Both concepts , besides being close­
ly related each other , maintain a certain relation­
ship with the comiolementary and competitive characters 
since if any kind of unbalance between them should 
occur , it could oertainly originate other unbalance 
between the complementary and competitive character 
with resoect to conferences and outsiders •
In such a case , the market opening process would 
slope again towards one of the two characters just 
mentioned , thus becoming such a process void •
The concept of flexibility must be borne in mind 
throughout the whole opening process , and even 
regarding the planning of the process in itself .
Not only the national shipping policy must be rather 
flexible but also the market opening process so as to 
make possible the reallocation of the strengths of 
the different markets and together with it , the 
adoption of the relevant adjustments •
Finally , we have the concept of the market growth , 
without which , any intent of opening the market would 
lead to even sharper disadjustments within the already 
existing rigidity of the market . Then , it goes with-
out saying that these six key points are closely 
connected each other and are of fundamental import­
ance whenever a structural shift towards a greduel 
trade opening is sought •
I'loreover , such an opening plan is very likely to 
succeed ,, provided that said key concepts are not 
overlooked or underestimated on importance .
Then , what I wanted to stress is that both the 
conferences and the outsiders are essential to 'foster 
and expand any liner trade in South America , and thad; 
such a development must be difinitely carried out on 
the basis of free competition or at least , something 
similar to it , Otheruise , the liner shipping trades 
will never develop in harmony end as a consequence of 
that , the expansion process would be seriously 
threatened .
3 PTOMOTIO'.'AL TRAFFIC SYSTFFIS
3 . 1 AFFFS3 TO FJE" LINZR FHID'^ IA'G r'-’AFKZTS
Generally speaking , many exporters hav/e receiv/ed 
during the last feu years , in one uay or another , 
offers for placing their products in non-traditional 
markets , as the recuired goods uere of primary and 
also industrial origin Normally , the pursuit of 
these exDort operations became frustrated mainly cuing 
to the scarcity and more often to the non-existence of 
any kind of regular service to destinations such as 
the i'est and Fast Coast of Africa , Arabic countries 
and even Central America • This case is typical of 
countries such as Argentina , Chile , Peru , Brazil 
to some extent and others , but it specially acplies 
to Argentina •
If ue take the example of Argentina , I should point 
out the fact that all these destinations above ment­
ioned together uith all those destinations that are 
clearly defined as non-tracitional trades , uere and 
still are nouadays unprofitable traffic systems from 
the point of vieu of a private operator or ouner ,
Even so , uhen there uas the possibility of exporting 
large volumes of bulk c-rgoes , uhere regular lines uere 
not needed but instead an available ship uhenever 
should exist a charter party in betueen , The operat­
ion used to get complicated very quickly due to the 
fact that most of the ports applied as destinations 
uere part of the long list of dirty ports or non- 
-operative places • Obviously in this case , the 
fact of considering a dirty port as final destinat­
ion of any export business y meant and still means for 
the shipouner concerned a certain number of delayed 
days t ® greater daily running cost , and consecuently
rlso a greater final technical cost , additional creu 
costs , scarce chances of picking up neu cargoes -t 
the oort of destination as to avoid balElast trips , 
and several other noints which are common in the daily 
running of a fleet under the commercial and economic 
oressures- . Thus , the Argentinean products were and 
ere still disolaced by those foreign competitors , who 
despite of being ouoting the same and sometimes higher 
international prices than the Argentineans did in FOB 
terms , are capable of reducing such equality or dif­
ference by im.proving the CTF cost and therefore by 
using the already existing liners in the trade , and 
consequently by bringing down the final cost through 
the adjusting variable in this case : the freight rete. 
Evidently such a gap is not cossible to match unless this 
country decides once fcr all to foster the growth and 
development of liner shipping as we u'ill see later on , 
This is a common characteristic which can be found in 
Latin American countries , specially if we bear in mind 
both coasts of Africa , as far as traffic systems are 
concerned .
I consider is important to point out the fact that if 
there are no linking services between national ports 
in Argentina and non-traditional ports , it is because 
the maritime transport is directly related to the ex­
portable supply of Argentina , and its demand for imports, 
which together with exports find their respective 
destinations and origins spread in the industrial 
centers of the USA and the EEC mostly , and therefore 
without having developed a higher degree of commercial 
diversification , provided that we only look upon trans­
port by sea and not others •
This clearly means that no private shipowner is going 
to be interested in investing , cooperating or promot­
ing the establishment of any regular line , as long as>
does not exist a real end tangible foreign trade policy 
oriented towards these non-traditionel trades , which 
only could be done with the relevant analysis and putting 
into practice of a service , either in the hands of the 
State or in the hands of. private undertakers with the 
corresponding exceptions , or counting with direct/indi- 
rect state subsidies under degressive clauses laid down 
according to the growth and diversification degree of 
the components of each segment , It should not be for­
gotten that regular service does not mean to appoint 
just a vessel to a certain traffic to carry out its 
round trip after an estimated number of days , but that 
comprises the service starting with at least three ves­
sels in direct connection with the time at sea and the 
time at port or port operations , This is to say that an 
acceptable cargo-flow cannot be expected if such a serv­
ice means a vessel every 50 or 70 days f specially in the 
case of Argentina which is a country quite far away from 
the industrial centers as well as from its South American 
partners with the logical exception of its bordering 
countries , and where the implementation of any traffic 
means , because of the long distances , to always think 
in terms of at least three vessels for a promotional 
traffic without existing services of any sort •
Nevertheless , a certain progressive development might 
be expected if a vessel were placed every 25 days approx­
imately , From this statement it can be readily deducted 
that such a trial could be succesfully carried out when­
ever the National State should adopt a coherent and 
aggressive expansion policy of exports to non-traditional 
markets , wherein the answer to the transportation problem, 
although crutial , is only part of it ,
Regarding liner transport , the State counts with the 
right tool for covering or working out the promotional 
trades : Empresa de tineas Hlaritimas Argentinas . This 
state-owned shipping company is the only one that in my
opinion , could take over those promotional zones and 
hence to carry out the implementation and exploitation 
at the first stage uiithout profits but with losses 
coming out of the non-regular trades . It can be said 
as well , that this is the way the different traffic 
systems in the uorld got the solid structure of regular 
lines , and this happened after having been just non- 
-regular-trade lines as they are right now ,
Besides this , and basing my opinions on u/hat is clearly 
stated in any book of Political Economy , I am strongly 
convinced that' the main goal of a public services enter­
prise is not to maximize profits but to achieve such a 
service . In most of the developing countries I uould say 
that in real life none of these ideas are carried out  ^
thus giving place to a new entrepreunerial style : to 
maximize losses and without leaving any evidence of them. 
But coming back to the central body of the idea , we can 
set out that that is the way all traffic without regula­
rity I'lill continue getting shape , end simply because this 
is how it is demanded by the market economy strengths ,
In other words and to put it clearer , there is no other 
way out or feasible alternative .
3 . 2 PRESENT POLICY
Before such an uncertain environment , as far as state 
shipping policy is concerned , quite a large number of 
exporters whose commodities uiere subject to be container­
ized , looked for -^ he chance of reaching those non-tradit- 
ion^Miestinations by means of transhipments made in ports 
such as Hamburg , Rotterdam , Marseille , Genoa , Singapore 
etc , so as to reach areas such as the Middle and Far East, 
West and East Coast of Africa and many others • But this 
procedure , in spite of being the unique viable alternat­
ive , sometimes pr'esentod the following constraints :
1 ) A very high impact of the rste on the FOB velue of 
the oroduct • , whereby generally only those products 
with a greater endowment of added value other than the 
common average y were allowed to be exported owing to 
a better and greater capacity to bear such a burden •
2) The almost non-existent movement of containers in 
the port of destination , which means that every cont­
ainer had to be unstripped , unstuffed and therefore 
its cargo moved thereafter as if it were break-bulk , 
with all the risks and economic burdens involved in 
such an operation •
3) An excessive transit time and loss of control in the 
follow-up of the units .
4) Quantitative restrictions to the number of containers 
to be received in those ports , due to the very scarce 
likelihood leasing companies assign to theseunits of 
getting outbound cargo so as to take them back in the 
industrial centers without having to gat worried about 
huoe amounts of sleeping capital and operative headaches 
among other things •
Desoite these drawbacks , which might perfectly be 
called traffic restrictions , some exporters had the 
privilege of exporting , although not necessarily with 
an optimum profit margin but with losses , that in the 
best case were only financial lasses expressed in real 
terms • This was and still is the case of a certain cargo, 
to give just an example , which is usually shipped in 
Buenos Aires towards the city of Basrah , located in 
Irak , and through two ports of transhipment :
Marseille in France and Mersin in Turkey , to finally 
have to make a land transit from nersin to the final 
destination . If we sum up the different on-carriages , 
handlings , movements , times , and the fact that such a 
service was done in a middle of a war (IRAW-IRAK) , we
cannot allege that these exporters lacked courage and 
imagination regarding transport alternatives . But 
such an imagination is the one that nowadays is stag­
nated in the public sector , specially with respect to 
transport planning and infrastructure development • The 
proof of this is given by the fact that even today , 
combined services continue being the only alternative •
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for liner goods , fundamentally thanks to the consti­
tution and implementation of joint uontures between 
several shipowners and ship agencies around almost 
all the world •
3 . 3 EXPANSlOk' STRATEGY
As UB said before , vessels of a certain regular ser­
vice would have a limited cargo capacity and also 
operative restrictions with respect to technical spec­
ifications of those commodities to be carried , which 
obviously would hinder meeting the transport demand 
reouirements for superior tonnages , such as dry bulk 
cargoes , liquid bulk cargoes , fruits , frozen m.eat 
and fish ,
A regular liner service in the liner market of the 
River Plate is supposed to operate either with full 
container vessels or with a kind of multipurpose ships, 
thus combining several technical aptitudes based on 
what this market can eventually offer , It is very un­
likely or almost impossible to believe that a private 
shipowner would invest in a. traffic which is not based 
on traditional liner goods and during times of recession, 
as in the River Plate traffic , where the outbound cargo 
flow that is supposed to be regular but is not , is 
presently threatening the structure of old conferences 
and not so old gentlemen agreements of any kind •
This happens to inbound cargoes as well , and even with 
deeper fluctuations • But the situation gets even worse 
when we analyse the large volumes of cargo and their 
degree of attractiveness to potential investors • At 
present , this segment is strogly influenced by two 
topics quite independent from each other : seasonal 
peaks and political framework •
I wonder who would be willing of investing before such
an uncertsin scheme < Anyi';ey j for expansion aids , sea­
sonal peaks are one of the rr.cin constraints since no 
shipowner is going to be uilling to become that capit­
alist just for season • And no shipowner is gping to 
be willing to work out different strategies under a 
kind of business that depends largely on governmental 
decisions of political identity .
Then , it is right here where the State should inter­
vene once more through its foreign trade secretariats 
and organisms j with the aim of overcoming delays which 
occured in ports of destination by means of bilateral 
meetings with those countries engaged in the relevant 
traffic • For instance u/e can set out soma T'lediterra- 
nean ports of ['•'orth Africa such as Benghazi f Tripoli , 
Lattakia , Aqaba and so on , were ships usually suffer 
from delays ranging from ?D to ED days and even m.ore , 
due to the fact that these countries , as many others , 
grant berthing priorities and soon discharge to those 
vessels whose cargoes ere internally recuired accord­
ing to the dcm.and and supply fluctuations in the 
domestic economy , Such '-'iscriminaticn is normally 
avoided 'chen the commodity on bo'^ rd has an official 
organism or institution as consignee ; in such a esse 
the cargo is usually either cischarged immediai-ely ai <-Br 
having berthed the vessel , or remain on board without 
being unloaded but with the corresoonding payment of 
such a waste of working time • But of course , most 
cargoes do not fit into this category  ^ and therefore 
it represents a high operative and also commercial 
barrier fos shipping expansion in this promising market. 
In other .words y the only thing that can be done to 
avoid such a limitation , is to insist on negotiations 
undertaken by the State through its departments special­
ized in shipping and foreign trade , and without leaving 
aside the pattern of bilateralism ,
Uithin this context , it might happen that from the 
said bilateral negotiations there will be no positive 
outcome because of ^he political restrictions or simply 
because they have to deal with a government holding a 
political system completely incompatible , thus leading 
to situations of very low productivity , But anyway , 
it becomes quite clear that if an action plan is under­
taken in this regard , and even when the results of the 
corresponding negotiations are not of the same degree 
of reciprocity , considerable advantages would be 
obtained from several countries , specially with those 
far located from the industrial centers . At the same 
time , such a policy , although not totally liable , 
would help to achieve fleet expansion targets by 
dynamizing the export process to non-traditional markets, 
which nowadays is overborne and self directed by the 
heavy burden of the inefficiency and by what is even 
worse , the absence of planning and undertaking .
Before analysing the behavior of the promotional traffic 
systems , I should point out a statement whereby ship­
ping is commonly accepted as a derived demand of the 
international trade , Although nothing is more true than 
this , it should admit a small shift regarding oromotio- 
nal trades , wherein at the very beginning or short run, 
the foreign trade becomes a derivedsdemand of shipping , 
and then afterwards , once the development of the rele­
vant trade gets the medium run or even the final stage 
of the short one , shipping becomes again a derived 
demand of the trade •
Between promotional traffic and a regular starting ser­
vice there are a number of similarities as well as dif­
ferences regarding the seatrade growth and fleet develop­
ment , Before beginning to spell out each case , I should 
leave clearly differenciated the promotional traffic from 
that of the regular • The first traffic system is related
and therefore i-herein the upkeep and exnansion of such 
traffic depends to a great extent uoon the nouernrrental 
support , since the above traffic is not profitable in 
itself so as to foster private exploitation , as long 
as the latter generally means a sufficient volume of 
existing cargo carried by any available flag in the 
market , uherein such a freedom is decided to be rest­
ricted end controlled by setting up regular traffic with 
cargo allocations and commercial exploitation purposes •
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On the graph 3,3»1 , 're can see represented one prcmot- 
lonel traffic split into three periods of time of ex­
treme importence in order to echievs expansion goals • 
'^ormally , during the short run of a traffic like thi$, 
the space tonnage is likely to increase much more than 
proportionally to the foreign trade euailable , until 
the level shipouners decide that it is uorthrhile to 
invest (a ) , and thus to generate a certain impact or 
influence on such a foreign trade grouth , From point 
A to point B , the whole medium run period is comprised, 
this is to say where shioowners are supposed to become 
at least such a trade relatively developed , unless they 
want to keep themselves on swimming into subsidies and 
without positive prospects . This is a key period of 
time , whcrp shipowners and government will know whether 
the investment project helps the foreign trade to net 
gradually developed end whether it fosters the fleet 
expansion by itself . I'Je can notice that these two last 
variables are not independent but rc-ther interrelated , 
and furthermore despite the fact that they belong to a 
unicue master project , each of them represents a 
project by itself , this is to say that by investing 
without stop-and-DO cash flow policies during the short 
and medium run , shipping expansion and foreign trade 
growth is very likely to occur , From point B and provided 
that the cargo and fleet reactivation has taken place 
during the medium run , space tonnage and foreign trade are 
likely to grow up rather proportionally on average , 
although not exactly proportionally , since ship tonnage 
supply always suffers from a certain delay in answering 
the market requirements regardless of the traffic looked 
upon , Ue can also notice that in this special case , 
the foreign trade becomes undoubtedly a derived demand of 
the space tonnage during the first stage ; and that is 
because it previously was a non-existing traffic without
the "inimum possibility of setting its goods corried i^’ithcut 
considering on-carriages end risky triangulations under 
very high cost terns , uhich generally tends to drastica­
lly reduce the export cargo flou . But once the foreign 
trade gets gradually expanded , then shipping again be- 
cornes a derived demand of the international trade , uhich 
uould be a very promising symptom in order to foresee a 
healthy fleet and trade expansion , Houever , such a 
strategy is condemned to fail whenever shipping , uhen 
becoming again the derived demand of the international 
trade so as to play the role of maritime transport and 
ally to the foreign trade , it does not get the support 
from the governmental spheres to achieve both targets , 
the fleet end trade excansion ,
In such a case , the planned space tonnage overcapacity 
will have no sense , thus negatively affecting every 
period of the project , which obviously would lead as 
I saidbefore , to a total and complete failure and 
additional stagnation of the sector of services and 
foreign trade to non-traditional markets •
Finally , I uould li!;e to add that , once this model has 
been worked out and its outcomes have proved to be even­
tually acceptables , the ideal situation uould be to get 
a nroportional growth or similar expansion rate of both 
variables as in the shadowed surface "Z” and ”z'*' , 
wherein both variables should preferably keep a certain 
coorelation between them , although an equal rate would 
not be of extreme priority •
Anyway , this is how a starting traffic system is supposed 
to face scarcity and economic development matters in a geo­
graphical area where the prevailing features are given by 
tonnage overcapacity , decreasing rate of cargo flows in 
every segment , imports substitution , economic stagnation 
and consequent isolation , among several others • Now , 
if we have a look at the graph of the establishment of a
raguler service , i-hich before starting being regular 
was just a free rrarket with interesting , although not 
huge , volumes of csrgo and with clear signs of growth . 
Some similarities as well as fundamental differences 
uith the promotional traffic can be noticed ,
GRAPH 3«3.2
ST ; space tonnage STI : a given level of tonnage 
FT ; foreign trade
Y , Z' , Z Z " :  different trends in the long run 
n n \ n S ^  area of existing tonnage/cargo endowments
On this scheme we can also notice that even though there 
is alrecdy ?n existing volume of cargo which was carried 
before without any kind of traffic regulation and which 
is going to be carried within this regular regulation
system , there is else certrin overcapacity that is 
represented by the initial investment c^ r^ried out by 
shipowners during the first stage or short run , until 
such an overtonnage is matched by the increase of the 
cargo-flouj , This increase is likely to take place 
after the short run is finished and when the cargo- 
-flou is supposed to be driven by such a regulation . 
During the medium run , the cargo-flou normally 
suffers several fluctuations owing to the existing 
overtonnage and the bargaining power of shippers f 
thus causing different curve trends . In addition to 
this , fluctuations on the cargo-flow and hold space 
utilization are also generated by problems of adequa­
cy of the market to the new regulation system , Such 
a system can take many shapes such as conferencial 
organizations with or without pooling agreements , 
gentler.en agreements , point ventures with state 
participation and many other sorts of regulations 
cperating under conditions of either open or close 
market . Undoubtedly , this could eventually deter­
mine the difference between an expansionist strategy 
of fleet end foreign trade , and a market shaking up 
due t,o an excessive regulation and protectionism 
arising from the State and oriented towards uihat is 
known as an infant industry .
Coming back to the third graph , we can notice that 
investment in shipping tal<es place during the short 
run and it gets a certain level of overtonnage (Xl - 
X2) throughout the same period with the only purpose 
of placing regular vessels , preferably of national 
flag , in those places where foreign flag and non- 
-regular units were operating . By regulating traffic, 
such a current of money is expected to come up and 
consequently to generate a certain overcapacity at 
an initial stage , and with the aim and hope of get-
ting it relatively mctched throughout the second 
stage or medium run , Of course , such an ovortonnage 
uill be gradually offset by the increase of the for­
eign trade of this traffic , which is supposed to link 
industrial centers with developing areas under market 
economy terms .
But the development of the cargo-flow should not have 
opposite targets to the regulation system : this is 
to say that by controlling traffic with an internat­
ional organism such as a Freight Conference , the 
governmental authorities or whoever might be in charged 
of such an organizational undertaking , should be 
aware of the fact that the overcapacity problem has 
solutions of a very different nature than that offered 
by the regulation scheme . Dveftonnage might be reduced 
by increasing the cargo-flow , provided that such a 
regulating organism is flexible , cooperative , profe- 
sionally integrated , and not so rigid in the decision 
making process , which in my opinion is extremely 
essential to respect and bear in mind throughout the 
first stage of any shipping market in its childhood . 
Unless the relevant Freight Conference understands 
and properly assumes its regulating role as it should , 
ship overtonnage will remain as it began and the cargo- 
-flow , if not totally detained , will never find the 
way out in order to reach higher rates of growth and 
diversification so as to bring down dead freights • 
Therefore , in this case we might say that by adopting 
a very strong regulation process , shipping could act 
as a negative variable and thus , giving place to what 
is called the law of diminishing returns ,
Then , in order to get rid of det/elopiment barriers , re­
gulation schemes and cargo-flow must be treated in such 
a way that even the most unsignificant resolution be 
laid down and adopted under the point of view of the 
market interdependencies , and its potential outcomes
analysed and spelt out li'ithin the managerial concept of 
atrategic planning of both the liner shipping field and 
the foreign trade ,
As soon as the initial im/estment in tonnage has been 
made and the short run has finished , the curve tends 
normally to become almost stabilized for shipping , 
and continuosly growing for cargo-flows (X2 - X3) ,
This period is characterized by the fact that owing to 
structural problems of organization , entrepreunerial 
philosophy and pressure coming from quite recent grown 
trade segments , shipping tonnage and cargo-flows are 
directly and indirectly related to market fluctuations, 
thus producing a kind of lag in erasing the still ex­
isting gap between available tonnage and available 
goods . But anyway , flucturtions will not take place 
forever and its real impact on the functioning of the 
interdependency of these two segments is not very 
worrying ,
We can state that fluctuations depend on to what ex­
tent the regulation scheme is aware of its influence 
on the other market variables ; in other words , it 
depends on one hand , upon the existing degree of inte­
gration between the Freight Conference or whatever , 
and the foreign trade , and on the other one , on the 
sort of human resources they use to achieve control and 
regulation objectives , All this normally happens 
during the medium run of the project and when the cargo 
flow is expected to grow up in order to keep the project 
alive , After point X3 and at the beginning of the final 
stage , there are some possibilities to be taken into 
account : curves X , Y , Z , Z' and Z",
Curve X , clearly shows a recovery if compared to X2-X3, 
due to the final driving obtained by the cargo-flow and 
by a logical relationship of growth , kept thereafter 
by the shipping tonnage and cargo expansion , which
usually leads to a small but necessary permanent ouer- 
tonnage so as to m^'ximize the operational productivity 
of spaces , either at a 70^ or as much as 80% of 
utilization . As a prolongation of curve X2-X3 , we 
have curve Y , whereby the trend of sharp cargo growth 
would"seem not to have a counterbalance of hold space 
capacity , leading consequently to an excess of demand 
of difficult satisfaction on the part of the shipowners, 
unless they should decide to charter-in some vessels .
But normally , although not always , any regulating 
organism that is proud of itself and of its operational 
effectiveness would never acceed to charter-in and there­
fore , an excess of demand would appear to be unavoidable. 
Such a situation used to occur in those organizations 
lacking statistics , planning and of overall , strategic 
planning , Anyway , such an excess , unless otherwise 
solved , leads to the disconformity between exporters 
end importers , thus encouraging even mors the presence 
either of new outsiders or of old outsiders which at 
the time of the said excess were absent , but decided 
to come up again and to compete in a market where they 
still keep a worthy knowledge of its commercial possi­
bilities ,
Then , if we assume that what I have set out happens in 
an open market and involves an Open Conference , for 
instance , it is vary likely that such an organization 
gets troubles regarding competitive strategies to be 
followed , as well as operational structure problems 
with respect to pooling shares , sailings , low and 
high value freight tons and others • That is why an 
open market , which is supposed to provide most of the 
necessary elements to reach positive expansion rates of 
cargo and tonnage , may become a negative tool to reach 
those rates if the control over such a decrease , 
exercised by the regulating organism , is excessively
interventionist . Such interventionism c?n even hinder 
the performance of the orinciple of free undertekino 
end hamper a ruick decision making process , thet is 
supposed to take actions at the right time and at the 
right celerity . Unfortunately , I would say that the 
concept of close control is one of the most common 
arguments rais-ed by governmental authorities , whereby 
an open market is considered as if it were a dangerous 
and strange organizational cobweb set up by pressures 
coming from the transnational companies , but without 
really knowing that the actual danger is born from the 
very beginning the public sector nlays an excessive 
role by establishing a sort of feed-back system that 
durino the short run makes nothing else than controlling 
too much and adopting incoherent resolutions without 
receiving oositive outcom.es , thus getting overgrown 
much beyond whet might be advisable ,
Finally , there is an important ooint I want to raise , 
and it is given by the fret that by constantly expand­
ing the cargo-flow without its corresponding counter­
balance and by excessively trusting the overtonnage 
reached during the short run , the only outcome likely 
to come up , sooner or later y has the name of shortage 
joined by all its negative effects on the organizational 
structure of the regulating scheme , es well as on the 
commercial functioning in itself . Before going on , I 
would like to clarify that scarcity is a concept that 
many times , more than a barrier or a problem , is a 
helpful and fostering element of new actions y like 
those which might be framed into the concept of strate­
gic administration y competition y development and ex­
pansion policies •
Fallowing the other alternatives , we can see three 
curves left , which ere nothing else than different 
trends of cargo/tonnage expansion , and are showing
different levels or volumes of foreign trade for the 
same level,of liner tonnage .In other words , it 
shows three levels of missing traffic planning , 
whereby an excess of demand or a shortage of supply 
is much easier to reach than in the case of curve Y ,
The traffic recovery , once these curves are brought 
down , would .necessary have to deal with the structu­
ral restrictions before mentioned • In this case , 
where liner tonnage seems to come down , the answer 
to such a decrease could be found in the gradual and 
growing weakness of the regulation system owing to 
the increasing of non-regulated competition , which 
on the other hand is a kind of self regulatory inst­
rument between liberalism and protectionism in their 
corresponding extremes •
Finally what we can see is that in an already existing 
regular traffic system , shipping'-is a derived demand 
of the international trade whose growth or expansion 
is not subject to liner shipping planning during a 
first stage , as for promotional traffic , wherein 
shipping investment plays the major part of the role 
in the short run , to afterwards become with perman­
ent character the traditional derived dem.end before 
set out .
As I mentioned before , an open market can become by 
itself a source of sharp problems for the correspond­
ing country , when such a market gets either excessive 
participation and surveillance on the part of the State, 
or when such controlling function does not exist at all. 
Both extremes are harmful positions if what we look for 
is the upkeep of an open market • However , nowadays 
practically no government allows the existence of a 
market of those characteristics without any control 
over its operational asoects • Then , it would seem to 
be clear that what one should look for is a middle 
point between two extremes , since it has already been
cleared ud that neither the firet extrere or position 
'jould be of -some usefulness to reach cargo and tonnage 
positive exoansion rabes . h'evsrthelses , excerience 
shous that the position of the public sector regarding 
the interventionism degree , is expected to be quite 
nearer to the liberal extreme than to the other one • 
Obviously , it- does not mean that such a market in its 
several segments , is almost totally free from the
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st^te t=nt?cles , but that a seaond niddla acint 
should be sought betueen the first sguidistant point 
and the liberal thought , The only one uho is lastly 
entitled to determine the right level of interference, 
is the sensibility shown by the traffic development 
curve once the said traffic is already ooereting .
The graph 3.3.3 shows the self-defeating effect a 
wrong TD/PSI relationship could have , whereby , as 
scon as the traffic development increases owing to 
the fact that the market conditions for doing so are 
given , the public sector interference increases as 
well with the same tendency in the short run , but 
in order to reach higher scales in the coming period • 
Normally , a curve reoresenting a public sector ex­
cessively jealous of its incumbencies , tends to 
COmorise not only the whole area embraced by the 
trajectory of the traffic development curve , hut 
also new oossible cx"^ansions .
In addition to the Tr,ct that an interventionist oolicy 
with extremist features in it , runs cpposits to the 
concept of expansion in an open market , traffic deve­
lopment is drastically stopped together with any 
sign of grovith , producing thus a solid tra'^ f^ic 
stagnation characterized by diminished variables end 
increased bureaucratic measures , which in real terms 
and from a macrceconomic standpoint is a loss of 
quite difficult recovery , and with clear symptoms 
of negative impact on the foreign trade and balance 
of payments among other effects •
Generally , the PSI means a certain cost to be borne by 
the foreign sector of the domestic economy , and there­
fore such a cost usually plays against the traffic 
development curve in the long run and also orobably 
before the final stage , wherein the TD curve might 
continue to be stable in the best case j although
ths reality normrlly condemns such a trend to be even 
ucrse by gradually bringing it down until touching 
inadmissible levels of exploitation , whereby the 
relevant regulating organism would loose control and 
credibility on its members and means • In this case , 
the traffic and its regulating scheme are very likely 
to be broken down into many segments of different 
nature end.without interconnection between them ,
This is the same as saying a black traffic future is 
coming unless the relevant authorities realize in 
time ths vital need for a share of freedom in order 
to let any market grow up and get developed in accor­
dance with the strength of the market and together 
with some oublic sector orientations as well as clear 
and precise guidelines . In other words , a promising 
and recently created ':aritime trade under ooen market 
rules can achieve positive rates of cargo and fleet 
exoension , whenever the State interference does not 
go beyond the admissible limits an economic openning 
strategy can propose . Otherwise , and as it has been 
seen before , cargo and tonnage growth and development 
will find its way simply blocked by barriers of legal 
and operative nature of very difficult avoidance . The 
rain oroblem within this context is given by the fact 
that most of the governments belonging to LDC's y 
although aware of the overwhelming sizes of their 
administrations and of the existing sub-capacity to 
carry out their tasks regularly well , believe that 
when national cargoes are picked up by foreign flag 
vessels and when an open market tends to go straight 
against the national policy interests , which is like 
this just because of the existing shortage of national 
legislation for protection of the local markets from 
the derk shadows of the external imperialism ; when in 
fact , the actual and only source or knot of the
problem is born in an excess of State intervention by 
laying down tons end tons of rules , regulations , 
decrees , laws , and by creating committees and special 
deoartments to carry out tasks of rather doubtful use­
fulness and to achieve old fashion goals with outdated 
managerial style and understanding of the present 
reality ,
As the reader can realize , I am not necessarily in 
love with the public sector but rather I feel a very 
limited respect for the public servants in LDC's , 
and at all levels of responsibility , since I am 
completely convinced that , if not all , most of the 
liability of stagnation and underdevelopment in most 
fields , falls on their heads , owing to m.any reasons 
I am not going to set out right here , since it could 
perfectly be the subject of not only one , but of 
several theses .
Following the graph 3.3.4 , we can see an interesting 
relationship between the functions TD and PSI . The 
first one is made up of cargo volumes and liner ship­
ping tonnage as longas the other one reoresents the 
state intervention through its different means . As 
long as the public sector interference increases , the 
traffic development sees its expansion diminished , as 
it is shown on the graph by the decreasing positions 
of TD : TDI , TD2 , TD3 . Obviously , the opposite 
reasoning is valid as well . Once more , this graph 
would appear to demonstrate that a search of a right 
point of interaction is of top importance for the 
harmonious upkeep of both functions the TD and PSI , 
but always keeping in mind that to have expansion 
aims , it is always better to be closer to the market 
economy principles than to the regulating extreme .
FULL REGULATION niDDLE POINT TOTAL FREEDOM
TRAFFIC REGULATING 
ORGANiSn
^^^The area i.'herein , in my opinion , oublio sector 
intervention should be located , thus leaving to the 
orivp.te sector enough manocuvering space so as to 
produce the expected expansion ,
Lastly ue h^ ’ve the graph 3,3.5 representing a sort of 
ideal tendency betu/een such functions . Such a rela­
tionship presupposes a kind of louj elasticity on the 
nart of the state intervention regarding traffic 
changes , and reflected on its development ,
As a general guideline ue could say that the more the 
state interference is , the heavier are the burdens to 
be borne by the trade , as long as'the wider the tasks 
of the public sector are , the smaller the cargo/ton- 
nage expansion rate will be , due to the implied 
consequences in such a strategy of unjustified over- 
expansion that keeps it totally untied from the targets 
before mentioned.
3 4 CDK'CLUSION
As ue can see , uh?t would epoear to refrain clear is 
the fact that through interuensionist measures adopted 
by the governments , the final results are very likely 
to be of low performance and of void projection .
For examole ,-if we look at the international liner 
markets and try to identify the liner markets whose 
growth and development let them to be classified as 
the m.ost dynamic and promising trades in terms of car­
go and technology , we are going to observe that those 
trades do not have to face any major official inter­
vention com.inc from their local governm.ents .
Neither the EEC nor the USA deal with an excessive 
governmental interference , unless the traffic concerned 
falls into the category of "promotional trade" or it 
is guided by strategic reasons . On the other hand , 
we can see that both the liner markets and the liner 
fleets of centrally planned economy countries have 
never been-so far classified as competitive and pro­
mising under international standards t In fact , the 
only fleet uihich is competing in the 'destern _ markets 
with relative success is the Soviet one ; but nobody 
can deny that the Soviet penotration into the ''Jestern 
liner trades is mainly given by its preferential 
domestic bunker costs and low crew costs rather than 
by the success of the interventionist system in it­
self , We might well affirm that the full public 
intervention system worked out by the socialist count­
ries f is definitely widening the existing gap between 
them and the Western liner trades • floreover , I do 
not intend to set down that the success of the Western 
European liner trades is entirely due to the'lack of 
official interference , but to leave clear that such 
a low intervention draws a suitable framework into 
which , together with strategic management and free
cc^petition , cny u''.dertaking can lead o the festering 
cf both the cargo levels and the liner tonnage .
Then , if we apply these concepts in a Latin Arrerican 
context , we should focus our attention on the two 
market structures which were oreviously set out : 
regular and promotional trades .
Regarding the first one , it is highly advisable to 
follow the principle of free competition together with 
a gradual decrease of the state participation in the 
decision making process until reaching timely levels 
at which the public intervention can be no longer 
considered as needless • In this regard , the opening 
orocess of the rrcrkst is something that should not be 
overlooked , since thanks to it , the particular trade 
will slowly regain competitive character and get a 
profile of growth and expansion , provided that such 
en opening process is joined by a decreasing state 
perticin-^tion.
Regarding the promotional trades , both the state 
intervention and the close character of the relevant 
markets are of fundamental importance to fulfill 
throughout the short run ; but as soon as the short 
run is over and whenever the trade has grown enough 
so as to allow a slow opening of the marl<et , the 
state participation must be prepared to leave the 
floor to newcomers and to reach a settlement with 
private owners as regards the future exploitation 
throughout the medium and long run • Otherwise , 
instead of having today a promotional trade expecting 
to develop and to be served by different technologies, 
we have an everlasting undertaking leading to the 
utilization of inadequate means and subsequently to 
the permanent decrease of the overall efficiency •
In such a case , even if the promotional trade gets 
gradually developed during the m.edium run in such a
way that shippinQ becomes once more the derived 
demend of the intcrnetionel trade , the potential 
prospects of commereid diversification and develop­
ment will be considerably diminished mainly owing 
to the lack of competition and to the utilization 
of inadequate technology .
Therefore , we can say that despite the fact fehgt 
an excessive PSI tends to block the way towards the 
liner business expansion , it is necessary to keep 
a certain PSI level , although with different ex­
tents , in both a oromotional trade end a regular 
traffic .
h r-iACROEcowor<iic analysis
A , 1 INTRO-AUCTION
Ue can start by saying that from a theoretical point
of v/ieu; liners carry the world's trade in manufactures
and high value units , and that their services meet
trader's needs for regular scheduled services world-
>wide , for quantities large or small and at a known 
and specified tariff rates • It has been accepted for 
a hundred years that these characteristics require a 
degree of stability only produced by orderly trading 
at which end shipping conferences were evolved .
Personr-lly I guess that since the system has lasted a 
century , it will probably last another 20 years , al­
though on bad days it may look as though it might not 
last that number of months . But anyway , we can affirm 
there are alternative ways of getting stability , One 
would be through an oligopoly structure - the few ship­
ping lines selling to the many shippers , in conditions 
of short-run stability and long-run competition ,
The economies of scale achievable by large container 
ships have changed the structure of the liner industry 
in ways that make an oligopoly set-up possible . The 
shipping companies are bigger than they used to be and 
a series of joint fleets , providing even larger 
organizations  ^ has been formed • In the industrial 
west such a set-up might be tolerated without conf-^ 
erences , provided shippers and their councils, could 
talk to the consortia .
However , in the Thirld World such a system does not 
seem to be acceptable politically . Alternatively , 
stability of a kind might be achieved through a system 
of state-owned fleets , highly regulated as to routes f 
rates and shares «
f^ ost people uould probably believe that such a system
would bs inflexible and lead to diseconories and high 
costs , to. which I would reply they are totally right 
and that such diseconomies usually take place regard­
less of whether the management and staff personnel 
belong to an Industrial country or a less developed 
one . The most likely long term situation may be that 
the West , for its intra-western bloc trade , will 
continue to use a Conference system , disapplying the 
cargo-sharing orovisions of the UN Liner Code ; second, 
that the West's trade with the Third World will apply 
the Code end be more protected as well as less efficient 
and third , it remains an open question whether the USA 
will have to move to close conferences , despite there 
are no clear grounds today for saying it will • 
Overcapacity will thus still condition economies in 
important areas , certainly through much of the 1990s . 
Anyway , we might well forecast an increase , but net 
a marked increase , in protection of one kind or another 
which could be the best interpretation of the future . 
Another pressure cf the 19SGs was end still is ovar- 
tonnaging , due partly to already known political press­
ures , in part the aftermath of the oil crisis of the 
mid 1970s , and in part the result of the rapid penetra­
tion of the liner market by container ships , All this 
could be expected to settle down somewhat towards the 
end of tha 1990s , but if it were to continue as des­
tructive competition , the further innovation would be 
prejudiced and protective forces would tend to increase 
as a form of counter-action .
Nevertheless , a degree of flag protection in Third 
World trades is likely to persist , with 40-40-20 a- 
rrangements under close conferences and market rules 
as well as with bilateral 50-50 arrangements . It is 
also relevant to look upon the degree to which trade 
will become further regionalized , because greater em­
phasis on trade within rather than between regional
blocs would reduce the distance goods have to be moved, 
and so reduce the dcmsnd for shipping ■ services • The 
Dost-wer oeriod has seen the emergence of regionel 
groups like the EEC , COI^ IECOW , the ANDEAW PACT ,
CARICOPI , ALADI (ex ALALC) and so forth . These groups 
have been successful enough to endure , end it is a 
tenable thesis to consider their future expansion to 
larger groupings , such as the Far East , incorporating 
Australasia and China j Europe , incorporating the 
Mediterranean and k'orth Africa ; Latin America as a 
whole ; and the Middle East with the Indian sub-cont­
inent , Lower.distribution costs would be the fundamen­
tal reason for the emergence of such groupings . It is 
oerfectly known the fret that the existing blocs work 
far from perfectly and that many weak developing areas 
have not been able to build up an aderuate industry 
behind a wall of regional protection as to avoid the 
need of exporting to other major international markets 
to bolster their economies . Many stronger developing 
countries (NIC's) have sei.aed opportunities in the 
large markets of Europe and North America .
Indeed , regionalization doss not seem to be a major 
force intrade growth . Even if the countries of the 
EEC , the strongest new free trade area , have retained 
and developed strong third market connections all over 
the world • The most likely assumption over the long 
term is that balance of payments stranglings , parti­
cularly because of the existing imbalance , will force 
nations to seek markets for their exports wherever they 
can , This is not to say that the pattern of the trade 
will be static , merely that opportunism will require 
nations to continue to incur the cost of worldwide 
distribution ’,
Therefore , regionalization is likely to have a stronger 
influence on shipping than it had before , transfering
then resources to other means of transportation such as 
rood and railL"ay devices , end dirinshing the seaborne 
trade mainly cu/ing to the present status of the different 
world shipping markets together with a very low index of 
economic opening from the industrial world towards the 
developing south •
The above is* therefore oerhaps a rather long disgression 
to establish a neutral point for the future of liner shipr- 
ping , but the implications of regionalization seem too 
important to ignore , specially when it might lead to 
deep changes in regional and inter-regional shipping 
evolution in the long run .
li . 2 IFIPO^ T SLRSTITLTIOM ; I[Yipo.CT DP LIWER SHIPPING
The objective of this analysis is not to carry out an 
isolated study of each component of the balance of pay­
ments , but spalling out the limitations and constraints 
of the foreign sector of the economy as a whole , accord­
ing to how the shipping demand and supply will behave • 
Absolutely in all countries of the developing world , 
it highlights the existing contrast between the import 
and export tendencies . The sharing of these countries 
in the world exports has suffered a orogressive reduction 
and it is even more noteworthy to point out that such 
a participation also decreases in the trade of primary 
oroducts , justly wherein presumably they would enjoy 
comparative advantages . However , regarding imports , 
the coefficient of these countries seem to show a 
raising trend in the long run , Although such a gap 
between the components of the commercial balance is not 
so keen as in other areas y Latin America does not get 
rid of such a .tendency .
This different evolution of the exports and imports are 
totally related to two kinds of structural phenomenoms :
a) tha existing incompatibility in the structure of the 
tuio variables of the foreign trade , uhich could techni­
cally be called UPS , or unbalanced productive structures,
B) the existing lag shown by these countries in the pro­
cess of technological penetration and development •
If we should pay attention to both concepts just for a 
while , we might notice that during the present century, 
the international trade developed certain items more 
intensively than others , specially machinery and 
equipment , Then , it would seem to confirm the fact 
that in' recent years the contrast between the trade 
growth rates became wider for different kind of goods .
Wow , if we look upon the trends of the international 
trade , ue can appreciate that rates are high in pro­
ducts imported by Latin America , and relatively low 
in those exoorted by it ,
As long as the higher rates are related to products of 
modern technology , the unequal allocation of the tech­
nical progress and specieliration is clearly set out . 
Obviously , the situation creat:ed by such technical 
orogres.s comes out in the imports of developing coun­
tries , so long as their exports join very weakly the 
technological participation in the manufacturing pro­
cess . Therefore , the foreign trade structure of these 
countries leads to a desequilibrium of dynamic consequen­
ces : there is a primary sector of greater relative effic­
iency thanks to the existing comparative advantages com­
prised into it f but of a lesser relative dynamism if 
we compare it with the industrial sector , wherein the 
relative efficiency is of quite lesser dimension as 
long as its dynamism is greater than the primary sector. 
This leads to a problem of relative speed with respect 
to the input and output of foreign currency , owing to
the unbelpnced rtructural conditions of both sectors ,
In other t'ords , it leads to the exoort of products 
whose world trade grows slowly and import of products 
whose world trade grows quickly , and thus brings about 
an external desecuilibrium given by the different exist­
ing productivities of the primary and industrial sectors 
together with.a slump in unit crices and export volumes. 
Experience shows , that shipping has during the last two 
decades in Latin America been , one of so many activities 
directly affected by such economic phenomenon •
Obviously , the bigger the gap of productivity between 
both sectors is , tbs higher will the barriers to get 
?n acceptable ratio of input/output of foreign currency 
be f L''ith all the implied consequences it could have in 
order to boom the foreign trade of the area concerned •
’Je can set out that as long as foreign loans received 
in hard currency are net allocated to those industries 
Capable themselves of again generating foreign currency 
by exporting what was manufactured internally and phys­
ically as Liell as financially fed from abroad , the 
process of self-emortization will become void and with 
it , the industrialization chain will get a perfectly 
determined end inside of the domestic economy and not 
outside ; thus limiting'not only the economic viability 
of the whole economic region from the industrialization 
point of view , but also restricting the liner shipping 
utilization to excessively low levels as a secondary 
effect ,
One OT the main reasons f if not the top one | whereby 
liner shipping in the industrialized world developed 
considerably in lesser time , is given by the fact that 
in these countries y even when there was a certain gap 
of productivity between said sectors y a strong degree 
of homogeneity was and still is kept between the two 
pillars of the economy as far es foreign currency ere-
ption is concerned . Bottle necks of balance of oeyments 
ere practically non-existing or perfectly maneagsble . 
Liner shicping , despite the present international re­
cession , kept itself carrying cargoes coming from both 
sectors and gron'ing volumes day after day . Then , since 
low , medium and high value cargo permanently grows in 
relative terms compared with markets belonging to LDCs , 
liner shipping in developed markets was fostered and 
encouraged from the very beginning such a gap was matched 
in the now known industrial world . The role to be played 
by the foreign sectors in the economic development of a 
whole region made up of several develop'ing nations , is 
closely related to the basic strategy each country 
undertakes •
Such a strategy can be stated in terms of yrcrdsticks 
containing its outlines and setting out the role to be 
played by the foreign trade . Furthermore , these models 
can be useful for differenciating stages either in the 
internal develooment of a country or between different 
countries .
In international economic spheres , it has been high­
lighted by CEPAL (Latin American Economic Commission) 
that the growth and development of Latin America as a 
whole can be split into two stages : towards the 
outside and towards the inside • The first one is re­
lated to the period wherein exports prevailed as the 
driving engine of economic growth and development , 
as long as in the second one the motive axis constit­
uted the import substitution process , with quite large 
amounts of effects on liner shipping , I should clarify 
that these two situations were just partial outcomes 
coming out of deliberate strategies followed by the 
countries of origin , since they also to a great ex­
tent obeyed special circumstances leading to follow a 
determined behavior line in their economies • For
instance , during the stage of econornic growth towards 
the inside , several programs of manufactured export 
promotions quickly became frustrated mainly owing to 
a combination of causes inherent to their own economies 
and to restrictive or deppresive conditions of the 
international market  ^ including the international 
liner shipping -markets •
As I stated before , an important characteristic of the 
modality adopted by LDCs regarding the first growth 
scheme , is that the exports of these countries still 
keep on showing a decisive shortage of technological 
mix-up along their manufacturing processes , thus limit­
ing more sharply yet their chances of being succesfully 
exported , and uidening even more the already existing 
productivity gap between the primary and industrial 
sectors .
Obviously , what might come out of ;^ his statement is 
that all this , inevitably leads to an external 
strangling of the economies of LDCs together with a 
negative collateral effect on liner space utilization, 
its tonnage , its tendency to achieve economies of scale 
through capitalization , its tendency towards high-tech 
acquisitions , its trend towards the functioning of 
liner markets under market economy rules , its capabili­
ty of getting expanded and developed pushed by its own 
market and so forth .
As we can readily notice , the market is the bible for 
a liner company , so long as the domestic and foreign 
sectors of the national economy are the main pillars 
for national development and progress ; but far from 
being isolated concepts or areas , they are rather 
connected between themselves in a sort of market inter­
dependency , wherein any upward or downward movement of 
a variable may mean very different changes in those 
interrelated areas , and wherein , unfortunately , eco-
nornists seem not to realize that by treating uihat is 
uariable es something constant , tliey are bringing 
about rcny and different sorts of mistaixes of difficult 
corrective adjustment , and creating the source of most 
of the fallacies in political economy , In business 
most of the fallacies have their cause in a sticking 
to means and methods which doss not have a lasting , 
but a temporary virtue •
Summing up , ue could state that by speeding up the GDP 
growth rate of the region , imports would increase as 
well and with it the commercial imbalance would rise 
even more •
Such a desequilibrium could be brought down in the short 
and medium run either by refraining or by substituting 
imports in such a way that a structural change is oossi- 
bly achieved through a better reallocation of factor 
sndowm.ents •
However , although the Latin American GDP growth rate 
during the decade of the 70's was in average 5,6^ , im­
ports increased but at a lesser rate than the GDP , This 
obviously leads to only one conclusion , and that is that 
import substitution was carried out with relative success, 
and with it , shipping and specially the liner market , 
was once again strongly influenced by the economic policy 
adopted by this region ,
When analysing the substitution process , the import stop­
ping process as a disturbing element , also comes up , 
which sometimes is closely related to such a substitution 
scheme and others as a prevailing topic , An extreme case 
of import stopping of the region was the sharp reduction 
born by the import coefficients coming out of the 1930 
crisis . From 1929 to 1932 , such a coefficient was 
brought down 50^ in Argentina and Mexico , B5^ in Brasil 
and Colombia , and almost 80^ in Chile , Such a stopping 
trend was a fundamental factor in driving the substitutive
process , tonether the Ipck of capacity for import­
ing , high custom barriers and several kind of control 
devices were set up , leading to compress the supply 
and demand , Subsequently , the internal increase of 
prices together with the imports reduction brought 
about the necessary conditions for undertaking the 
manufacturing process of similar products in geogra­
phically internal terms •
After the 1930 crisis , the stopping policy was adopted 
more or less regularly by the economic programs of these 
countries , and that is the main reason whereby in fact 
it is quite difficult Sometimes to identify its actual 
effects end to distinguish it from the substitution 
effects . Owing to changes in the price setting struct­
ure and other circumstances connected with the supply , 
demand trend for consumption and investment as well as 
the beh-vior of the productive system is modified , and 
consequently certain imported goods are much less 
utilized than what is the case in more open economies .
Now , if we pay attention to the substitution process , 
we can well set out that such a process , which has 
deep implications on liner shipping , has a meaning 
much wider than simple shifts in the import coefficient,
A batter way of spelling out the imports structure in 
more detail would be by classifying three large groups 
by economic destination : consumption goods , interme­
diate goods and capital goods • Thus , a graphic draw­
ing can be carried out to show the comparative advance 
degree of each country regarding the substitution process. 
This can be done by means of equilateral triangles 
wherein each side , with a longitude of 100^ , represents 
the total in imports of consumption , capital and 
intermediate goods •
(l ) BRAZIL
(2) ARGENTINA
(3 ) mEXICO
(4) COLOMBIA
Consumption 50 
Goods
(4 ) CHILE
(5) PERU
(B) VENEZUELA
(7) CENTRAL AMERICA
Intermediate 
Goods
i%)
Capital Goods {%)
(source ; CEP.AL - Latin Am, Economic Commission)
It can be noticed that , although uith exceotions , im­
ports of most of the countries are mads up of a quite 
low ratio for consumption goods (less than 30'?) , a 
ratio for intermediate goods oscillating between 30f?! 
and 50? , and the same oscillation regarding capital 
goods • The same graph shows that Argentina , Brazil 
and Mexico have achieved a wide substitution of 
consumption goods , while Central America seems to re­
present the exception to the rule since consumption goods 
seem to comprise more than 40? , more than 20? of 
capital goods and more than 30? for the intermediate 
ones • When export fluctuations are likely to take place, 
normally there are two options to choose in order to 
match their effects : either to reduce intermediate 
imports or to restrict the income of capital goods •
If the first ones ere reduced , the level of internel 
economic activity uill be affected uith immediate 
symptoms . On the other hand , if capital goods ere 
limited or restricted , the capitalization process 
can be seriously uounded ,
Obviously , such en effect uill undoubtedly rebound , 
sooner or later , not only on the level of internal 
economic activity but also in the development of the 
economy , The consequences end difficulties of keeping 
on practicing the substitution model , can be appreci­
ated at different levels :
--  imports as a uhole .
--  its sectorial content •
--  the industrial development it might generate .
--  the development strategy it represents .
From the imports point cf view and in international 
terms , its coefficient uith respect to the oroduot is 
already leu enough in some Latin American countries end 
it keeps a tendency dounwards . The forecast of some 
of these coefficients according to some recent studies, 
leads to extremely lou indexes , equal or even lower 
than the minimum coefficient obtained by the largest 
end more developed nations of the world , However , the 
tendencies for the long run represent a more intensive 
substitution process than in recent years , whenever 
we shut out wars or armed conflict periods , for Ar­
gentina , Brasil and flexico ,
But on the contrary , such a process has been diminish­
ed in the countries with more reduced domestic markets. 
At the same time , by prolonging the internal extensive 
industrialization without having a correlative way out 
of such a transforming scheme , it would stress the 
worsening of the foreign sector of the relevant national 
economy further of generating a progressive receding 
from the international standards of efficiency . Once
the imports of consumption goods reach high levels oT 
substitution as uell as other import products uhose 
manufacturing process requires relatively small-seized 
plants f substitution must operate areas where the pro­
duction can be achieved in terms of considerable eco­
nomies of scale ; this is to say in areas such as those 
related to intermediate and capital goods •
If we sum up the main features of the substitution pro­
cess we might notice that all of them lead to a much 
lesser foreign trade and consequently to much smaller 
liner markets • These characteristics are as follows :
A - STRONG I^ T^ERMAL EXTENSIVE INDUSTRIALIZATION 
B - LACK OF EXTERNAL COUNTERBALANCE 
C - HIGH DEGREE OF If^ lPORT SUBSTITUTION
D - STRONG TENDENCY TO DIVERSIFY THE SUBSTITUTION PROCESS
Item A , in terms of shipping , clearly states that by 
industrializing a country or region and by producing 
locally what before was imported , cargo tonnage to be 
carried by sea will decidedly decrease end with it , 
the relevant liner market is likely to be either broken 
down into several independent organizations or to keep 
the same structure as the one existing before but with 
a smaller magnitude , Although it is true that by 
achieving internal industrialization targets , new im­
port requirements come up and therefore an upward move­
ment of the demand for shipping is expected , while new 
demand reouirements are quite lower in relative terms 
to what could have been imported without such a pro­
cess . Therefore , even when there is a kind ef 
compensation of cargo tonnage within the same segment 
and represented by new import devices , the trade volume 
is inevitably reduced and with it , south bound traffic 
deeply damaged • Such a damage is allowed to occur
th?nks to the second phsnomenom I cell lack of external 
counterbalance . As 'j'e have seen before , this is 
nothing else than a shortage of cutouts uhic hare supposed 
to keep a certain re'lationship with their inputs •
However , this relationship of continuity can not be 
achieved due to several internal problems found during 
the manufacturing process and also owing to the fact thafct 
those inputs have never been oriented towards the joint 
participation of both the still imported materials and 
accesories , and the national factor endowments • In 
addition to that , I should clear up that the national 
policy was never to carry out substitution as a means 
of earning foreign currency by exporting product units 
containing a certain degree of manufacture but to deal 
with fluctuations of hard currency income due to the 
negative international market conditions given in the 
short run ; which I personnaly consider a big mistake 
since it clearly represents a lack of planning and 
entrepreunerial undertaking ,
Anyway , this second item together with the first one , 
leads to an even more depressed liner market in its dif­
ferent segments  ^ and obviously becomes represented by 
a downward tendency on the part of the south bound tra­
ffic and a too sharp upward curve condemned to get stag­
nated in the short run ,
Regarding items C and D , we might well affirm that by 
raising the substitution degree and by spreading or di­
versifying such a process y traffic recession is not 
going to give up its decreasing treeds towards levels 
at which an hypothesis or likelihood of free market 
economy and gradual deregulation is quite unlikely to 
take place , but rather it will tend to shut out any 
private undertaking which could be encouraged by a 
more free y or less central regulation owing to the 
simple fact that the weaker . certain traffic is y
the more regulated it becomes uith the conseriuent effects 
on liner innovation and market specialization ,
I believe it is important to point out that any advance 
in the substitution process makes it possible to achieve 
higher levels of development , but once such a process 
is achieved , new import requirements u/ill have to be met 
in order to not only keep the same development degree but 
also to keep the economy growing at faster and higher 
rates than before , In such a case liner shipping would ' 
not be so negatively affected except by the fact that , 
in real life , it is -not the real case-, ''Jew imoort 
needs generally do not come up as they theoretically 
should , and the liner market gets more and more 
compressed day after day . The reasons for such a 
phenomenom escape'-from the frame of this study , Slthouoh 
I should say that it is caused by a kind of collateral 
substitution that takes place immediately after the first 
step of substitution of any segment of the industry ,
Of course , there are always new import needs and new 
voices are constantly going to be opened in the relevant 
traffic tariffs , but its actual volume is rather 
unsignificant compared with the real volume' it should 
have if it were done like a normal process with planned 
structures •
If we have a look at what happened in South East Asia 
with countries such as Thailand , Indonesia as well as 
South Korea a little further to the north , one may 
readily realize that those nations were and still are 
strongly involved in substitution processes and without 
having to deal with bottlenecks in their marine cargo 
traffic • Then , including myself , one might wonder 
why ; I would say the answer is very simple , but the 
root of such a reply is not so simple ; the import sub­
stitution processes of these countries were carefully 
outwardly oriented , bearing in mind that the master
target of auch processes u.'as not only to bring about 
the creation of Iscal industry with all the multiplier 
effects comorised in it , but also to allocate between 
the productive factors the necessary conditions as if 
to make them into competitive elements in international 
terms , caoable of generating worldwide exports with all 
the expected advantages included , such as foreign 
currency earnings , higher rates of employment , non­
existence of liner traffic reduction and so forth . 
Thereafter , the extent to which each nation develops 
its merchant marine is a topic that depends entirely 
on shipping policy , which I am not going to deal with 
right now , But the most important aspect to underline 
here , is that these countries , by carrying out such 
a process of macroeconomic nature , did not engage 
neither the financial standing of the liner shipping 
sector nor the cargo-flows of their relevan-.t liner 
trades • Obviously such a orocess was partially achieved 
by Latin America as regards the local spreading of 
industrial resources but almost completely void with 
respect to export schemes and outbound cargoes by sea , 
with consenuent reductions of the liner market as a 
whole , and thus creating different liner markets as 
far as the concept of interdependency is concerned , 
and regarding segment shapes and structures .
What I am trying to demonstrate here , is simply that 
liner shipping has much deeper roots than it is supposed 
to have or commonly accepted , and that is not , asI: people say , only a derived demand of the foreign trade .
" It is also the derived demand of other macroeconomic
f
strategies adopted within the framework of the nationalI and internal economy , which at first sight seems not
; to have any direct relationship with shipping , when in
the daily practice each movement suffered from many 
macro-variables which can be monitored throughout a 
brief period of time in the management of a fleet or
* 1
undertaking of a oroject , I consider the hehevior of 
the national economy v/ariebles as the actual parameters 
for measuring the feasibility of any liner market from 
all points of uieu , and not the behavior of the foreign 
trade of the country or region uhich in fact depends 
largely on what goes on internally • This concept was 
apparently understood by the nations before mentioned 
and moreover by their governments and non-marine 
authorities by adopting macro-policies oriented to 
achieve national economic targets but uithcut getting 
the marine field damaged f but rather encouraging it 
at the same time , Foreign trade forecast is of extreme 
oriority for a liner company ; but unfortunately it can 
only be foreseen , and uith certain limitations , through­
out the short run but never beyond it in economies of 
LDCs .
However , the actual variables to be picked up and 
keot in mind as if to predict in reliable terms whet 
is coming in the near future , are the ones belonging 
to the internal macroeconomic policy . Those are the 
only ones , in my personal opinion , that should be 
taken into account for monitoring , analysing and 
evaluating the liner market growth and development in 
the long run •
Foreign trade gives a rough picture in the short run 
and is unable of granting by itself  ^ security of 
continuity • Furthermore , since liner investment and 
exploitation are based on long run expected earnings 
owing mainly to its highly capitalistic character com­
prised into permanent recessive cycles , it can not 
trust the short run performance of the foreign trade 
variables , but must go beyond them and rely , although 
not totally , on the long run prospects made up of 
internal variables coming out of both the primary and 
industrial sectors of the economy .
To fully understand this concept , it is enough to look
upon the Latin American macroeconomic policy throughout 
the past fou.r decades , wherein all policies adopted 
were done regardless of any collateral effect it could 
possibly have on the shipping field • During these 
decades , liner shipping in particular , was oscillating 
according to many different policies and changing inter­
national environments , such as a ship without final 
destination and whose only objective is to keep herself 
afloat and wait for better weather conditions •
 ^ . 3 - REGIONAL IflPORT SUBSTITUTIOM AND ITS EFFECTS ON 
LINER SHIPPING
Like we have partially seen before , when the export sec­
tor lost its dynamic character as an income generator , 
Latin American countries chose an accelerated process of 
industrialization , Then , given such circumstances , it 
appeared unlikely to start directly by setting up basic 
and capital industries , as this was the reason whereby 
the process focused primarily on those industries which , 
from the technological point of view , appeared to be of 
relative easy undertaking . 'dhen such a process started 
showing a certain weakness due to the factors already 
explained , and the foreign sector of the economy began
Ionce more to strangle the economic development of -^ he 
region , the internal logic of the process demanded to 
keep on substituting , thus affecting even more the 
several major liner markets with the consequent pricing 
transference inward the domestic economies •
At that time , the expansion of industries such as steel 
and iron , chemical plants , oil refineries and some 
branches of mechanical industry could be noticed , In 
these new activities the endowments of.capital and tech­
nology used to be greater than those of the traditional 
manufactures , and subsequently , problems of economies 
of scale and market size started coming up claying a
restrictive rcle even more sharply then before ,
An important topic I want to point out at this stage is 
the market size by saying that such a concept keeps an 
unalterable relationship with liner market size and its 
possibilities to grow up or become stagnated .
If we assume that any liner market is capable of develop­
ing by its own-means under open market conditions me 
can set out that whatever the policy may be regarding 
industrialization , such liner markets are going to have 
considerable development gaos among them « If a process 
of import substitution is carried out in such a way that' 
countries , members of a -regional community are going to 
spread the necessary links to coooerate with each other 
and to go beyond the domestic markets to exploit neighbour 
markets as if to reach economies of scale , and at the 
same time to diversify their supply sources as a means of 
cutting out ties of dependency  ^ then  ^ it seems easy to 
conclude that liner shipping prospects are not very 
encouraging , In this case , rail and road transport will 
play a fundamental role in the carriage of goods among 
most Latin American countries , although anyhow , there 
will be a few specific maritime trades that will get a 
kind of drive regarding cargo tonnage j and these countries 
are those far located from the geographical center of the 
region , beyond which , land transport operators will have 
to deal with the economies of scale orinciples whenever 
they want to get by • And it is at this point where liner 
shipping can still get a better chance of improving and 
getting rid of its overtonnage by filling the gap with 
cargo , But still •, this trend would not be the master 
tendency for all the liner trades but it would be an 
isolated scheme and non-representative of the real effects 
of regional substitution and regionalization of industries. 
But in the case that throughout this import substitution 
process , which could possibly take place beyond the do-
mestic , some positive outcomes should occur
ss recerds exports of mcnufactures which cot through 
the internal industrialization process | then , Ixner 
markets would definitely be improved and strengthened 
owing to new cargo flows f cither between the geogra— 
ohical extremes of the region or with the industrial 
centers . This would obviously lead to very different 
political implications than in the first case , but 
not for that less valid . A comparison between the USA 
and European countries reveals that the North American 
market size is four times larger than the one in France, 
Germany or UK . However , each of these countries has 
a smaller market size than Latin America , but in a 
small- magnitude . 'dhen the comparison is done between 
said Eurooean countries and the three largest countries 
of the region - Argentina , Brasil and Mexico - it can 
be verified that its market size is again four times 
smeller then that of the Europeens .
Evidently , what can be seen here is that both ,
Europeans and North Americans have elready oassed the 
examination of imcorts substitution , industrialization, 
diversification and cooperation by making use not only 
of their domestic markets but also of their neighbour­
ing markets , with the clear Duroose of reaching 
economies of scale and high productivity • As a matter 
of fact , liner shipping is dominated to a great,extent 
by those nations as well , and this means nothing less 
that shipping , and mainly the liner branch , which has 
deep rootso buried into the domestic economy , deserves 
a better understanding if it is expected to expand 
and to be utilized as a useful tool to earn foreign 
exchange •
A second kind of comparison refers only to one segment 
of the domestic field which is represented by the de­
mand of mechanical products , which can be well regarded
ES one of the crucial sectors within the industrializa­
tion process . If ue comcare the international demand 
cf mechanical products in one of the before stated Euro­
pean countries with the total of Latin America , ue can 
Observe that the Latin American demand is smaller than 
the French one , the one from Germany or UK , and the 
ratio between -the USA and the Latin American total is 
aoproximately of 16 to 1 , Furthermore , if such a 
comparison is made individually among those European 
nations and Argentina , Brasil or I'lexico , such a ratio 
comes close to 5 to 1 ,
These global figures clearly demonstrate that the Latin 
American market is not very important if measured in 
international terms and that moreover , industrialized 
countries own market sizes that actually surpass the 
internal ones due to the magnitude cf their exports , 
which in fact , is the weakest and most lim,iting point 
in the expansion scheme of liner shipping of any LDC , 
Regardless of the country , either south or north bound, 
liner market exploitation is based to a great extent on 
the carriage of products with a given added value and 
not of primary goods as several authors have considered, 
which makes liner shipping a kind of head bridge in the 
process of placing national goods on overaeas markets . 
'i/e might say , at the risk of oversimplifying that any 
liner service that pretends to get by in a competitive 
environment such as the existing one nowadays , is bound 
to look for an acceptable mix of both primary goods and 
manufactured commodities ; but what is definitely im­
possible to accept is the possibility of succesfully 
competing in a market made up of a very low rate of 
industrial cargoes , which actually show the deadline 
of variable costs as well as running costs ,
What comes out of all this , is that if Latin America 
wishes to continue its economic development process ,
uihich ssGms to to full of constraints end draubccks 
represented .by the inpossibility of increasing its 
incones through exports and of carrying out succes- 
fully the substitution process together uith the in­
ternal and outgoing industrialization , what it has to 
do , is to aim at becoming integrated from ell points 
of view ss the only feasible way of achieving possitivel;y 
the industrialization program and a suitable balance in 
the regional industrial structure uith the incorporation 
of basic industries •
By integrating Latin American nations , liner shipping 
is not supposed to remain untouched but diminished in 
terms of cargo volumes throughout the short run . But 
thereafter , and provided that such an integration is 
effectively realized by gathering different factor 
endowments coming from several countries and from dif­
ferent segments of the industry , the liner sector is 
expected to grow up , This h?s the mein purpose of 
reaching economies of scale and high productivity 
capable of transforming the internal m.cnufacturing pro­
cess in an export oriented economic organization. , as 
in East Adia ,
Within this context , liner shipping structures belong­
ing to the heterogeneous market segments are likely to 
mix up technical knowledge and specialization together 
with different growth and expansion rates in the long run 
in other words the liner business is likely to increase 
its space utilization rate and to, finally settle down 
with the support coming from the internal industrial­
ization outwards oriented as the main variable to 
negotiate shares , and to combine in a much better way 
the regional resources which are represented not only 
by a combination of primary and industrial commodities 
as far as liner transport is concerned , but also by 
marine technology exchange amiong the existing members •
out for Latin America as a uhole , and also for liner 
shipping provided such an integration program achieves 
its external target of expanding its products and 
services much beyond its frontiers .
4 . 4 -  OBJECTIVES OF A RZGIO’^jAL DEUELDPflENT POLICY : 
ITS EFFECTS ON LINER T^ ARKETS
The problems of the foreign sector regarding the growth 
of developing countries are constantly discussed in 
UNCTAD , where there is always a common understanding 
of what policies should be adopted to overcome the 
growth barriers :
a ) better treatment of traditional exports with resoect 
to unit prices , quantities and continuity ,
B) promotion of new exports , specially manufactures , 
from LDCs to industrial nations .
C) better conditions and more suitable currents of for­
eign capital from the industrial centers to the peri­
phery ,
D) realization of regional agreements on economic inte­
gration among LDCs .
These four aims are closely connected to each other and 
have complementary targets , and although all of them 
have a certain influence on liner shipping activities ,
I am going to focus the attention mainly on the inte­
gration phenomenon , since I consider it is a quite 
relevant topic in regional terms so as to expand and 
interregionalize the liner trades end their different 
segments in Latin America .
As we have already set out , economic development in 
this area has so far been based on substitution policies 
on one hand , but requiring on the other hand as well , 
an additional pillar made up by manufacture sales in
the international narkct . Then , economic integration 
would mainly lead to keep the import substitution pro­
cess alive , with the purpose of linking it with the 
market enlargement as a result of such an integration . 
Such an enlargement of the market would definitely mean 
that the manufacturing process of some goods reaches 
acceptable efficiency levels more quickly , since the 
productive capacity of the new undertakings would be 
utilized in a more complete way and the adopted pro>-- 
cesses would incorporate economies of scale .
Normally , the necessary investment per unit of new 
production , particularly the one reruiring the use of 
scarce currency , would be reduced , thus enlarging the 
increment of the productive capacity that could be 
obtained with the limited resources available • Thus  ^
integration would accelerate the import substitution 
process as well as it would make it more rational and 
effective .
It has already been explained that the upkeep of a rythm 
of a suitable imports substitution is quite unlikely to 
be done , if it is only based on the national markets • 
Obviously , most of the goods whose productions should 
start , require large plants , quite considerable capi­
tal investments and a very complex technology , so that 
its production in small size markets might only be carried 
out by sacrifying efficiency • In return , economic 
integration would enable the creation of a substitution 
program of these goods at a regional scale •
Now the questions are : What could be the role to be 
played by liner shipping within this regional context ? ; 
Are liner trades going to keep the same development 
trend as before the integration ? ; If not , what are 
the changes going to be and what is the timing factor 
influence ? ; Is the Latin American liner segment pre­
pared to face such a challenge of sharp shifts and 
entrepreunerial innovations ? ; To what extent would
the linsr ehipeing incu'stry rctuelly bene^ i^t from re- 
gicnol policies ?
These ere just & feu questions arising out of the eco­
nomic integration phenomenon , and to uhich I hove clear 
ensuers , although not always of positive character • 
First of ell , the existing targets of a regional import 
substitution program have two different faces as far as 
liner transport is involved ;
1 - To place the substituted commodities not only in the 
domestic market but also into foreig-n rcrl-:sts , members 
of the regional integration • In such a case , t*^ e in­
vestment required for building som*e specific capital 
goods -nd intermediate commodities would find justifi­
cation not only from the rcononies of scale point of 
view , but also from, the social cost one • By having 
several markets with di-^fcrent specialization degrees* 
the scope for the demand gets opened as if it were a 
domestic market ten * twenty or thirty times larger in 
magnitude * and more promising regarding its possible 
potentiality , Therefore , efficiency and quality 
standards are likely to be achieved by opening the 
national borders to'wards limiting countries or ccny 
member nation to the regional integration scheme ,
2 - This process * when limited or restricted by either 
partial lack of know-how or unsuitable manpower or any 
sort of technical constraint coming out of the binding 
complementary character of the process in itself * may 
choose the alternative of shutting out the possibility 
to carry out all the transformation process frontiers 
inwards , and to look for a sort of combination of eco­
nomic factors together with a certain ratio of complement 
with regions located frontiers outwards , but of course 
members to the area •
That is the way a project that is apparently unattainable
owing to scarce factor endounents or for instance to the 
non-existence of one of them , may be perfectly accomplished 
by means of "gathering the right factors in the right en­
dowments '^ rom the regional context •
Regarding the first topic and as far as liner markets are 
inuolued , we could state without running any risk of 
getting into pure theoretical arguments , that by enlarg­
ing the national markets through the opening of frontiers 
and legal-economic barriers , many projects are likely 
to be undertaken and what I consider of top importance , 
are going to reach international standards of efficiency. 
Naturally , such an efficiency standard will not come up 
neither suddenly nor in the. short run but is going to 
get gradually developed end to create oositive outcomes , 
very orobably after the short run has finished , Then , 
during the short run , and orouided that the regional 
import substitution is properly accomplished , having 
in mind the concept of multiplied markets , south bound 
cargo flows are going to get gradually reduced till 
reaching a level at which the remaining import subst­
itution altern'^tives , being quite a few , indicate 
what to expect or what not to expect in the coming 
future regarding cargo tonnage alternatively available 
in the liner markets , their potentialities and prospects, 
their different segments of demand and so forth ,
However , something we should not overlook is the fact 
that this regional substitution never occurs for all 
the relevant goods at the same time , but thatt there 
are normally several kinds of lags in undertaking such 
a process , such as an implementation lag , analysis 
lag , factors complementation lags and others « this 
is to say that even though the south bound market is 
going to be , although gradually , sharply compressed, 
sooner or later but always within the short run , such 
a market is going to receive a growing demand given by
the new import needs gencreted by the internal and re­
gional program of industrializstion , since the main 
target of substituting is to create industries , local­
ly run and managed , and not to generate an import shut­
down ,
However , the new import needs in terms of tonnage and 
throughout the second half of the short run , are going 
to be of quite lesser magnitude than in previous periods, 
but will help liner shioping to overcome the short run 
without having to apply to the lay-up tonnage market , 
or to any sort of strategy such as flagging out and 
others •
GR^PH
CM : cargo volume
A : average of imports before the process 
B : curve of new s/b cargo-flow during the process 
X ; inflection point (curve B)
On this graph is clearly shou.'n an existing gap that will 
never be filled during at least the first half of the 
short run , owing to its own dynamic character of the 
process end to the second main target of the process, 
that is to decrease the import coefficient as a way of 
saving foreign currency and cutting out dependency ties 
from the industrial centers •
Standard or normal cargo inflows are likely to be 
permanently reduced up to a level at which is supposed 
to be close to the ending point of the first half of 
the short run although it might also be somewhere close 
to the starting point of the second half , Herefrom , 
the trend of the south bound cargo is going to suffer 
from a shift by raising its volume as far as tonnage 
is concerned , and by increasing its degree of diver­
sification if we look upon the kind of commodities to 
be imported ; but even though the trend changes towards 
more positive or less negative figures , there will 
always be a gap in the cargo volume between the new 
import needs and the former import level before the 
starting of the process , which actually is impossible 
to be matched if we talk about number of tons carried 
from the statistical point of view , But what very 
probably is not going to be so sharply affected is 
obviously the freight tons level that is what actually 
matters to any shipowner , since and as we said before , 
any import substitution process involves an advance in 
the goods to be brought in technological standards as well 
as certain increase in tonnage depending on the way and 
how far such a process is carried out •
Then , such a gap will always be there in volume terms 
but probably not forever in value terms as far as freight 
rates are concerned ,
The Z area shows the difference between the still non­
sub stituted goods and the new import needs , which in 
simple words means that the development trend of the new
imports curve in the finel stage of the short run has 
begun , Uhat could oossibly happen during the following 
stages is something rather dif^^icult to foresee althouoh 
not impossible ; but anyhow such an analysis will depend 
entirely on how the macro and micro variables behave to­
gether with the joint participation of both the public 
and private sectors of the economy ,
Uhat could possibly happen with the new import needs 
curve throughout the medium and long run in different 
situations expressed in terms of cargo volumes can be 
appreciated on the graphs below ,
A : new import needs 
B : non-substituted products
imports average before the process
We can assume that on the first graph , once the
short run is finished , the curve of new import needs (A) 
gets stagnated throughout the medium and long run owing 
to any kind of mismanagement arising out of any of the 
many program strategies that make up the master target 
of import substitution  ^ so long as the curve of non— 
substituted products (B) will continue with variances 
during the medium run and , consequently , with .a great 
likelihood of rising during the long run as a consequence 
of its own dynamic character , in the process which bears 
in mind the G!\!P growth as well as the population increase 
and similar items •
In this case , the reason whereby the process becomes 
rigid and unadjustable can be found in the misplanning 
of market enlargement as an attainable alternative with­
in the context of import substitution and industriali­
zation programs «
On the seconci graph we can assume that such an enlarge­
ment with all its economic features is accomplished and 
therefore , the new imports curve tends to go gradually
UD from the v-. ry beginning of the second stare , as 
long as the other curve tends to keep the same trend 
during the medium run and to dscreese slowly durino 
the final stage es e consecuence of new achievements 
and developments in the process as a whole • In this 
case and as uie have just seen , the traditional imports 
will tend to be lower each year and the new import needs 
will tend to increase not in volume but in value terms y 
which simply means that although always existing , the 
cargo volume gap is likely to be partially offset by 
better and higher technological products paying better 
freights am.ong other things •
On the third graph (4,1',A) we can assume a situation 
whereby the 'whole process is partially carried out and 
lus performance is of rather doubtful a.ccurscy , Then , 
what hapoens here is that everything is going to be 
developed anyway but with certain delays coming out of 
such partial misplanning , If we compere it with the 
second graph , we can notice that the same trend is 
followed by the third one but in later terms ; this is 
to say that the upward movement of curve A takes place 
at a later stage during the medium run and suffers from 
certain interruptions during its growing trajectory , 
thus producing several lags throughout its development 
in the medium run , Such a tendency will continue during 
the long run with the typical effects of the stop end 
go policies ,
Curve B tends to decrease but also at a later stage , 
within which such a lag can take much more time than 
the represented one on the graph , Then what comes out 
of these three examples , is the fact that despite an 
existing solid import substitution process , the gap 
between curve A and the average of imports before the 
process is going to be importantly reduced in quantity 
and strongly overcome in value during the long run ,
Throughout the first end second stages , the gap is 
going to remain , although not totally , quite im­
mobile ; but at least the trends to be adopted will be 
very useful to foresee what is coming in the long run . 
Then , we can finally state that by involving the whole 
area in an imports substitution program , liner shipping 
and its markets will be bound to resist the same effects 
of an economic recession during at least the first years 
of the programme ; but once such a process gets an 
acceptable speed-up and properly combines the available 
resources on a regional basis by means of the enlarge­
ment of industrial markets , liner trades will ex­
periment rather drastic shifts in thsir structures and 
in their different segments , specially when the medium 
stage reaches its ending point ,
Regarding the second point , we should start its 
analysis by accepting the fact that even when the pro­
cess just mentioned , together with the market enlarge­
ment strategy is a feasible way out so that it reacti­
vates the regional economy without jeopardizing the 
liner shipping structures too much during the first 
years . Such a process can perfectly find barriers of 
structural nature that in fact are quite difficult to 
overcome , thus producing stop and go effects on the 
basement of the process generally owing to the im­
possibility of reaching high import substitution coef­
ficients on their own , or in other words due to the 
lack of complement regarding the factor endowments 
within a regional context , This is to say that the 
actual advantages of such a process can readily become 
real drawbacks whenever the factor endowments mix does 
not exist . But let us suppose for a while that^in 
addition to the import substitution process , its 
internal industrialization and the market enlargement , 
there is also the complementary character of the factors 
among the regional nations . In this case , the whole
process , mede up of four clesrly identified steps , 
with its interns1 and external economic trends , is 
going to heue several and different effects on liner 
traffic in a region like Latin America .
In order to analyse the economic integration on a re­
gional basis I consider it necessary to split the liner 
traffic into four fundamental areas :
1 ) REGIONAL LINER flARKETS - IMPORTS OR S/B TRAFFIC
2) OVERSEAS LINER MARKETS - IMPORTS OR,S/B TRAFFIC
3) REGIONAL LINER MARKETS - EXPORTS OR N/B TRAFFIC
OVERSEAS LINER MARKETS - EXPORTS OR N/B TRAFFIC
Regarding the first area , ue can start by saying that 
u'ithin a regional context , what can not be logically 
substituted can be done through the regional complement 
system and technical assistance among the countries of 
the integration cone , This is to say that any under­
taking that runs out of any factor of production , can 
be regionally complemented by other participating 
country ns regards the scarce factor as a way of getting 
lo'j'er standard costs and greater penetration indexes .
All this leads to larger regional markets in the liner 
business as far as south bound cargo tonnage is concerned 
due to the simple reason that by gathering regional re­
sources instead of only national ones y the cargo tonnage 
to be moved uiithin the context of the regional complement 
in terms of raw materials y capital goods j accessories 
and spare parts will be much greater than before the re­
gional strategy . Houever y I should clear up the point 
that not all the cargo of complementary nature among the 
member countries of the regional agreement is going to 
be carried by sea , but by RAIL end ROAD , since the 
geographical features of the continent do not shoiu 
neither archipielagos of considerable extent nor inac­
cessible zones by land •
Then , treffic which will probrbly benefit from such a 
process is the traffic that nowadays , is ruled under 
the concept of bilateral agroer.onts , such as the 
system existing between Argentina and Brasil , wherein 
the distances between the industrial centers of both 
countries indicate that the best alternative to carry 
goods is represented by the setting-up of liner markets , 
without forgetting , of course , the relevant cost-benefit 
ratios associated to those distances • Then , although not 
totally , the new regional cargo will influence to a great 
extent the develooment and expansion of the regional liner 
segments from the very beginning such a complement cycle 
starts f or at a later stage if such a cycle was not 
adopted on the right time .
Regarding the second area and follo'j.’ing the same deductiv'o 
■Procedure , it seems ruite easy to realize that the south 
bound cargoes coming from the industrial centers will have 
to bear a sharp reduction on its volume , due to the sim'^ le 
fact that the region is already engaged not only in an im- 
rort substitution process locally run and planned but also 
in a regional im.port substitution program with character­
istics of complement and balancing among the member 
nations . Then , the overssas segments of liner trades 
in Latin America are logically expected to decrease in 
tonnage y and consequently in.segment terms as well , 
which at first sight and individually considered would 
seem to be very disappointing , although actually arises 
as something quite oromising if considered as it really 
is , this is to say as only one segment in the whole 
market ,
Continuing the analysis , if we spell out the third 
area we can set out at the risk of oversimplifying that 
like the first area , any regional import implicates a 
regional export , thus producing a kind of cargo react­
ivation based mainly on two pillars represented by the 
ouflow of goods coming out of the com.plement strategy
?nd frctcrs balancing between the rrember nations , and 
by the rrnrket cnlargenent within the rsyionrl frontiers 
of the zone in egreement as a whole , and not only in 
national scales •
Once again , as I said before regarding the first area, 
not everything that is going to be exported will be done 
by sea , but at least a substantial share of it will be 
sent through the liner markets .
Eventually , the four area left as the most important if 
we think in terms of liner fleet expansion and liner 
market enlargement and diversification comprised into 
the framework of regional economic integration .
'de can stats once more , that the immediate target of 
a substitution policy is to spread internal industrial- 
izction as a way of developing technology , of generating 
jobs , of gathering and utilizing more properly the eco­
nomic factors and so on ; but after such an objective , 
comes up as a must , the chance of placing substituted 
units abroad by means of what we already have seen : 
domestic import substitution and regional import subs­
titution programs •
The domestic process brings about several strategies 
placed between itself end the regional substitution pro­
cess with many different effects on liner shipping • 
de can say that those strategies are ruito interrelated 
between themselves as well as closely connected with the 
liner-'shipping development , being all of them of positive 
outcome in average • But even though the average shows 
positive figures as far as liner growth is concerned , 
they are of very relative importance without the success 
of the fourth strategy or area , since what comes 
immediately after a regional substitution program is 
nothing less than the way out for those products locally 
produced and '-'known as production exceedings •
There is no regional economic integration in the world 
that has been set up by looking only inwards the regional
contsxj: and without considering the hard currency inflow 
it night get by looking outwards • In other words , such 
a orocess starts internally oriented , to finish externally 
spreaded by means of export strategies , wherein liner 
shipping plays a supporting role from the economic point 
of view , and a first line role regarding defense and 
policy matters •
Coming back to the main topic , it can be said that the 
nations members to the regional economic integration , 
by opening their economic borders and by gathering their 
land , capital , labour and technology endowments in 
complementary ratios in accordance with the real needs 
and possibilities of the regibnal industry , are in a 
much better position of reaching economies of scale with 
quite attractive chances of transforming their infant 
industries , in cost competitive activities working and 
operating under all sorts of efficiency standards .
All this , ”hich appears to bo quite easy to achieve 
i:then on the paper , is actually v/ary difficplt and mis­
leading to carry out in a recessive environment . 
Furthermore , it highlights the importance of the fourth 
area and the dependency shipping gro'wth and expansion 
keeps on it ,
Anyway , this process , externally oriented , can be 
considered as the motive axis for liner shipping expansion 
on all its segments and on both sides , the supply and de­
mand • Therefore,'we can take the north bound overseas 
liner markets as the strongest beneficiary of the subst­
itution program in regional terms •
Besides this I want to underline the fact that a complete 
and promising integration cycle , with its subsequent 
positive results related to liner trades y is by no means 
a guarantee that such a cycle is going to last forever . 
Such an integration orocess should bear in mind the four 
fundamental steps for achieving positive outcomes from an 
economic point of view , and for keeping the Jiner shipping
supply untouchsble during the first periods , as uell as 
for raising the space denand in a pomanent manner :
1 - nOf'IZSTiC IPOOPT cUBSTITUTION fND LOCAL INDUSTRIALIZATION
2 - FAARKET ENLARGEMENT IN REGIONAL TERMS
3 - REGIONAL IM'^ ORT SUBSTITUTION AND COMPLEMENTARY CHARACTER
4 - OVERSEAS EXPORTS THROUGH ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND STANDARDS
OF EFFICIENCY
Whenever those postulates be resoected and coordinately 
accomplished , economic reactivation is very likely to take 
place , and together with it , liner shipping orouith and 
development , Then , ue can finally say that on overage , 
and as is shown on the graph right below , liner shipping 
can definitely get benefits from this process , but 
always provided there are teams in charge of loolcing after 
what is going on in subjects or areas such as economic 
planning and foreign policy matters of the whole region ,
LINER MARKET TRENDS IN 
THE LONG RUN
IMPORTS - S/B EXPORTS - N/B 
REGIONAL LINER MARKETS + +
OVERSEAS LINER MARKETS - +
However , if we go a little beyond the positive liner 
market trends arisen out of economic integration , and 
if we analyze country by country in Latin America , we 
can see that the integration strategy , as a dynamic pro­
cess in itself , finds a very dark side to explore and to
Latin American natackle in many , although not all , 
tions .
Such a drawback is basedrupon the fact that before speak­
ing of regional integration , a country should look upon 
whether it is already nationally integrated and consolida­
ted or not , since it is rather unlikely to talk in terms 
of regional planning when not even the internal complement­
ary character of factors is given in a minimum expression . 
This is the case of the areas relatively less developed 
within the same country ; for this puroose we can take 
Peru , wherein there'are at least three kinds of economies 
perfectly differenciated and with a very weak linkage be- 
tseen them :
A) the exoort economy , made up of products such as fish 
meal , copper and other products , which have shown through­
out the last decades a rather high degree of dynamism and a 
higher technological level ;in relative terms .
B) the coastal economy , which produces for the domestic 
market , some manufactures and services , can be consi­
dered as relatively less developed and technically advanced 
than the latter one . Furthermore , it does not get many 
benefits from the dynamism of the first one , since greater 
exDorts normally generate an income which is actually spent 
in a very low share on manufactured goods internally oro- 
duced .
C) the economy of the mountain , which operates at subsist­
ence levels and with extremely primitive techniques ; so 
that the developments of the previous economies affect it 
on a very low scale , thus keeping it self-stagnated and 
isolated throughout the time .
What I want to highlight with such a brief explanation , 
is that if economies of scale are to be reached by the 
countries which are members to the regional agreement , 
and if mobilization of economic factors are to be planned 
and utilized , national integration seems to be the first 
and indispensable step whenever we think interms of eco-
nomic imorovement y wherein liner shipping is included. 
The areas of rny domestic economy rust be connected to 
each other in such a way to allouj a good starting of 
the process as a uihole as well as of liner shipping as 
a segment of it .
4 . 5 COK'CLUSlOrJ
According to what has been stated so far , ue can 
readily observe that there is no way to succesfully 
develop and imolement a liner shipping strategy within 
the Latin American context without first looking upon 
the ecorramic development of the region . This is due 
to the simple fact that , on the one hand , the stag­
nation level is so wide end rigid that it does not 
allow to think of planning and undertaking strategies 
of any sort regarding the liner trades , as long as 
on the other hand , different monooolies as well as 
oligopolies have taken over the existing markets 
within a framework of even deeper recessive character­
istics .
Such development must definitely be ^ased upon the 
following basis :
A - Import substitution 
3 - rOcrket enlargement 
C - Regionalization 
D - Exports
'jJe can say that the imports substitution program (A) 
has already been accomplished on a national basis by 
almost every nation in Latin America , although more 
specifically in South America , As we saw earlier , 
such a process can no longer offer new alternatives 
of domestic production as a way of diminishing the 
outflow of foreign exchange and creating internal 
industrialization .
Therefore , it would seem easy to predict that the 
next step should be the market enlargement strategy 
(B) as a way of combining all the available factors 
of production with the purpose of reaching high 
economies of scale and international standards of
efficiency . Then , immedietely after these stages , 
exports (d ) -ere likely to corr.e up es a result of the 
ounctusl accomplishment of the previous stages .
All this , which has been so far briefly stated , is 
supposed to show the way upon which the economic variables 
can lead Latin America to reach e much better performance 
and together with it , to get the chance of expanding and 
professionalizing its liner fleet . Such development , 
as we said before , will not take place before the short 
run is over and provided that the four stages of econom.ic 
expansion be respected and carried out accordingly ,
The whole Latin American economy is submerged into grow­
ing stagnation cycles leading to diseconomies in every 
possible segment ,
The international economy , specially that of developed 
nations , tends to restrict the international trade by 
means of the implementation of protectionist measures , 
growing subsidies and scarce opening degree of their 
economies towards LOCs ,.ond even sometimes among them­
selves .
The international capital markets seem to offer rates 
of better financial performance than the IRR offered 
by many development projects all around the world •
Foreign debt pressure constantly grows , and certainly 
hinders the expansion of many industrial segments , 
which turns every time the economic recovery into some­
thing more unlikely to achieve ■
The above mentioned are just a few reasons whereby I 
personally think that the regionalization strategy in 
Latin America , is more than a simple coherent answer 
to the international situation • Furthermore , it 
clearly demonstrates that any liner shipping offensive 
undertaken by any Latin American government , can by 
no means succeed in expanding and becoming professional 
its liner merchant marine by underestimating the actual 
economic roots of the crisis and by relying entirely on
its own cargo-flow , which by no means again , is 
enough so as to develop and expand a liner fleet 
aiming at becoming efficient •
Nowadays , the Latin American liner trades are  ^ if not 
totally , puite regulated and controlled by their govern- 
rr.ents . Such a control is obviously owing to the lack of 
growth in their liner markets and consequently domestic 
economies •
Then , the cause of the depression in the liner trades 
can be identified as the reigning economic stagnation 
with internal and external origins , as long as the 
consequence is represented by the governmental control 
through the setting up of bilateral agreements , pooling 
agreements , cargo reservation laws , etc , etc •
Both the cause and the conseruence lead to even sharper 
diseconomies from a liner shipping standpoint •
Therefore , at present f liner services can be reallocated 
but never expanded if it tries to develop by itself • 
Besides y Latin America cannot substantially share the 
liner trades in the industrial centers , since in order 
to receive cargo one must be prepared to give cargo ; 
and actually there is nothing to grant in these liner 
trades •
I can finish by saying that liner shipping must develop 
together with the undertaking of regionalization policies. 
Otherwise , what is going to occur is just a reallocation 
of services and not a real expansionist trend ,
5 STRATEGIC AD'^ I"ISTRATIOP.'
5 , 1 fTARKET REALITIES
According to what uie have already seen and discussed 
throughout the preuious chapters , ue cen readily rea­
lise that Latin America is going through an economic 
situation uherein the values of the main variables o_f 
economic growth and development are almost unsignif­
icant and sometimes negatives , and where consequently, 
shipping markets are compressed and limited , thus 
leading to an excess of supply over the demand •
Regardless of the market we look upon in Latin America ,
UB can set out without any doubt that the liner shipping 
trades were run in a pretty different way twenty years 
ago than the way they are presently managed , simply 
because the then existing market magnitudes and segment­
ations , allowed at that time to keep an , although not 
perfectly balanced , acceptable break even point af what 
then were the liner markets and its several segments •
But even though nowadays all kind of negative variables 
come up to clearly indicate that changes have to take 
place in a trade where , such a structure or relation­
ship is no longer kept , liner shipping companies are 
run as if it were the same situation then before with 
the sole exception that the level of cargo got a down­
ward trend during the last decade • And if I say that 
liner firms were run in a different way , is because the 
cargo level , this is to-say the demand , was in a certain 
counterpart relationship with the supply of tonnage and 
consequently , the managerial style kept a certain re­
lationship as well , regarding said level , On the 
contrary , the reality shows us that each economic 
situation deserves a soecific managerial current with 
its own strategies and philosophy , so as to be capable
of successfully decling b’ith the c:srket strength end 
its holders in a cuite different r^ erket balance , 
as the existing one nci-odays in this side of the 
world • Then , despite the fact that the present 
magnitudes of the liner market are substantially 
different than before , shipping comoanies are run 
with the same managerial criterion than those in the 
19BOs , Therefore , it is my pur.'^ ose to draw a man­
agerial style whereby a liner shipping company could 
get a certain degree of innovation end specialization 
within the framework cf strategic administration in 
any market of Latin America , alusys bearing in .mine 
the need of suffering from a structural shift , so 
that such a style fullfils the neu repuirements of the 
reZntionship cupply-dem.and ,
I should start by drauing a kind of comiOarative graph 
between the traditional manegorial trends folloued by 
liner companies throughout the last two decades , and 
whet they should do in the immediate future so as to 
earn specialization and get access into a m.pr!<et which 
Lies -Iways led by conservative and traditional manager­
ial currents ,
fJow , if we pay attention to the concepts included in 
table 5,1 , we can start by spliting these ten items 
into ten different explanations within the theory of 
strategic administration ; but before continuing this 
analysis , I should clarify what is the real meaning 
of strategic administration within the liner shipping 
context , Summarizing I might gather the main six 
points which are going to draw the context into which 
i>he concepts set out in the table 5,1 , are comprised , 
fIRST : the market with lineal growth rate during long 
periods , will never come back again to Latin American 
marl<ets ; it results totally unuseful therefore , to 
figure out numbers regarding future expectations on
the basis of linear growth . Due to this fact , strategic 
administration has an imoortant role to play in this game, 
as we are going to see on the following pages .
SECOf'D : the management uhich is only based on the ex­
perience coming from the executives and made up of organ-
I,
inational structures already worked out , is definitely 
bound to fail before a restless competition that adppts 
the new strategic attitude , that captures and uses the 
experience by adding it innovation and creativity ,
THIRD : the concept of seoarate divisions or departments 
is no longer advisable in strategic administration , From 
new , everybody must be on everything ,
FOURTH : the increase cf the market share of any liner 
COmoany must be carried out by reallocating the existing 
shares between the best operators • flerginal operators 
are likely to be excluded unless they adopt strategic 
management policies before being kicked out of the trade, 
FIFTH : liner shioping companies will have to change its 
attitudes toward shippers , in such a i;ay that liner 
operators will have to contact shippers and to do their 
best to pick up what can be picked up , Liner firms can 
no longer wait for the business . It is bound to wake 
up to reality and move faster than the market strength , 
SIXTH : the main topic of strategic administration as 
far as liner business is concerned , is to foresee the 
future through coordinated steps in this kind of m.anage- 
ment and within the context of short and long range 
planning ,
Now , coming back to the table and according to the concepts 
included in it we can set out the following statements :
1 —  So far , Latin American shipping companies were 
involved in ordinary planning , but in such a way that 
they used to focus attention only on short-range basis 
and without looking forward great shifts in the long-range
regarding the structure of the markets , cargo-sharing 
trends , demand pressures and so forth •
But nowadays , it is of fundamental importance that any 
liner company a!§ involved in long term strategic planning 
as well , since the shipping environment , although in 
recession , is still changing permanently and challenging 
innovators . Long term planning may result almost im­
possible to carry out in an accurate manner , as regards 
cargo volume or space tonnage demand , since as it has 
been spelt out before , the behaviour of the internatio­
nal trade variables are very unlikely to follow a sort 
of pre-determined pattern , so as to let them being 
standarized in international terms .
iqBLE 5.1
TILL NO'ji WAS BY
1- ordinary planning
2- staff functions
3- internal environment 
A- fix rules
5- economies of scale 
B- the whole market
7- routine
8- static tools
9- short run
10- static management
IN THE t^ UTUBE '.'/ILL BE BY
formal strategic planning 
linear participation 
internal and external env, 
comparative advantage rules 
flexibility to adaptation 
segmentation 
innovation 
dynamic tools
critical short run/long run 
mobile management : int-ext
But long-range strategic planning actually goes much be­
yond this topic to deal with concepts such as operating 
plans , canvassing strategies f management performance 
and capabilities p competition performance , corporate 
image , product acceptance and miany others • Then , we 
can set out that the scope that comes out of formal 
strategic planning covers a much wider operational area,
u'hich uncloubtsdly rrents ruite cloarer targets and sho'js 
more clearly ss well , the rveilsble r.eens to achieve 
these targets .
Strategic planning precises in a liner shipping company 
are discussed at a later stage , as well as its advant­
ages and drawbacks •
2—  -Generally staff managers used to decide and to play 
the major role in the decision making process • Such a 
role , either well played or not , used to fall into 
the category of invariable owing to the fact that even 
when staff oeople mismanaged any topic of commercial 
nature , the own gccdness of the last two decades , 
tended to quickly match any cep that could possibly 
core up in such a situation of staff misjudgement •
At that tim.c °veryhody got his share and nobody L'’ss 
really u’orried about what the com.petitors could do to 
increase their shares • But the marl<et became gradually 
wors-e amd "ith it , the gaps originated by wrong staff 
decisions started being so wide that staff turnover 
ratio started being very high as well .
Obvicusly , the ens„er can he found in the participation 
enjoyed by lineal managers , since they are actually the 
gays uho arc at the battle front receiving the bullets 
end shooting back . As simple as that •
Ue can say that the greater the participation of the 
lineal managers in the decision making process are, the 
more the chances of pointing towards the right targets 
are , an.d with the suitable means , specially when the 
hold space oversupply represents the common factor of 
all liner company , and whose diminishing .variables might 
perfectly be the intuition of lineal managers .
3 —  This item speaks by itself , although anyway I 
would like to mention that liner companies used to always 
look inwards , and never ever outwards •
Domestic marfcets are important so as to set the m'^ in ba­
sis ■*^or liner ooerations , but by no means can be consi­
dered as the only feature on uhich attention can be 
focused . Together , the international and political eco­
nomic frames must be spelt out and its conclusions inter­
related with all the other planning devices , I'-hereby 
externalities can no longer have surprising effects on 
local traffic systems •
4 —  This item is closely related to the latter on-. , 
since it reflects the lack of innovation and managerial 
creativity by means of the so called fix rules .
If they were fixed , is because the market did not de­
mand much more ; but neither the managers used to under­
take actions related to the increase of participation , 
specialization , leadership strategies end so on .
Nouadays , any liner shipping company wishing to get by 
from the existing fierce competition and discrimination, 
must without any doubt , excloit to any possible extent 
comparative advantages in all liner segments , including 
those of uncertain profitability , as a way of anticipat­
ing any segment transformation , and improving , anyway , 
the overall efficiency •
Comparative advantages in an open market with a conferen- 
cial system in it , can be reached by comeeting as an 
outsider , by getting differenciated from the others 
as regards canvassing means , by granting more extensive 
shore facilities , by financing freight and demurrage 
charges in better terns than competitors do , by capital­
izing managerial professionalism and by many other means,
A static liner company is nowadays , a firm candidate to 
be swallowed up by the other liner sharks , as long as 
the one keeping moving its managerial teams and also aleirt, 
loo'king for strategies , is the one able of getting by 
and even probably without figures in red colour .
t sconorriss of scale be5-- In Litin Arrericcn 
long to the pest , if 
enough hold space deand so es
'crhets 
’ucr existed There is no ■ onr er
;hink in operating
ner businesses under such a conceot , and not awen as a 
future investment strategy •
This is a concept , the north american flag ouners soern 
not to properly understand , since from the very beginning, 
all north american fla'^  vessels operating in South Ameri- 
cen trades were and still are suiming into subsidies 
ouing to the inflexibility to adaptation that brought 
about huge amounts of dead freight , as well as 
ooerative problems of every n-ture . In other words , 
shipowners must be wise enough so as to include the con­
cept of flexibility in any planning end menagerie 1 pro­
cess .
Flexibility to adaptation may be recresented by the 
right understanding of neu needs of f^o market at the 
at the present situation , and by the right undertaking of 
actions oriented towards the fulfilment of the neu recuire- 
m.ents coming out of the markets '^ ramed into critical 
shortage cycles . Flexibility to adaptation must take 
place mainly in tuo areas : technical and com.mcrcial .
The technical side should look for’ not necessarily 
investments in neu-buildings units but in reconverting 
existing operative units into mors suitable vessels , 
aiming at providing a better balanced cost-benefit re­
lationship service , as long as the commercial side 
should look upon the canvassing force and the different uays 
of giving more flexibility to the demand in business terms 
without hindering the expansion of the present market 
share •
5—  Before , liner companies used to approach shippers 
in order to get their cargoes , or uhat was more common , 
shippers used to contact shipping companies to get their 
cargoes loaded , In such a procedure , the cargoes were
booked and conseruently loaded as soon as they come up 
available to the canvassers  ^ '^'ho usually were very 
happy in bool^ ing them , without having to hamper such 
a shipper uith the possibility of rejecting his cargo , 
because it was a low-value one • Then , on average , 
most shipowners got the same net revenue trip after trip* 
But once the markets turned round 180 degrees and showed 
a totally different tendency * non-innovator liner firms 
began loosing cargoes both in quantity and in value , 
thus fostering those innovators that instead of trusting 
the traditional market variables behaviour , decided to 
undertake segmentation strategies by studying hinterland 
constraints of every segment , by adeauating its services 
to the hinterland requisites , by adopting a certain rate 
flexibility regarding some segments , by classifying car­
goes in different degrees of priority , by spelling out 
rate complementation for substitute segments and so on . 
Then , uie could set out , that segmentation is indispen­
sable to C'~rry out the right assesment of the present 
and future potentiality of each segment , as well as 
of grouped segments in similar FOB value *
7 —  Innovation automatically leads to new management 
criterisnas well as new commercial tactics to be used 
mainly by the sales force or canvassing people * Tech­
nological innovations will not go beyond the reconversion 
of existing units | since the degree of capital intensive 
existing in new-buildings such as a full container or 
multi-purpose unit , does not allow Latin American liner 
operators to run them profitably f mainly due to the 
existing imbalance between the supply and demand strength 
But even so , in my opinion | moderate reconversion tasks 
together with innovating commercial initiative , are 
likely to be the main pillars to win specializ'ation and 
then f differenciation • To get differenciated in the
commercial field , only requires a bit of imagination 
and cuite a lot of aggressiveness , as long as in the 
technical one demands certain caoital endowments , whose 
principal is likely to be reoaid in fact , quite faster 
than any other traditional investment made in high-tech 
ships by the same amount ,
8 —  Static tools such as administrative procedures or 
intuitive managerial decisions were the most common and 
still actually are the most popular methods to' adopt 
policies , and draw short term strategies in many ship- 
oing comoenies .
Wowadays , even when the demand has been drastically 
reduced by both the internal and external environment , 
computers are of great help in the decision making pro­
cess within the decision context of any traffic , Depart­
ments or sections such as canvassing , sales f containers, 
shiooing policy , conferences and others , definitely 
need to work with computers whenever they want to achieve 
acceptable decision-.timing ratios •
It can be said that a oroper use of computers grants the 
facility of gathering kilometers of com.mercial informat­
ion , and gives a certain degree of differenciation as 
far as those departments or sections are concerned •
The key areas within the commercial management context 
where computers can produce quick positive outcomes , 
are sales organization and canvassing task force , 
containers allocation and different operational features, 
such as follow-up of units end demurrage charges monito­
ring , commercial decision making .based on opportunity 
and timing factors , traffic statistics organization 
oriented towards an easy interpretation and a nitid 
projection of the present and future threats and 
ooportunities , as well as figures and trends of the 
past and current performance •
In my opinion , this is what Latin American liner com­
panies orimarily need as to match in certain way the 
existing gaps of managerial technics with the industrial 
centers .
As everybody knows , computers can be adequated to al­
most all the needs of shipping companies , but I think 
that any computer utilization which goes beyond the 
commercial or traffic management , is a waste of capital. 
Such a capital could comparatively be allocated to other 
areas , or simply saved • Technical utilization of these 
equipment may not be necessary throughout the short run, 
but perhaps at a later stage •
9 —  This point deals entirely with m.anagerial attitudes 
and leaves aside any technical consideration ,
The crisis is there and can be touched , so that is real 
and perfectly tangible , managers need to be one step 
ahead of what happens right now , Short run strategies 
must be looked upon not as a way of adjusting the master 
strategy , but as a way of seeking means in order to be­
come specialized and differenciated at a moment that , 
it is dramatically basic and tactically demolishing , 
Basing my commients on working experience in critical 
markets and not upon theoretical arguments , I feel 
totally positive in saying that the deeper the stag­
nation and recession are , the more appreciated the 
efforts of reaching differenciation and specialization 
are by shippers and public sector , Even I would say 
that since crisis makes the skills sharper , sometimes 
is better to deal with critical environments , with 
the only purpose of developing managerial minds and 
creativity , because I consider quite easy to reach 
high innovation degrees , when behind one there'is an 
army of banks and financial institutions willing to 
lend money to carry out specialization projects , as 
north amsrican companies usually do ,
/
!'"-nnaners hpue to have tboir minds oriented towards 
critical short run tactics and of course , frcmsd into 
a raster strategy leading to the long run , which in 
real life is nothing else than a long-range guideline •
10 —  With this item I want to 1 eaue clearly understood 
that by organizing a kind of mobile management , either 
external or internal or even both of them , specializa­
tion is likely to come up and press very fastly in the 
liner circles • Line managers an.d canvassers are supposed 
to be dynamic and persistent in their tasks , running 24 
hours a day in the street if necessary , and bothering 
as many executives as possible .
Static management can no longer survive in critical 
trades unless it is protected by discriminatory res­
olutions etc f whereby is not necessary to achieve in­
novation , Commercial diversification and sales spread­
ing is unlikely to occur whenever managers keen on 
using old fashion managerial rules , as those comprised 
in static tactics •
The only one who , in my opinion , could adopt static 
management is the chairman of the company ; all the 
others must behave like insects around the marmalade : 
restless and frantically disordered • The market demands 
it ; as simple as that .
5 . 2 -  ADPIIMISTRATION BY OBJECTIV/ES
I start by defining what is the meaning of administration 
by objectives (ABO) , and ti& delimit its frame or area 
of utilization •
First of all I should highlight that the results coming 
out of the use of an ABO system may differ markedly from 
country to country , specially if we look upon developed 
and LDCs . As we are going to see at a later stage in this
chapter , the elasticity of demend and the opening degree 
of the liner market concerned , are the rein factors that 
mark the difference between an industrial nation and a 
LDC regarding positive , neutral or negative outcomes , 
Then , administration by objectives can be simply defined 
as the managerial strategy whereby staff , lineal , and 
operational oersonnel commit themselves before higher 
management levels for achieving certain specific goals , 
throughout a limited period of time and by adopting their 
own procedures under personal liability .
This system , in fact , is very unlikely to produce 
positive outcomes in those markets l■'here the traditional 
way of operating , leaves aside concepts or philosophies 
such as free market economy or decentralization trends 
and includes many and different means of restriction and 
control over the normal functioning of these trades •
We can say that the efficiency of the ABO system will 
probably vary in a proportional way , to the opening 
degree in the relevant market •
From this stetement we can readily notice that the 
closer or more familiar a given market is to its public 
sector , the lesser the likelihood will be to achieve 
positive outcomes out of the system .
A tyoical comoarison can be done between an open market 
economy an a centrally planned economy , thus represent­
ing the two existing extremes within this subject , 
Regarding the first case , an ABO system will certainly 
find a wide range of possibilities of being exercised 
in its different forms , while the latter represents 
the maximum degree of public sector interference , since 
everything as well as everybody , belongs to the state . 
Obviously , in a free market economy like the United 
States , the human creativity , pointing towards combet- 
ition and subsequently towards specialization and innova­
tion , is very likely to take over the market philosophy
asss to rake run the trade under such e pattern ,
"long as in a oantrslly olannad acono,r,y , innovation and 
Epscielizetlon through human creativity , if there is 
any , is entirely guided by the central authority 
Khere at , simply left to say that the countries uhich 
hold out in the functioning of its markets under such 
conditions are certainly condemned to be not only one , 
but several steps behind those nations enjoying uider 
concepts of economic freedom .
We can also set out uithout any risk of being mistaken . 
that in times of International economic recession aad 
specifically , during stagnation periods in LilCs , the 
human creativity through strategic administration pro­
cedures and technics in its different shapes , is nou- 
adays considared as the key point from a global poin 
of via» , since uith it , the existing oversupply gaps , 
oroteetlonlst trends , regulation measures and retali­
ation counteractions , freight market decreases and 
many other constraints , ere looked upon to be o v e i c o m e  
or at least offset in such s may that , those countries 
and liner companies that kneui hou to net advantage from 
it during recent periods of time , are going to enjoy 
hioh degrees of specialization and innovation leading 
to the attainment of oositive rates of fleet expansion
’Hd 'ceptable marl<et growth indexes , as primary and
secondary effects respectively .
in other words , normally a well chosen managerial team 
using the right administrative and managerial tactics , 
is much more likely to attain better outcomes than these 
results coming from monetary investments in technological 
devices , which contain a rather scarce participation of 
management skills . But now . the point that wa oouW 
raise right here is related to the category into which 
both , the Latin American liner trades and its shipping 
companies should be pieced , and consequently the chances
of adopting an adecuate AEO system without meaning to 
fall into resources overlapping or , i;aste of time and 
resources ,
First of all I should clarify that , although liner markets 
in Latin America are framed into the liberal side of the 
entrepreunerial philosophy , there still are different 
degrees of mixture between the currents of free enterprise 
and public interference ; therefore it would not be 
accurate to look upon the whole Latin American market as 
a single traffic .
There are several countries in this area with different 
intervensionism degrees am.ong them , and even with diffe­
rent internal policy orientations regarding its own trades. 
This could perfectly be the case of Argentina , Brasil and 
Mexico among others ; but let us take the example of Ar­
gentina , wiherein the m.ain four trades enjoy different 
structures or systems , and follow distinct regulations , 
which eventually leads to the need of implementing quite 
different management strategies within the framework of 
an ABO system .
Before going on with this enalysis I consider it necessary 
to state the main advantages and characteristics the ABO 
system enjoys , so that to leave for a later stage the 
drawbacks and limitations such a scheme has to face in 
partially liberalized economies •
This scheme simply consists in asking questions at the 
relevant levels , such as :
--  What are your targets for the coming 90 days period ?
--  What are your projects , prosoects and expectations ?
--  What steps are you going to follow in order to achieve
these goals ?
--  In achieving these goals f how many standard and/or
extra working hours will you need ?
The answers to these questions are supposed to be written 
on a suitable sheet of paper with several copies to be
sent to the imnediete superior levels • In other uords 
this is a kind of written commitment , whereby the per­
son involved is morally as well as orofessionally hound 
to attain those objectives on the right timing ,
His performance must be evaluated quarterly , and the 
degrees of achievements discussed face to face with the 
boss , This quarterly appraisal , has the only purpose 
of making people feel responsible at all levels y and of 
developing a kind of self-demanding behavior in their 
attitudes • Furthermore , such an evaluation is quite 
useful in the way that people involved in such a pro­
cedure , are obliged net to forget the main goals of 
the organization set out on the paper , as well as the 
means to achieve them ,
This system of quarterly confrontation may seem to be 
very simple y but whenever the degree of manacerial 
pressure is well administrated , it works without waste,
I could say that it works acceptably well , mainly for 
the following reasons :
1 - it lets the person involved in such a system y to
become his own boss end draw his own targets •
2 - it lets this person to be more efficient in what he
does } and it induces him to motivate himself by 
means of his own initiative .
3 - it allows the original ideas to reach the higher
levels of the company , without any kind of major 
interference •
4 - it helps to detect worthy people as well as to avoid
anonymous managers •
5 - it obliges to keep a periodical conversation between
the assessor and the subordinate , what leads to  ^
avoid unnecessary tensions and resentments • Without 
a periodical chat and discussion , is probable that 
a manager who does not perform as he is expected to 
in a specific matter , may develop or experiment 
resentments against his supervisor . Or even he might
think thet his fsilure is due to the existing bed 
relationship between them ,
Summing uo , whet a method of quarterly appraisal of 
means and objectives does , is to stop intermediate 
managers for a while , just to meke them think of the 
development of the strategies adopted , how they be- 
have , to set objectives and’ define ways in order to 
achieve them •
Another important point included in this system , is 
that it does not allow oersonnel rotation inside the 
company , since it considers that each function in 
each department must be carried on by the best oeople ; 
and the best people are not the best in all functions. 
Therefore , the system prefers to fire a sub-standard 
manager instead of training him in other deoartment 
or division u’hen he was given the chance of choosing 
his area , within which he 'j;as supposed to be the best 
or at least outstanding ,
On the other hand , a transference to another sector 
of the comoany would mean to run the risk of loosing 
time in training and in getting him adapted to the 
new job , without the real certainty that he is going 
to be eventually , the best .
A shiooing comoany , as any other company , can not be 
merciful in times of recession and neither can accept 
dealing with the wrong oeople whenever it uiants to over­
come such a recessive period •
Mow f since we have the main advantages and characterist­
ics briefly expressed , we can observe to what extent 
an ABO system can succesfully be worked out in a given 
liner trade • To this purpose , let us come back to the 
four mainliner trades in Argentina :
4 - ARGENTIMA/MEDITERRAMEAM freight COMFEREMCE ; AflFC
1 - argentima/brasil freight comference
2 - europe/argentima freight conference
3 - INTER-A|V|ERICAN FREIGHT CONFERENCE
: ABFC 
: EAFC 
: lAFC
1 - ABFC : cpen conference - close market
2 - EAFC : .open conference - open market
3 - IAFC : ooen conference - close market
A - AHFC : open conference - open market
1) The ABFC although is an open conference , it is run 
on close market basis and under a bilateral treaty ; 
this is to say that the only ones alloujed to join this 
conferencial agreement under freight tariff ration­
alization terms , are either Brazilian or Argentinean 
owners exclusively ,
Then , wh-’t we can notice here , is that since govern­
mental interference is maximized through the signing of 
a bilateral agreement and the setting-up of equalized 
freight rates , just very little left to exercise human 
creativity within the frame of strategic administration. 
Both f the staff and lineal managers are bound to respect 
and follow certain pre-established standards of perfor­
mance as well as to focus the attention on the own 
dynamic character of the bilateral process , Competition 
does not exist , since share allocation end state leader­
ship take over the market philosophy , and therefore 
managerial attitudes find an extremely narrow path on 
which ideas should develop ,
2) The EAFC , was and still is nowadays the strongest 
liner market , principally the lines joining ports be­
tween the River Plate and sections A , B , C , D (north 
of Spain and France , Germany , Holland , Belgium etc) . 
In this context , we can observe that this market 
deserves to be classified as the most dynamic and 
changing in economic terms f since owing to its own 
characteristics of opening and freedom , an ABO sceme 
could perfectly be implemented into it • Competition 
does exist and therefore , both the staff and liNeal 
managers can rely on results coming from the ABO stra-
t e g i 2 s .
Th0 Conference is bound to frontelly ccrrpete uith the 
so called ■'^ reicht rates moderator and to induce its 
managers to demand the people behind them , to accomp­
lished their best under pressure conditions « The same 
will occur on the outsider's side , where they will be 
obliged to compete not only with the conference as a 
single large company , but also among them , Then , 
either in conferaneed firms or not , different oer- 
formance appraisals will be carried out (bimonthly , 
quarterly) , different managerial factors as regards 
timing will be considered , distinct decrees of pre­
ssure will be exercised in accordance with the real 
opportunities or entry barriers that this market could 
possibly hav/e , diverse canvassing strategies are like­
ly to be adopted end so forth .
An open market not only allows , but that demands the 
best to come up and take over the largest slice of the 
cake , which on the other hand , will never be so large 
so as to become in a beautiful monopoly by itself , 
since there will always be clever determined competitors 
totally decided to challenge the best and to increase 
its slice by all the available means ; this is to say 
by operating either in a conference or as an outsider , 
or as a specialized owner in less costly triangulations 
or whatever other alternative •
An open conference run in an open market , where out­
siders are supposed to come up and compete , leads to 
a sort of ideal experimental field regarding the im­
plementation of strategic administration technics , 
specially in markets going through recession and stag­
nation cycles and in those on their ways of getting rid 
of them . In this case , the difference between under­
taking and not undertaking managerial strategies , might 
readily mean , success or collapse •
The experience shows that most developed liner markets
in the ucrld are governed and ruled in high percentages 
by ABO schemes , and uithin a framework lacking of cuhlic 
sector interference and traffic discrimination ,
For instance , the liner markets in the FRG , are manaoed 
in the range of 80~90^ u,nder ABO rules ; the same per­
centages for Belgium and Holland , about 80,'^ in France 
and a little bit above 90^ in Scandinavian countries •
Of course | the USA and Canada as well , are highly 
competitive in this regard , as long as other nations 
not so industrialized , show anyhow a lofty figure ;
BO^ in Italy and Spain .
Then , summing up we might say that this managerial 
scheme can perfectly be applicated in those markets 
enjoying both basic features : no state interference / 
no market opening limitations . The more liberalized 
the market is , the more capable the trade will be in 
contributing positive results coming from the ABO pro­
grams •
3) The lAFC has been made up in such a way that the n/b 
traffic is totally restricted tooutsiders under the pro­
visions of the relevant bilateral agreement , as long as 
the s/b traffic is open to the outsider competition , 
which is nothing else than a simple regulation without 
any practical value , since obviously no outsider would 
be willing to trade on a regular basis on only one leg 
of the traffic * Then , here we have again an open 
conference that in fact is not open to third flags , 
and operating in a close market • Then j as fear as the 
management by objectives is concerned , its likelihood 
of being implemented aiming at getting positive out­
comes f is practically void •
Once again , the organizational structures of shipping 
companies are made up of interrelated commitments regard­
ing cargo allotments , pooling rules and so on , Then , 
everything is controlled and governed by a central body
that makes impossible the development of managerial skills 
as well as the increase of the overall efficiency •
4) The AP1FC has similar characteristics than those set 
out in the EAFC ; this is to say that it works on open 
market basis and under an open conference structure ,
Here $ once again  ^ an ABO system can readily be adopted 
and thus managerial pressure can be fully exercised ,
Such a pressure f either oriented to staff or lineal 
personnel , must not be neither excessive nor too light, 
but it must point toward reachable targets in a critical 
short run ,
Normally , the international success of this system is 
due , to a great extent , to the exigency degree that 
managers usually applicate on their operational oeople , 
but keeping a certain relationship with the real supply 
and demand . Such a pressure can go a little beyond of 
what the market can actually offer ; but pressure in 
excess is a well known sort of mismanagement and does 
not lead to anything fruitful , but to internal tensions 
and resentments •
We have already set out the main characteristics and per­
formance degrees an ABD system can have in different 
organization structures ■ Then , what comes immediately 
out of it , is that such a system might ideally be used 
in open markets with open conferences operating therein • 
But even though such a system should seem to fit into 
open market structures , its results may vary according 
to the organizational structure on which is applicated . 
For instance , in an open market , two fundamental 
structures can be found : CONFERENCIAL ORGANIZATION AND 
OUTSIDER ORGANIZATION ,
As we know , every member to the conference is bound to 
fulfil certain technical requirements and to follow a
given criteriii as regards share "llocetions and cargo 
=!llotments , k'hereby , in spite of being operating in an 
open Rerket , the field to develop rranagerial innovation 
and creativity is not actually very large , although is 
larger of course than the existing one in a close market, 
restricted market or bilateral agreement •
In other words , since such a kind of traffic is oligopo- 
lized in one way by the conference that operates on 
common freight rate tariff basis , managerial creativity 
will only be groupel and focused to combat the existing 
outsiders .
Competition among miembers of the conference can be oriented 
toward services but not rates , uhich makes shippers 
rather indifferent • Even so , some creativity and in­
novation which can be followed by investment decisions 
or not , is likely to come up ashore regarding both the 
technical and commercial side •
But obviously , uith respect to outsider operators , ABO 
yardsticks are of top importance , specially if we 
consider that they do not belong to any cartel orga­
nization nor similar structures . They compete against 
conferences and among themselves , thus leaving aside 
concepts such as share allocation , pooling agreements , 
etc , etc ,
Outsiders are more capable of negotiating with shippers 
not only freight rates , but also the extra time of 
containers , routings , delays of any kind and all other 
sub-services related to this buisness , specially those 
of operative nature .
Outsiders have to be flexible to negotiate successfully, 
and together with such a flexibility , strategic administ­
ration procedures in its different shapes must be adopted; 
therefore , we can affirm that the more capable in getting 
managerial innovation outsiders are through strategic 
administration , the deeper the penetration in the traffic 
will be , end conseouently the greater its abilities to
get positive outcomes from ABH strategies through flexible 
policies , the tougher the task for the conferences will 
be , leoding to e much better performance end overall 
efficiency of the system . Then , an ABO system , which 
in fact should be called a sub-system , originates a kind 
of chain reaction , thus bringing about tactical changes 
in the managerial field and rate adjustment in the pricing 
forming process , or what in other words could be called 
changes in the master system ,
So , what can be said right now , is that both the eco­
nomic cartel and independent operators , can make good 
use of an ABO system , although to different extents 
and therefore with unlike results . But the one ignoring 
the Dotentiality and the threat such a system coul mean , 
adopted and developed by any competitor , is very likely 
to become marginal in the medium run unless it adoots in 
time , managerial counter-measures throughout the critical 
short run ,
tie can conclude by saying that strategic administration 
provides the right tools for reaching certain managerial 
creativity , but not only in the local or domestic traffic 
but also in the international one , thus flushing the 
existing quality gap between the local traffic end the 
international one •
As we stated earlier , such a scheme is likely to strongly 
supoort the rates moderator role that any outsider is 
supposed to play , thus bringing about a positive chain 
reaction as far as rate setting and managerial attitudes 
are concerned ; but of course  ^ the same system becomes 
totally void when we talk about close markets , cargo 
sharing , cargo allotments , cargo reservations and pool 
agreements , like the ones existing in the lAFC or ABFC , 
as well as many other conferences in Argentina , and most 
of the trades between Latin America and -the industrial 
centers •
The next point aims at clarifying the actual role trade
restrictive rreasures just rrentioned ere presently play­
ing in Argentinean markets , from the overall efficiency 
point of view , end to uihet extent such a trend could be 
deviated touard a different market philosophy by using 
strategic administration plans and by adopting a higher 
opening degree in the maritime trades •
5 . 3 -  Llf'JER REGULATION
As I have just mentioned in the last point , there are 
several methods whereby liner shipping can be restricted 
or more closely controlled . These are : cargo sharing , 
cargo reservation , allotments and of course , different 
uell known types of conferences .
In general terms we can say that , while freight confe­
rences aim at limiting price competition , cargo sharing 
and allotment policies point to limiting service compet­
ition ,
By their nature , these agreements restrict competition , 
The degree of cooperation required by these agreements 
can vary from a simple allocation of sailings , to re­
venue pools specifying the shares of particular 
commodities traded between particular ports to be allo­
cated to eech party to the agreement , to space charter 
agreements , joint service agreements , and , in the 
extreme , outright mergers between lines ,
On the other hand , we have cargo reservation acts  ^
whereby some specific cargoes are bound to be transported 
on national flag vessels , which obviously lead to direct 
intervention and market regulation on the part of the 
State concerned .
Now , the question is , to what extent , a strategic 
administration program would help in getting rid of 
regulatory and discriminatory interference exercised 
by the public sector . The answer woul lead to the
theory that advocates a gradual cample Tie ntation of 
market liberalization and strategic administration ; 
this is to say that as soon as the regulation becomes 
gradually less strict , strategic administration must 
get quickly adapted to the new environment so as to 
let liner companies prepare themselves , and thus to 
compete in equal conditions than those foreign liners 
that are already trained and accustomed to make good 
use of such a system , Whenever regulation takes over 
the functioning of the traffic , either through a 
bilateral agreement or any kind of pooling agreement , 
the overall efficiency of such a market tends to get 
drastically diminished in the long run , uhile the 
critical short run finds both lineal and staff manaoers 
unable of competing end developing their managerial 
skills • Everything is controlled , shared , regulated 
and monitored in such a way that the management quality 
gap , between developing countries and the industrial 
centers , tends to uiden regardless of the volume of 
cargo available in such a market or uhat in other uiords 
could be called , regardless of ujhat the trade demands 
For example , recent studies of the impact of bilateral 
cargo sharing agreemsnts concluded thct the protection 
provided under these agreements resulted in the use of 
older and often more obsolete ships than would be 
employed in the trade if it were open to third-party 
competition • The conclusions reached were ttiat contain
erization was not effectively employed and members of
the conferences covered by the bilateral agreement 
generally used their older tonnage to serve the parti­
cular trade « The same study also found a significantly 
higher freight rate level , than should be expected in 
the service , if it were open to some degree of compet­
ition , The reasons behind it are the lack of effective
competition , the essential protection provided , the 
high costs of the protected marginal operators , the
lack of rationalization of tonnage employed and schedule 
of seruices provided , as uell as less than efficient use 
of port infrastructure and suoport services •
Then , as ue can notice, the quality and terms of service 
nearly always decline under non-competitive service 
conditions , imposed even by cargo reservation •
Even on routes covered by closed conferences , there is 
always^ the potential for non—conference operators to 
offer services in competition with the conference •
This ever meant any danger to the conferencial system , 
but on the contrary usually provides a measure of serv­
ice and freight regulation which assures the offering 
of resonebly competitive terms .
Summing up and coming back to the question , strategic 
administration is by no means capable , by itself , of 
generating a new market philosophy toward higher open­
ing degrees and progressive receding from regulatory 
parameters • But what it does , is to prepare managers 
and operational people to think and evaluate in strategic 
terms , since as I said in previous chapters , the openir^ 
degree of the regulated markets will come up by itself , 
as soon as the import substitution process together with 
its internal industrialization and subsequent internal 
and external diversification take place and bringabout 
the gradual traffic expansion , In such a case , any 
market , regardless of its location and political flag 
will have to get gradually open ; and that is exactly 
the right moment for managers to compete so as to obtain 
specialization in any field •
This is what presently happens in the EAFC , where 
conference and outsiders are accustomed to freely 
compete and to do their best to reach innovation 
scales under whatever method they consider useful ; 
but all of them , of course'..’, under pressure •
Strategic administration can also lead to rationalization
of services and therefore , it ujocld be eble to i mo rove 
the overall efficiency by minimizing costs , 
f'ouj , if ue pay attention to one traffic in oarticuler 
so as to reveal the actual causes end conseruences of^  
a bilateral agreement , the real gaps as far as the 
traffic effectiveness is concerned may be noticed •
The traffic chosen is the lAFC , and particularly the 
existing line between Argentina and the United States. 
East Coast , where as we said before , the market policy 
follows the tendency drew by a bilateralism framed into 
a close market . Such an agreement provides 50^ to each 
party , thus remaining forbiden by law the outsider 
competition ,
In this particular trade , ue can observe two different 
technologies , which were developed and oriented to 
compete in very different trades ; however , they are 
competing each other and consequently , they are very 
far from rationalization standards , . On the one hand 
ue have North-American flag vessels , built with high 
technology standards aiming at reaching high economies 
of scale in a market where the concept of economies of 
scale , end as I mentioned before , is very far from 
what the market can actually offer • On the other hand 
we have the Argentinean flag vessels , built with 
medium standards of technology aiming at participating 
in the trade and keeping its national interest up to 
50^ , Neither the first nor the second one , has 
properly planned such an agreement , since the United 
States lacks of flexibility to adaptation while Argen­
tina suffers from an axcess of state interference , that 
comes represented by its own stater-ouned line •
While the United States keeps running vessels extremely 
large and without the chance of reaching acceptable 
loading factors , Argentina's national shipping line 
finances its traffic liquid deficit by means of public
funds
This problem can be looked upon from two points of view 
according to my understanding : the economic side end 
the managerial aspect ,
The Argentinean flag vessels , although more suitably 
designed for this traffic regarding sizes and capacities, 
are by far more costly to run than the North-American 
ships , and less efficient as regards round trip schedul­
ing , port operations , container operations , folloiu-up 
of units , and further operative issues • North-American 
vessels , although too large in size , are less costly 
to run then the Argentinean ships in terms of cost/ton- 
nage ratios and cost/ton/mile indexes •
As I said before , these ships are strong in what its 
competitors are not , this is to say in all the tech­
nical operations of a typical liner company such as 
scheduling , port operations , containers follow-up , 
timing factors and shore facilities to shippers • But 
of course , they were designed with another view , in 
fact totally different , of whet the South American mar­
ket should have been , and therefore , instead of reach­
ing economies of scale in a market deeply involved in 
recessive cycles , they increase the amounts of dead 
freight year after year • Then , from an economic point 
of view , it is right here when the subsidies come up in 
order to match the increasing dead freight gap , In this 
context , the North-American shipping is the one receiving 
great amounts of subsidies , while on the Argentinean 
side , although in smaller amounts , subsidies are granted 
as well •
Following this brief analysis with the managerial issue , 
we can notice that North-American companies , in spite of 
being aware of the fact that they did not bring the most 
suitable units into the traffic , encouraged its managers 
to undertake innovative and agressive tasks related to 
marketing , canvassing and cargo forecasts in oveseas
merkets , this is to say , in this case , particularly 
Argentina since they consider that the managerial 
attitude of their personnel must be exactly the same than 
the one they mould have to shou in the oun North-American 
market , On the contrary , Argentinean managers usually 
rely on cargo sharing provisions , thus leaving aside 
any managerial undertaking , since sooner or later , 
their ships are going to be filled in the same quantity 
trip after trip , but of course not in the same freight 
ton value' •
So uhat ue can see here is that even though me speak in 
terms of close conference and close markets , mould seem 
that a olace is always lefting to reach specialization 
and innovation accomplishments.
But anyhow , it seems to be the right moment to raise a 
key point : what is the alternative may out to bring 
about imorovements in the overall efficiency of this 
Particular traffic , that may perfectly be the case of 
any other Latin American country dealing with the USA , 
or any other industrial nation under bilateral parameters. 
'Jiell , everybody knows and accepts that a bilateral 
agreement tends to stop competition and to hinder the 
internal efficiency of the traffic .
Also everybody knows that a bilateral agreement mill 
necessary produce adverse effects on the countries 
members to the agreement , particularly in the long run , 
Everybody knows that such unefficiency in the long and 
medium run , is bound to be offset by either rising freight 
rates or by granting state subsidies • But anyone involved 
in liner business could reply that there is no market so 
as to encourage and support liner operators to bring back 
the overall efficiency that this trade ever had , But 
also I wouldsay that not everything always depends on the 
market , and that is the reason whereby I am completely 
convinced that , in the case of a bilateral agreement 
such as this one , there are several complementary ways
of recovennc the overall efficiency i-jithout breaking 
doun euch e treaty into an open nar'-'et full of compet­
itors ) since not alvcys the bilateral eorcements mean 
unprofitable undertakings •
In my opinion there is one way whereby a bilateral treaty 
could be modified without breaking it down into an 
open market or a more liberal traffic . This rre-thod 
consists in granting a certain decree of opening to 
such agreement , but cnly in internal terms ; this 
is to say that such an opening uill take place within 
the context of the bilatercl treaty , but with a wider 
scope with regard to liner compcnias •
Then , besidas hawing a conference under the control 
of both parties , why not allow r'crth American and/or 
Argentinean outsiders to concete ""gainst such a conf­
erence , thus acting cs freight rates moderators among 
other tonics , In this case , cargo sharing uill continue 
being used between t^c two parties members of the agrccme 
but the rest of the market would to shared without any 
raculation among the several outsiders and regardless 
of whether they are Argentinean flag vessels or forth 
American ones •
Logically , some provisions should be laid down in order 
to avoid an oversupply oh the pert of any of the two 
Parties .
This could be one way of keeping most of the negotiated 
shares for the corresponding belance of payments , and 
of granting a certain dosis of competition leading to 
the improvement of the overall efficiency of the trade 
for both parties  ^ and for all the liner companies 
operating in such a trade , This Improvement should 
come up throughout the medium run to be finally settled 
in the long run ,
But as I have said before , this market , as well as many 
others in Latin America , is submerged into a recessive 
cycle , end then , any kind of marl<et opening would im­
mediately lead to an oven sharper overtonnags coming
from these interested outsiders in exploiting the market 
during the critical short run . Then , it seems very 
easy to conclude that before a marl<3t cpening takes place, 
an economic reactivation m.ust be generated in accordance 
with ujhat I mentioned in previous chapters •
5 . 4 -  CD^.'CUJ5I^
Psfore starting the conclusion , ue should not forget 
that the cause of the closing degree of most Latin 
American liner markets as well as the emergence of 
high levels of public interference , is given by the 
existing recession and-econoric stagnation on this 
side of the uorld , And subsequently , the consequence 
can be regarded as a loss of relative efficiency in 
these particular trades compared uith those trades 
which in spite of everything , could enjoyed a bit 
more of freedom •
Once more I feel secure in saying that  ^ if Larin 
America is on the way of becoming integrated by means 
of the utilization of its own national and regional 
resources so as to obtain internal industrialization 
and external diversification , it should start 
thinking of developing not only the econom.ic varia­
bles , which ere totally essential | but also the 
managerial skills and systems •
We' might l"e11 affirm that even though a real aconcm.ic 
growth together with a gradual opening tendency in the 
liner trades should take place , the entire ■^ rocess 
Liculd ree its performance pretty diminished and hold­
ing even negative effects in those cases where some 
liner markets should run out of national operators due 
to the unskilfulness of the managers in facing both the 
regional and the international competition •
Such inability to deal with the new realities of the 
market , is supposed to be gradually offset and event­
ually erased at the same time the gradual opening pro­
cess occurs ; since as I just said , the opening pro­
cess in the liner trades as well as the new mianagement 
style , are going to begin at the seme time and to 
develop at the same speed , this is to ssy gradually .
As long cs a certain correlctior, is I'jell kept and 
properly nonitored between the opening crocess and the 
new fPcncOerial trend in the relevant liner trades , 
the negetive outcomes ere likely to be left out end 
the overall efficiency is likely as well , to improve. 
Then , management by objectives seems to be the most 
suitable system in order to meet step by step , the 
new reouirements of the environment , In this case , 
both the managers end the system in itself , are bound 
to quickly change their attitudes since on the one 
hand , there is a growing oressure of demand coming 
from a olanned recicnal economic growth , and on the 
other hand , there is a graduel market opening process. 
Both facts are closely interrelated , but the extent 
to which they can be developed may be drastically 
limited whenever there is no change in the managerial 
thought , Therefore , these three factors (regional 
economic growth - .market opening - strctegic administ­
ration ) will definitely lead the whole process to a 
safe port , provided that first of all , its inter­
relation is well set up end punctually followed up , 
and secondly , that there is a tangible economic ex­
pansion
5 strategic PLAfriNG
B * 1 IG'TRDDUCTICM
I want to start this chapter by defining the context 
into which strategic planning is going to be developed 
an related to previous issues .
The idea is to define a strategic planning methodology 
together with its advantages and drawbacks in order to , 
at the same time , relate them to two fundamental topics t 
the close and open market philosophies •
As we have seen before , the main features of these trades 
are , although not very different , of special consider­
ation ; specially when we know that these traffic systems 
bring about outcomes of very different nature and there­
fore , of very different impact as well . The traffic 
chosen will be once mors , for practical ends , the 
River Plate liner market in Argentina , where liner ship­
ping companies of several structures and sizes can be 
found , and where the economic indicators do not shut out 
the possibility of applicating the coming comments on 
any Latin American liner trade .
'I'hat comes out of all this , is that a strategic planning 
method may have many different ways of being elaborated , 
implemented and fed back according to the region and 
market trend comprised in the analysis • And one of these 
differences is given by the degree of opening that a given 
market enjoys ; therefore , within this context we are 
going to compare the weaknesses and strengths of the 
strategic planning methodology in an open and close 
market ,
Then , I think this is the right time so as to raise the 
typical questions in this regard :
--  Is strategic planning a useful tool so as to increase
the overall efficiency of the market ?
--  Is it Dossible to imolement such a methodology into
constantly changing environments ?
--  To uhet extent a strategic planning system is cacable
of granting positive outcomes in close markets ?
--  Does it have the same productivity in open markets
than in close trades ?
--  Is it possible to plan in advance in those trades
where the public sector interference tends to an 
everlasting growth ?
--  Can a strategic planning system be successfully used
by a Freight Conference ?
--  Does it really foster human creativity and imorove
management standards ?
These are just a feu ouestions ue are going to deal with 
throughout this chapter , with the idea of soliting this 
analysis into two main structures : open and close markets 
Regarding the first one , us =>re going to include the 
different forms of operating that such a market may have, 
this is to say on the one hand the traditional freight 
conference , either open or not , and on the other hand 
the so called freight rates moderators or outsiders •
In the case of the close mar!'-ets , the analysis will 
range from a very simole bilateral agreement to a very 
complex regional undertaking .
B . 2 COiyiPARATIUE STRATEGIC PLANNING
I want to define strategic planning by saying that it 
is the systematic and more or less formalized effort of 
a company to establish basic company purposes , objectives 
policies and strategies and to develop detailed plans to 
implement policies and strategies to achieve objectives 
and basic company purposes •
Strategic planning is not an attempt to make future
decisions . Strategic planning is not forecasting product 
sales and then determining what should be done to assure 
the fulfillment of the forecasts uith respect to such 
things as material purchases , facilities , manpouer end 
so on , Strategic planning goes beyond present forecasts 
of current services and markets and asks much more fund­
amental questions : Are ue in the right business ? 'dhat 
are our basic objectives ? When uill our present services 
became obsolete ?
Nou , let us have a look at the exhibit 6,2,1 and to 
analyze it in accordance uith the different trade needs , 
de can start this enalisys by spelling out the content of 
each box and by comparing its pe.rformances according to 
the different environment uithin uhich they are goibg to 
be looked uoon , The substantive planning premises are 
shoun in the four stacked boxes , As usual , at the top 
of the stacked boxes ue can notice the expectations of 
major outside interests ,
For larger corporations it is important , in strategic 
planning , to have an understanding of uhat interests 
major constituents of the enterprise have and hou they 
are expected to change , For a very small corporation 
the focus can be almost wholly on stockholder interests 
but for 8 large corporation other interests must'be re­
cognized , Anyway , outside interests do not very very 
much if we talk about liner companies which operate uith­
in close or open markets , The only difference that could 
be found is that in open markets , stockholders are 
accustomed to be more flexible before a changing- environ­
ment , and furthermore , both the suppliers and the 
customers , are very much business-minded as far as 
negotiations are concerned , In a close market , liner 
shipping firm stockholders behave according to much more 
rigid patterns , as long as customers and supoliers 
usually follow ore-determined business standards that

L'ere oreviously set up by the members of the close merkei:, 
in order to fulfill the re quire m.ents of rigidity end 
stability regardless of the ectual situation . In other 
words , the fundamental contrast is given by the exist­
ing mobility of the strengths of supply and demand under 
open market rules , end the unreal inflexibility of the 
same strengths under close market rules • 
fHanagers and employees of organizations have interests 
that also must be appraised and addressed in the plan­
ning process . Especially important are those of top 
executives that derive from their value systems . They 
are fundamental premises in any strategic planning 
system .
Expectations of major inside interests normally vary 
substantially from open to close markets , meinly due 
to the feet that open market means competition , and 
such a competition may take infinite shapes and adopt 
innumerable strategies , based all upon managerial be­
havior end Performance •
'\s we have seen in the previous chapter , open market 
managers are bound to think end ret in term's of 
competitive standards so as to reach what I consider 
the three pillars of managerial criterion in liner 
com.penies t
-- IM'vJO'JATION
--  SPECIALIZATION
--  RATIONALIZATION
If we look upon freight conferences , these three con­
cepts are fully necessary and perfectly adaptable to 
the actual needs of an open market , while in the case 
of the outsiders , the concept of rationalization only 
refers to the internal structures of each company •
It has previously set out that whenever competition
does not exist , 'jhich rrinht bo the case of a close 
rrerket , nanacernent skill and overall productivity 
tend to diminish fastly , thus leadinc to inefficiency 
cycles that usually contain heavy burdens to be borne 
not by the member liner firms but by its respective 
domestic economies . In real life , suggestions and 
expectations coming ffom management teams in close 
markets , are very unlikely to produce a signifiesnt 
change of direction as regards the policy-making pro­
cess • If ue take the example of a bilateral agreement 
such as the one bet.ueen Brazil end Argentina or the USA 
and Argentina , where several notional flag vessels from 
both sides c=’rry out their ore-determined tasks , ue can 
see that the scope to improve end raise targets is , in 
fact , extremely narrow , On the other hand we have the 
yardstick of an open market made up of freight conferen­
ces and outsiders which , for obvious reasons already 
explained , ■f^ind a much more suitable field to develop 
internal expectations oriented towards the achievement 
cf the three main managerial pillars •
Included in the data base is information about past 
performance , the current situation and the future .
This information is essential in helping those doing 
the planning to identify alternative courses of action 
and to evaluate them properly , Illustrative of types of 
past information collected are the following : sales , 
profits , return on investment , m.arket share , employee 
productivity , public relations f and service development 
capability , Information about the current situation , in 
addition,would include such matters as management 
capabilities , employee skills , competition , corporate 
image , social dem.ands on the company , interests of 
major customers , and service acceptance . Data about 
the future would , of course , include forecasts of 
markets , sales , selected economic trends , competition,
technology , and other trends of particular concern to 
the organization (e.g,, international turbulence , govern- 
rent regulction) ,
If ue bear in mind once more that ue are dealing uith 
both open end close market structures , the results 
coming out of the data base are destined to be again 
yery different for one type of market than for the other; 
but uhat certainly will be the same is the necessity of 
having such an information flow at the right timing , so 
as to deal better outfitted uith the critical short run 
and the grouinc uncertainty of the long run .
'Regarding pact information , it can be gathered all 
regardless of the market nhilosophy except uihen ue look 
upon tbr concept of service development capability .
I'iithin this context and in the specific example of the 
liner firms under close market rules , such developm.ent 
'j’ill entirely depend on the rate at uhich the trade 
grous , uhich at the cane time will depend upon the 
economic strategies undertaken on a national or re­
gional basis • In other words , the shipping service 
development capability , by no means can achieve positive 
rates of expansion by relying totally on the close market 
rules ; this is to say that if there is any tonnage ex­
pansion in such a market , will be more due to subsidies 
and governmental procedures than to an actual trade 
booming , uhich simply leads to the obtainm.ent of uncertain 
information • On tha other hand , liner owners under open 
trade rules , are likely to reflect what actually happened 
through many indicators of very easy individualization , 
Service development capability will depend on the strate­
gies previously adopted and aimed at achieving any of the 
three managerial pillars before commented ,■
The information of the current situation comprises a lot 
of aspects related to management behavior and oerformance. 
Therefore , such an information will be rather static for
■Hr
 ^
as long '’s it resultclose merket operators f 
considerably more realistic '^ or open market liners • 
Regarding the future , service acceotance is readily 
identifiable as non-existent in regulated trades owing 
to its own interventionist features . The regulation is 
there and there is no other choice for the user •
Service acceptance can be regarded as a reliable ind­
icator for open market operators •
The last box is sometimes called the 'dOTS UP analysis , 
an acronym for weaknesses , oportunities , threats and 
strengths underlying planning , Since a cardinal purpose 
of strategic planning is to discover future ooportunities 
end threats so as to make plans to exoloit or avoid them, 
as the case may be , this is a critical step in the plan­
ning process • There is an enormous payoff to the skilled 
probing of opportunities and threats in a comoany's 
future and relating them in an unbiased study of. the 
company's strengths and weaknesses •
This is the area where the most significant differences 
can be found , owing to the fact that not only the 
environment is looked upon but also the own company ,
All this , obviously leads to different ways according 
to the sort of liner firm and the traffic it operates • 
Practical exoeriance shows that the liner operators that 
are engaged in bilateral agreements or any other kind of 
regulating scheme , normally consider competition as a 
potential threat , capable of hindering the settlement 
of a pool agreement and of negatively affecting the 
normal performance of the particular conference • On the 
contrary , and regardless of the degree of competition , 
an open market operator will probably keep his eyes on 
the Pext steps the local government is going to adopt 
regarding the existing maritime policy of the market ; 
whether the state is going to take over a larger share 
of the trade or not ; whether the outsider operations 
are going to be restricted or not ; whether cargo
reservation ncasures ere going to he laid doujn , increased, 
diminished or not ; whether subsidies are likely to be 
granted or not , etc , etc •
’iihat ue can see so far is that the threats can be of very 
different nature in open markets , and practically of one 
type in close markets • However , since the environment 
is made up of an everlasting figure cf variables , would 
not bo strange that a totally di'^ferent sort of threats 
should come up in both open and close markets •
The opportunities are usually given by an increase of 
the shares , larger participation , quicker returns and 
so cn , hut in order to accomplish such opportunities , 
the liner companies will have to deal with at least one 
of the three concepts before mentioned ; If"'!CyATIOH - 
SPECTALIZATIOt' - RATinpALIZATIOH . Thorcfcrc , the way 
these concepts are utilized , '•'ill define the penetrat­
ion profile of the particular liner company or bilateral 
member .
It goes without saying that in a bilateral egreement , 
the opportunities are rather monopolized , while in cn 
open trade , they are spread among the existing 
competitors ; 'v.'hich brings about very different menage- 
rial technics between these tuc market structures , as 
well as distinct standpoints as records the way of 
interpreting all the available information and act 
accordingly ,
Regarding the strengths and weaknesses , we could well 
say that they differ from company to company according 
to their own characteristics and to what is required by 
the environment in itself .
The strengths in open market liner firms may be given by 
the existing managerial skills and human resources at 
very different levels , as long as in close markets , 
liner strengths may be represented by a close conference 
structure or a blleteral agreement whereby the ccmoet-
ition is left pside snd the crrgo shering is guarentesd . 
The L’-'ceknesses sen be directly related to the environnent 
and linked to the organizational structure of the 
participating firms in both market structures • I'Jeaknesses 
have the same shape for most liner companies regardless of 
the market structure , but with the only difference that 
such weaknesses are usually not recognized and not e\/en 
partially accepted by the members of a close structure , 
thus bringing about the implementation and granting of 
various kinds of subsidies •
Then , what can be seen so far , is that whatever the 
strategic planning method is , the close market liners 
are bound to deal with a great constraint given by the 
limitation self-imposed by themselves of shutting out 
all kind of competition and human creativity on both the 
technical and commercial management ,
In addition to that , these organizations do not join 
properly , but at a later stage , the economic develop­
ment that a certain domestic economy could work out , 
and as a conseguence of this , they are not what we 
might coll useful entities , for the improvement of the 
already existing traffic systems and the establishment 
of promotional lines to non-tr?ditional markets •
On the other hand , the open liners would seem to find 
the most important constraint in the fact of having to 
face the daily matters ccmprised into the economic 
development of the relevant markets according to which , 
they are expected to measure and aopraise their own 
strengths and weaknesses •
Therefore , the information coming from the boxes of 
this strategic planning model , is likely to cast datas 
of very different nature and related to both types of 
markets . Obviously , such ah information flow can by 
no means be underestimated •
As shown in Exhibit 6,2.1 the master strategies are
defined as basic missions , purposes , objsctiues and 
oolicies •
Program strategies concern the acquisition , use end 
disDosition of resources for specific projects , such 
as new technology for the exploitation of a promotional 
trade , end things like that . In this part of planning 
ue are concerned uith the most fundamental and important 
ends sought by a comoany and the major approaches to 
achieving them . This subject matter includes any type 
of significant activity of concern to an enterprise - 
profits , capital expenditure , market share , organiza­
tion , pricing , marketing , technological capabilities , 
service improvement , research end development , and so 
on ,
Wow f if we compare the master strategies of certain 
liner companies operating in both cpen and regulated 
markets , '.'e can readily notice that they are cuite 
sim,ilar and even in some cases they are exactly the 
same f for one structure than for the ether • But what 
is actually different is the way the operational strat­
egies are carried out to achieve those master strategies • 
Normally , any kind of liner company and regardless of 
the economic frame into which it operates , holds the 
same master strategies than the rest of its competitors :
--  to obtain a larger share of the market .
--  to foster innovation and specialization ,
--  to invest in technological devices so as to get the
service differentiated .
--  to hold a leading position in a Freight Conference •
-- .to start running a promotional traffic .
--  to train and develop ship-shore managers .
Even though many of these master strategies cannot really 
be achieved in close markets owing to the rigidity of its 
structural mechanisms , they are usually expressed as if 
they were actually attainable , which clearly shows an 
implied weakness in the system , as far as targets
accomplishment are concerned .
'de can define medium-range programming as the process 
I'hareby specific function? 1 clans are prepared end inter­
related to display the details of how strategies ere to 
be carried out to achieve long-range objectives  ^
company missions , and purposes •
Once operating plans are developed , they should , of 
course , be implemented • The implementation process is 
supposed to cover the entire range of managerial activit­
ies , including such matters as motivation , compensation, 
management appraisal , and control processes • After this, 
the plans should be reviewed and evaluated .
In this context , not only shipping companies but any 
kind of firm , usually goes through an annual cycle of 
planning in which plans are reviewed and revised • In 
turbulent markets such es the South American liner 
trades , the evaluation and review process must be 
carried out throughout shorter periods , in order to 
give a better :^ er''^ orm?noe to the fead-h^ck system ,
Then , what we have seen so far , are the m-in character­
istics that a traditional strategic planning model has 
in the two trades here considered • Mow , let us suppose 
that we should design a strategic planning yardstick 
according to the reruisites of each market , Then , we 
might have one model which could meet the needs of an 
open market , and other model into which a close market 
could probably fit •
One emphasizes management by strategy (exhibit 6,2.2) , 
and the other management by objectives (exhibit 5,2,3) . 
One focuses on what is feasible and the other focuses on 
what is desired ,
Obviously , the Exhibit 5.2,2 represents the sort of plan­
ning carried out in liner firms under close market rules , 
as well as a gap clearly revealing the limited extent 
held by the relevant strategies of the program ,
tXHIBIT 0.2.2 Strategic Planning model based on -GAP analysis
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EXHIBIT 6.2,3 Strategic Planning Model based on market strength and attroctiueness
A close liner market , either biletersl or not , is eIweys 
likely to face gep problems cjing to its own rigidity and 
lack of structure flexibility before a changing environment 
or turbulent trade .
The Exhibit 6,2.3 , has been designed to be used by liner 
comoanies under open market rules • If a company can echieve 
a certain dose of strength in attractive markets , it 
would register a superior performance ; but such a per­
formance can be positively carried out by means of the 
utilization of dynamic elements lacking of control , In 
this case , the coming up of a gap will be probably inter- 
oreted as a failure in the achievement of the goals of 
the organization , and not as a common and daily matter 
as it is considered in a close organization ,
We can set out the the Exhibit 6,2.2 is based upon static 
elements 'while the second exhibit deals with dynamic tools. 
Conclusions come up by themselves •
6 . 3 WORKING FIELD
One special characteristic that not only the Argentinean 
liner markets have , but also the South American liner 
trades is that normally , small and medium size liner 
firms can be found ooerating in these trades , specially 
those of smell size , as long as the large companies are 
just a feu in number and most of them state-owned , This 
means on the one hand , that most of the liner trades in 
this region are exploited by a substantial number of 
small-seized firms , and on the other hand that also these 
trades are shared in different percentages by the state- 
-owned large-seized companies .
Despite the fact that both the small and the large firms 
are operating and competing each other , they count upon 
different organizational structures and ways of operating 
in the oarticular markets , mainly owing to their sizes
rationalizationand consec^uently the leek of 
■'\s u/e have seen before , e strategic nlanning system 
ray differ quite e lot from an open to a close market 
and such an oscillation can be readily found among large 
and small organizations as well , particularly when ue 
look upon the South American environm.ent uhich is 
presently facing a growing cycle of economic stagnation 
together with what is known as market turbulences •
So in order to stress even more the concept of oscil­
lation just mentioned , we can have a quick look at 
the .main existing differences among large and small 
firms regarding their organization structures , in 
order to bring about additional positive reasons for 
implementing globally the strategic planning standards. 
According to what can be noticed in the Exhibit 5,3.1 
cn the next page , we can set out that the common 
characteristics of a small comnany suggest much more 
looseness , flexibility , and informality than typify 
a large company . Also , the role in planning of the 
chief executive obviously is considerably different 
between the two . Important differences in planning 
between the large and small firms can also be found in 
the i,~y goals are established and communicated , how 
the environment is aopraised and used in planning and 
decision making , how subordinate mcinagers and staff 
relcte to top management , and hou operational plans 
are linked to strategic plans .
In small firms the planning system may be much simpler 
solely because few people are involved and operations 
are less complex than in large organizations , Chief 
executives of small firms also may and often are so 
hard pressed to deal with current problems that little 
time is left to engage in strategic thinking , In larger 
companies the availability of staff makes it oossible 
for chief executives to spend more time and thought on 
strategic questions .
SMALL cnMPANY LAHGE COMPA^ JY
1 ) Chief executiue is basically an cntreprcnuer.
2 ) Most important decisions made at top •
3 ) 'olorkers and top managers in frequent and 
close contact .
Lines of authority end rnsponcihility 
loosely defined . Titles moon little ,
5 ) Communications largely face to face , 
oral and unspecified •
6) Staff functions are weak and poorly 
defined •
7 ) Top managers personally check employee 
performance • Few statistical control ,
8) Operations not too complex ,
1) Chief executive is a team leader and 
skilled at conflict resolution ,
2 ) Many important decisions made at lower 
levels •
3 ) Middle managers no often bypassed by 
workers and lower level managers •
a ) Generally , authority flows from title, 
not personality , ' .
5 ) Standard procedures are followed .
B) Staff function expanded and expertise 
respected «
7 ) Formal and impersonal statistical 
controls established and used .
8) Very complex operations .
EXHIBIT 6.3,1 : structural characteristics of small and large companies
The vieys in ujhich large companies are organized uiill 
influence olanning systems . A compcny that is centrally 
organized and deals with s single business , such as an 
insurance company or a public utility , uill have a 
comparatively simpler system than a company with decentral­
ized profit centers dealing in multiple , unrelated 
businesses .
*de can also say that complexity of environment importantly 
influences systems design , Companies faced uith a 
comparatively stable environment in which competition is 
weak will tend to do little olanning and if they do it 
will tend to be formal and ritualistic , On the other 
hand , an organization faced I'ith a turbulent environment 
in ij'hich competition is severe will tend to have strategic 
olanning but will design it to be flexible and more inf­
ormal ,
Then , we might readily affirm , that since the Argentinean 
trades ore exploited by a considerable num.ber of smell 
liner firms which are already dealing with the typical 
characteristics of the turbulent markets , there is no 
reason to believe thet a strategic olanning, system would 
not be a helpful element to improve the functioning of 
both the macro and the micro-variables of these trades .
The implementation of such a system , properly combined 
with a gradual opening of the particular markets , would 
definitely lead to reach a better managerial performance , 
to improve the technological devices , to foster the 
gradual growth and development of the ex-close trades , 
to settle a new positive trend as regards the interdepend­
ency of markets , to promote managerial innovation and to 
improve the overall efficiency of the trades concerned .
A planning method by no means can achieve all these goals 
unless it is joined by a gradual ooening toward the 
national , regional and international competition . lAost 
companies are in a favorable position so as to develop a 
nlanning method : they are small in size and fast in the
decision npking orocess . Such a structural shift uculd 
oblige the large state-owned companies to revise their 
orocedures and policies in order to face the new compet­
itive environment without having to ask for more sub­
sidies , and with the only purpose to compete in equal 
terms with smeller firms ,
Anyway , we may well set out that , since a turbulent 
market demands a quick planning and decision process , 
the small firms are far better outfitted to deal with 
turbulent environments than the large firms ; therefore ,
3 strategic planning system could be of great help in 
achieving mar';et goals in small firms , although not 
that much in large liner companies .
''lost com.panies , as ue stated earlier , are small in 
size while just a few are large organizations . There- 
.fore , since a planning system could be readily adaptable 
to a small firm not only because its organizational 
structure requires it but also because the market demands 
it , such a system could perfectly drive the growth and 
devalooment of liner shipping trades whenever there is a 
certain tendency toward the economic opening of the ore- 
sent close and regulated marine trades . Such an opening 
trend together with a planning method , and provided that 
3 certain economic reactivation has taken place under the 
scope of the imports substitution program and the strategic 
adm.inistration  ^ is very likely to lead steadily to both 
the improvement of the overall efficiency of the liner 
trades and the reestablishment of the competition at 
international standards •
Now , from the managerial standpoint there are a number 
of points whereby we could reach the conclusion that any 
kind of strategic planning , undertaken and adapted to the 
real circumstances of the markets , would benefit the whole 
process : starting with the economic issues set out through­
out the first chapters , and ending with the managerial
themes .
To end this-chapter I would like to state the main 
concepts whereby I consider this sort of planning of 
top importance :
1) Strategic planning is indispensable to top management's 
effectively discharging its responsibilities .
2 ) Planning can simulate the future on paper , a practice 
that not only is comparatively inexpensive but als'o 
permits a company to make better decisions about what 
to do now about future opportunities and threats than 
waiting until events just happen , Planning itself 
clarifies the opportunities and threats th^t lie ahead 
for a ccmocny ,
3 ) Strategic planning is an effective way to look, at a 
business as a system and thereby prevent suboptimiza­
tion of the parts of the system at the exoense of the 
whole orcenization ,
4 ) Planning stimulates the development of appropriate 
company aims , which in turn are powerful motivators 
of neople ,
5 ) Planning provides a basis for measuring the performance 
of the entire conoany and its major parts .
S) Planning helps train managers as managers « It also 
helps build a managerial and staff capability that 
facilitate quick and proper response to new events •
7 ) Strategic planning systems provide,;an opportunity for 
people in organizations to contribute their talents to 
the decision-making process , thereby giving employees 
a sense of participation and satisfaction not otherwise 
easily achieved .
These are just a few reasons whereby , from the managerial 
standpoint , innovation and specialization goals are likely 
to be achieved , provided that , as I said before , a change
of attitude occurs re oar o'inn not only the freedcm of 
the liner trades but also the irneorts substitution and 
intern.-I diversification programs . Such a change is 
not supposed to reflect a shift in one of the sub-systems 
of the entire program , but a change combined uith its 
corresponding counterbalances on the part of the other 
sub-systems .
5 . h C D ^ i C L L ' S I C f i
'Je can state that strategic planning is the final 
necessary element to ba addec' to the systein in order 
to reach positive expansion rates of cargo-flouj end 
liner trades ,
Such an exoansion is likely to be accomplished pro­
vided that as I said in the previous chapter,, a 
certain correlation is maintained among all the 
variables of the process • One of this variables is 
the strategic planning policy , which added to the 
other elements in a nroper way , is very likely to 
give the last necessary strike so as to ensure a 
crad'uel turn toward levels of greater freedom and 
stronger competition •
Not only in Argentina but also in meet Latin American 
trades , t*^ G liner marl'.ets are operated by small liner 
firms under close maricet rules . Then , as soon as 
a gradual opening of the nar!<et takes place together 
with a regional econo'^ ic reactivation , a strategic 
planning rnethodolony must show up and start I'orking 
jointly with said concepts and u'ithout overlooking its 
relationship with the strategic administration basis •
The gradual opening of the liner markets will oblige 
shipping companies , regardless of the size , to 
undertake any sort of planning so cs to foresee in 
one way or another what such an opening will bring 
about ; and to this purpose there is no doubt that 
the smaller firms are better outfitted to deal with 
it , at least throughout the critical short run •
Such a process must be joined fundamentally by a new 
managerial current and by a general change of attitudes, 
from the very low levels until the heads of the relevant 
organizations .
If the strategic planning is not carried out according to 
the behavior of the other variables and respecting the
t h:
inc ■^ actors , the
difference that
omo marginals arc-
her nationals or
•’hole procpEo po on but uith
?  those rhioh are firr candidates to 
sst of the Latin American operate: 
sionals , and not a good
of both ragionals end foreigners , In this case , one of 
the targets 'uould be accomplished (expansion of the liner 
trades) , but in fact , the liouid benefits of such an
exoansion uill fly from the regional context to finish 
on the hands of the foreign operators .
Euen though this case should materialize , thus meaning 
anyuay a hard improvement as regards the overall efficiency, 
the '.'.'hole process vjould be partially and not totally 
achieved ,■ since the national and regional tonnage do 
not participate on that expansion , Hence ue can say 
that , strategic planning is definitely a strategic mean , 
and those ouners uhose strategies do not look forward the 
utilization of this system by the time the market opening 
takes place , are very likely to become marginals and to 
be loft out of the market before reaching the long run ,
That is uhy the opening end the adaptation must be gradual 
and not sudden ,
7 . - C3'''CLUSlDr.'S -.riD E^CCr^ r''’EN'~iATID\'S
'Je can start the ^inel conclusions by stating that a 
liner shipping devalopnent in Lctin America , by no 
means can be successfully carried out whenever it tries 
to become expanded by relying only on its potentiality 
and multiplier effects , as if it were a normal or stand­
ard domestic industry •
Such a strategy must be based upon the economic reactivat­
ion of the particular production units ; but in such a 
way that such reactivation should gather all the available 
variables or factors of nroduction cn a regional b-'^ sis , 
and not only on a national basis .Ue can affirm that before thinking of expanding the liner 
trades , what Larin America has to do is to mal<e such an 
expansion physically attainable p-nd economically '^ casiblc 
by suitably combinig the regional resources , so as to 
mcnufecturs with high econories of scale end'achieve grow­
ing export levels •• This -must he done regionally and 
should be regardsd es a useful future element as far as 
international shipping negotiations are concerned , since 
the mare liberal and larger a liner market is , the more 
will the chances cf dealing successfully with other liner 
trades be , in order to psrticipcte and share other 
markc'ts far located from the regional context ,
It should not be forgotten that as we said earlier , 
international shipping is a derived demand of the inter­
national trade . But such international trade , in the 
case of Latin America , must be looked upon as a regional 
trade which sooner or later , will enable regional liner 
owners to feel the symptoms of pressure of demand , pro­
vided that a well planned economic program seeking react­
ivation and regional expansion has been undertaken ,
Then , by no means a Latin American country can be 
singled out as capable of developing and becoming ex­
panded , including its liner cargoes end fleet , by
trussing only its economic potential and b’ithcut holding 
the essential support of a regional'economio program 
coriing from a Lauin Amsrioan rocioncl joint v/anture •
It is clear as bell , that in order to get the liner 
markets expanded , a gradual opening must come up so 
as to let the regional ouners to compete each other 
throughout a first stage , and to compete with foreign 
owners at a later period ,
This means on the other hand , that as long as foreign 
owners are allowed to come to the regional markets and 
compete on egual conditions , also the regional owners 
will be allowed to compete in foreign trades , thus 
chancing the present organizational structures of the
liner systems in Latin America . In other words , in
order to share something abroad , Latin America must 
be cr-parcd to share something at home . Dut evidently 
nothing can bo c^ 'ared at home if there is no economic
id davelopmant , ‘therefore in srdcr to
generate th^ rcoessary cargo flows , a regionalization 
progr£:m reems to be t^e most suitable mean ; and in 
order to rsaoh an unintarrupted rogicnal liner market
growth through the utilization of cargo flows , a 
nei' entr: preneurial nhilosophy must jtake over the 
prevciling'situ-tion so as to leave the floor to
concepts such as marl;et opening and interdependency, 
regional and foreign competition , managerial flexibil­
ity , strategic administration , strategic planning 
and others •
Once the economic reactivation takes place within a 
regional context , and together with it the cargo flows 
start rising both in. volume and value , the opening pro­
cess of the relevant markets must begin gradually so as 
to allow the regional liner 'operators to get used and 
prepare themselves to face the now market realities , 
which from the very beginning of the critical short run
ars E.'ip'actad lead to tha ottoinrrpnt of on 5-npro\/ed 
overall eff-icioncy ,
To let ths opening 'Process grov without mogor constro ints, 
the cu'^ lic sector interference must diminish crcportionelly 
to the increase of the opening degree until a level et 
which , such a participation can no longer be considered 
es an interference but as helpful element to set up the 
neu framework .
It should not be overlooked that the entire orocess could 
be counterworked be pretty negative effects if the manege- 
rial postulctss ore not properly understood and implemented.
As long as the opening process adva.nces , net only the 
regional but also the foreign competition will show up , 
thus turning the whole rr.erket into a graduel but safe 
comps'tition scheme..
During this process the regionel liner operators must 
adopt new managerial technics such as strategic planning 
and pdm.inietration , and start thinking of acquiring 
better technology to compote better outfitted and avoid 
becoming marginals , mainly owing to the presence of 
foreign competitors •
Competition will bring about a fall in r-tes and the 
liner firms will become gradually capitalized and much 
better prepared from a managerial standpoint . 
hut all this is possible just because tsn economic react­
ivation occured together with an economic opening trend , 
end because changes in management attitudes were timely 
adopted and strategically oriented •
I will end by saying thatthe two fundamental pillars in 
order to make liner shipping take off in Latin America 
are ;
-—  a regional economic reactivation
--  a new economic and managerial trend towards liberalization
and competition •
I personally cannot imagine other way ,
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